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What the Warrant Means: Justice, Peace, and the Key Actors in Sudan

Submitted by Pete Johnson on February 12, 2009 - 9:40am.
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Ocampo & BashirThe issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s sitting head of state for crimes against humanity offers the Obama administration a chance to catalyze multilateral efforts to bring about a solution to Sudan’s decades-long cycle of warfare. One of the crucial missing ingredients to conflict resolution efforts has been some form of accountability for the horrific crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated by the warring parties in Sudan, primarily the Khartoum regime.  Peace without justice in Sudan would only bring an illusion of stability, without addressing the primary forces driving the conflict.

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Enough Team
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Feb 12, 2009
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The issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s sitting head of state for crimes against humanity offers the Obama administration a chance to catalyze multilateral efforts to bring about a solution to Sudan’s decades-long cycle of warfare.  One of the crucial missing ingredients to conflict resolution efforts has been some form of accountability for the horrific crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated by the warring parties in Sudan, primarily the Khartoum regime.  Peace without justice in Sudan would only bring an illusion of stability without addressing the primary forces driving the conflict.

The decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court, or ICC, to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is unsurprising given the long pattern of profound abuses in Sudan directed from the highest echelons of government. Over the past several weeks, President Bashir has escalated violence in Darfur and increased human rights violations in Khartoum in a last-ditch effort to force the United Nations Security Council to defer the ICC’s investigation for one year “in the interest of peace.”1  However, as Enough argued when ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo requested the warrant in July 2008, the prior indictments of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic demonstrate that the pursuit of justice can be a catalyst for peace—if the international community stands resolutely behind efforts to promote accountability for genocide and crimes against humanity.2   The situation in Sudan is no different.  Senior officials within Bashir’s National Congress Party, or NCP, are deeply concerned about the possibility of further charges by the ICC, and a growing fissure between Bashir’s loyalists and potentially more pragmatic elements of the NCP could lead to the president’s removal.

To ensure that any potential leadership change within the regime will actually produce meaningful movement toward peace on the ground, the international community must fashion a firm and coordinated peace strategy conditioned on actions rather than words and policies rather than personalities. What should be clear to the international community, including the United States, is that President Bashir should be delivered to the court to face a fair trial on the charges against him. Furthermore, the international community needs to use multilateral diplomacy, well targeted pressures, and judicious incentives to bring both the NCP and Darfur’s rebel groups to the negotiating table, while making a major effort to revitalize the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, as part of a broader and more strategic peace effort for all of Sudan.

How the warrant affects the key actors in Sudan

Sudan is teetering on a dangerous precipice: Violence in Darfur is escalating and CPA implementation is faltering. An NCP-backed coup attempt in neighboring Chad seems increasingly likely. (Rebels supported by Khartoum have reached the capital N’Djamena twice already, in 2006 and 2008). The response of key actors in Sudan to the ICC’s move against Bashir is still obviously a work in progress, but the choices made in the coming weeks by the NCP, as well as the main rebel groups in Darfur, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, will have profound impact on the country’s future.  Understanding the calculations of these actors is fundamental to leveraging the arrest warrant into progress toward peace.

The National Congress Party

Sudan’s ruling NCP has faced substantial pressures both from within and without in anticipation of the warrant against Bashir. Internally, Bashir and his loyalists face growing opposition from a group led by Sudan’s Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha, its intelligence chief Salah Abdullah Gosh, and its energy minister Dr. Awad al-Jaz.  Tensions between the two camps have been mounting for months, and Gosh blames Bashir and his senior advisor Nafie Ali Nafie for Sudan’s increasing international isolation.

With the warrant now out in the open, this jostling between these two main factions will likely intensify and could split the party. Although Bashir, an army general, still commands loyalty within the regular armed forces, this rival alliance is represented by powerful actors in Sudan’s political, security, and economic sectors. Taha and Gosh bear significant responsibility for crimes against humanity committed during the regime’s 20-year rule, yet they have shown willingness to work with the international community. Taha was the NCP’s point person in negotiating the CPA, and Gosh has become the United States’ favored interlocutor on counterterrorism.  Within a ruling party increasingly focused on its own survival, Bashir may become a sacrificial lamb for a party in search of more pragmatic leadership.

Externally, Bashir’s efforts to force a deferral of the ICC investigation have run aground, and the new Obama administration has already raised the possibility of additional punitive measures against the regime. The African Union, the Arab League, and China have all maintained vocal support for a deferral, but the United States’ outspoken opposition has effectively neutralized these efforts.

Furthermore, the recent government attacks in Darfur have made it difficult for even some of Bashir’s most loyal allies to use their typical arguments while seeking to defer justice.  In the weeks leading up to the arrest warrant, some of the regime’s most stalwart allies already began distancing themselves from Khartoum. Most important is Egypt, which for years used its influence in the Arab League to rally support for Bashir’s government. However, relations between the two countries have cooled since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak met Bashir in Khartoum in November 2008. According to Sudanese officials, Mubarak called Bashir to task for failing to implement the CPA and for driving the South toward independence, a situation that would complicate maintaining the uninterrupted flow of the Nile River, Egypt’s main interest in Sudan.  Mubarak also voiced concerns that the Sudanese Islamist movement is the gravest security threat in the region, and blamed the Sudanese government for instability in Chad, and the continued predations of the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA.  If Egypt expresses a willingness to accept new leadership in Khartoum, other allies in the Arab world will likely follow suit, further weakening Bashir’s internal position.

Given these internal and external pressures as well as the regime’s historic patterns of behavior, there are three likely scenarios for how the NCP will react to the indictment:

Scenario one—President Bashir opts for confrontation with the international community:  By intensifying the aggressive crackdown in Darfur that he began in Muhajiriya in advance of the warrant, increasing aerial bombardments of civilians, restricting or expelling humanitarians and peacekeepers, stepping up support for Chadian rebels, threatening to withdraw from the CPA, or backtracking on counterterrorism cooperation, Bashir could force the international community to take more assertive action or back down.  At the same time, Bashir could work internally to assert firm control of the NCP by jailing opponents, imposing martial law, and increasing military presence in Khartoum and elsewhere.  While many humanitarians and U.N. officials have expressed deep concerns about this scenario, it is important to note that such maximalist behavior by Bashir would only serve to further galvanize international support for decisive action against his government.

Scenario two—Internal pressure forces Bashir from office: Given the mounting pressure from within, Bashir could decide to peacefully step aside and cede control to a new NCP candidate, who would participate in the upcoming national elections. Alternatively, rivals within the party could attempt to take power by force. Salah Gosh is one of the strongest advocates for removing Bashir, and Sudan is no stranger to coup d’états. However, Bashir has reportedly told Gosh that he may step down if the divisions within the NCP become irreconcilable. Some Sudanese officials have cited the possibility of exile in Saudi Arabia, which is not a party to the ICC. The new leadership of the NCP could then adopt a more pragmatic approach to the international community by negotiating an end to the war in Darfur and recommitting itself—although unenthusiastically—to the CPA. Bashir’s peaceful departure would undoubtedly be in the best interests of the NCP and the country as a whole, but some Bashir loyalists have threatened to kill Vice President Ali Osman Taha if any attempt is made to remove Bashir from power. Here again, it is important to note that after charges were brought against both Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milosevic much was made of the fact that there was no clear mechanism to deliver them to The Hague—yet that is exactly where both men eventually found themselves. This was in large part because in both cases loyalists recognized the increasingly steep cost of resisting international norms on an issue as fundamental as crimes against humanity.

Scenario three—Bashir stalls for time: After years of what the new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice calls “bluster and retreat,” by the international community, Bashir may well calculate that the pressure arising from the arrest warrant will eventually dissipate. The NCP has weathered heavy external pressure in the past and survived by exploiting the inherent divisions in the international community. It may be entirely possible that Bashir, rather than take dramatic action in response to the warrant, will bide his time, and commit the bulk of his energy and resources to facing internal challenges.

The Darfur rebel groups

Bashir’s indictment fundamentally alters the context for Darfur’s rebel groups, presenting a rare opportunity for the more politically savvy groups in the region to gain some legitimacy at the expense of the regime. Darfur’s most significant rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, supports the issuance of an arrest warrant.  At the same time, however, Mr. Ocampo is pursuing cases against the rebels, and the leaders of the JEM and the various factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, or SLA, have to weigh their support of a warrant for Bashir against the possibility that they are potentially subject to a similar fate.

Given the JEM’s dominant military and political status vis-à-vis the other rebel groups, its response to the warrant will strongly influence other rebels.  The JEM’s recent behavior—renewed military offensives, bellicose threats against the government, and overtures to the international community—suggests that the rebels are keeping their options open.  Although the JEM took control of Muhajiriya, South Darfur, by force in late January, the rebels withdrew when Khartoum requested that peacekeepers from the joint United Nations/African Union mission, or UNAMID, leave the area and threatened to level the town. Afterward, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim met in the Chadian capital N’Djamena with a senior UNAMID official and stated that the JEM is “willing to establish a working relationship with UNAMID for the protection of civilians.”3  

The JEM’s gesture toward UNAMID, a recent JEM visit to the United States (at the invitation of the outgoing Bush administration), and its decision to participate in “talks about talks” in Qatar suggest a broad effort to present itself as a credible political actor. However, the JEM continues to warn of greater military action down the road, including another attack on Khartoum if Bashir’s indictment leads to “chaos.”4  Although government forces routed the rebels when they attacked the Khartoum suburb of Omdurman last May, the JEM could seek to rally support for a new offensive meant to remove a president charged with war crimes from power. Provoking a heavy-handed response from the Sudanese government could also be a way to force external actors—particularly the United States—to increase pressure on the regime and potentially take military action to protect civilians against wholesale casualties.  Generating a threat of force from the international community to buttress one’s own strength is nothing new: The Kosovo Liberation Army used this tactic to great effect during the run-up to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.
    
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

The SPLM is largely in reactive mode, and senior officials within the party disagree on the possible effect of the arrest warrant. Salva Kiir, the president of the Government of Southern Sudan and Sudan’s first vice president in the national unity government, is deeply concerned that Bashir’s indictment signals the end of the CPA. Other SPLM officials are optimistic that second Vice President Ali Osman Taha will remove Bashir and recommit the NCP to CPA implementation.  Taha’s influence has diminished since the death of SPLM leader John Garang, and the NCP has sought to undermine CPA implementation. Yet many within the SPLM believe that Taha understands the importance of the CPA to the survival of his party, and that he will make some sacrifices—as he did while negotiating the CPA—to keep the deal on track. If Bashir were to step down, the new NCP leadership would have to work with the SPLM to reorganize the government of national unity, which an interim president would lead until elections and the formation of a new government.

Next steps for the Obama administration

Although no one can accurately predict how various actors in Sudan will respond to the warrant for Bashir, the international community, including the Obama administration can—through effective multilateral diplomacy, a willingness to call Bashir’s bluff, and practical steps to increase pressure on Khartoum in pursuit of a comprehensive peace deal that includes both Darfur and revitalized CPA implementation—make the pursuit of peace the most attractive option for the NCP and Darfur’s rebel groups. The Obama administration’s response to the immediate challenge posed by the warrant should take into account the calculations and possible scenarios discussed above, but it should also flow from answers to broader and more strategic questions: What is the end game? What is the overall strategic goal? And what level of force is the administration and its allies willing to use, if the Sudanese government chooses to escalate confrontation? Answering these big picture questions up front is fundamental since many of the tactical responses to the situation on the ground and arrest warrant could inexorably lead to a much higher stakes game.

A comprehensive policy approach to Sudan must include several components:
 

  • Consistent high-level diplomacy: Given the scale and complexity of the crisis in Sudan, the president should appoint a special envoy to serve as the United States’ point person on Sudan policy and lead U.S. efforts to forge a multilateral coalition that supports more robust measures to help end the war in Darfur and ensure full implementation of the CPA. This envoy must have direct access to President Obama, and appropriate staff and resources, including authority over the State Department’s Sudan Programs Group. This envoy would need a dedicated team and sufficient resources to carry out his or her work.
  • Firm messaging to the NCP: Messages should be conveyed to the key actors within the NCP both publicly and privately. In terms of public messages, the administration should make it clear that it fully supports justice and accountability for Darfur’s genocide, and will not tolerate any obstruction of aid efforts, deployment of UNAMID, or implementation of the CPA. There will be consequences for such actions that will directly affect the leadership of those entities party to the conflict. Behind-the-scenes, the United States must make clear that continued attacks on civilians or peacekeepers, the anticipated proxy coup attempt in Chad, or efforts to cut off humanitarian aid will be viewed as a major escalation of hostilities by Khartoum and will be treated as such by Washington and its allies. Any credible peace effort will demand an unconditional ceasefire and a peace deal in Darfur that includes accountability mechanisms broadly acceptable to Darfuri citizens, real movement on CPA implementation, and the demonstrable return of large numbers of Darfuri IDPs and refugees to a secure environment.
  • Firm messaging to the rebels: The Obama administration should make clear to Darfur’s rebel groups that it and the international community will apply a common set of standards to all sides of the Darfur conflict. The U.S. envoy should make clear to JEM and others that the international community will hold rebels accountable for crimes against humanity and that attempts to provoke external intervention will be met with consequences.
  • Contingency planning: The Obama administration must take steps to detach humanitarian and peacekeeping operations from dependence on Khartoum. Contingency plans should be established to reposition all non-life-saving personnel, and to provide life- saving programs in non-permissive environments.  The United States should consider providing air assets and logistical support to facilitate these steps if needed, and Washington’s allies should consider similar measures. Too often, UNAMID has been left in the position of pleading with the Sudanese government and rebels not to be a target of attacks. UNAMID should be in a position to respond with decisive force to provocations from any side and to effectively protect civilians. Until it can meet those basic standards, it cannot be considered an effective peacekeeping mission.
  • Clear consequences: The international community should establish clear consequences if Sudan fails to deliver Bashir to justice. These measures should include rapid escalation of targeted sanctions, an expanded arms embargo, imposition of an oil blockade on Port Sudan, and targeted airstrikes against air assets used by the regime for offensive military operations, with escalating strikes against military and government installations if there is continued intransigence. To that end, the Obama administration should task Pentagon and NATO planners with developing options for a multinational force to carry out the military options outlined above. Such a force could also temporarily buttress UNAMID by providing the robust command-and-control capabilities UNAMID currently lacks and badly needs.
  • Direct diplomacy with the SPLM: Although more robust measures aimed at Khartoum carry risks to the CPA, the United States ought to reaffirm its commitment to southern self-determination and take advantage of the SPLM’s role in the national unity government to encourage more pragmatic elements within the NCP to step forward.
  • Deeper engagement with China:  The Obama administration should engage more deeply with the Chinese to make clear that the U.S. goal in Sudan is stability and lasting peace—goals which Beijing should also support and which the two countries could work together to secure.  An American envoy should invite closer collaboration between the United States and China in support of Darfur peace and CPA implementation. Bashir is increasingly an obstacle to those goals and his behavior risks creating more danger and instability for the international community.

An historic choice

The situation in Darfur is changing daily, and it is impossible to predict what will occur in the immediate post-warrant period within the ranks of the NCP and among the key rebel factions. One thing, however, is certain: This is a moment of opportunity during which the United States has a crucially important choice to make.  It can help lead the international community in the pursuit of a credible and strategic approach to peace and justice, or it can let the situation worsen absent serious pressure from outside actors. Now is the time for the Obama administration to follow through on its promises to end the crisis in Darfur and lead international efforts toward a peaceful future in Sudan.

Endnotes

1 Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” The Sudanese government so far has failed in getting Security Council support for a 12-month suspension of the investigation, in large part because of the dismal situation on the ground in Darfur and the government’s lack of seriousness in addressing the peace process.
2 See Enough’s strategy paper by John Norris, John Prendergast, and David Sullivan, “The Merits of Justice” (July 2008).
3 See ReliefWeb, “UNAMID JSR Adada meets with JEM Chairman in N’Djamena, Chad,” February 5, 2009.
4 See “Darfur JEM claims free reign in the region, warns government,” Sudan Tribune, January 31, 2009

To the Referendum and Beyond: South Sudan’s Lesser Known Flashpoints

Submitted by Ana Brzezinska on July 29, 2010 - 11:38am.
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Field DispatchIn less than six months, the people of southern Sudan will vote in a self-determination referendum that is expected to result in the secession of the South roughly a year from now. The dynamics shaping the historic and dramatic changes in Sudan are fluid, yet some of the core issues facing southern Sudan will endure regardless of the outcome of the referendum. Because these issues are likely to be flashpoints for conflict within the South in the years to come, international actors engaged in Sudan must now closely monitor and address them during the pre-referendum period. In her last field dispatch for Enough, southern Sudan field researcher Maggie Fick identifies some of these key, lesser recognized, flashpoints.

Author: 
Maggie Fick
Jul 29, 2010

In less than six months, the people of southern Sudan will vote in a self-determination referendum that is expected to result in the secession of the South roughly a year from now. The dynamics shaping the historic and dramatic changes in Sudan are fluid, yet some of the core issues facing southern Sudan will endure regardless of the outcome of the referendum. Because these issues are likely to be flashpoints for conflict within the South in the years to come, international actors engaged in Sudan must now closely monitor and address them during the pre-referendum period. In her last field dispatch for Enough, southern Sudan field researcher Maggie Fick identifies some of these key, lesser recognized, flashpoints.

Unity Poster

Photo Credit/Maggie Fick

JUBA, Southern Sudan—While it may be taboo in international capitals to speak frankly about the results of the looming self-determination referendum before the vote actually occurs, here in the southern Sudanese capital, it seems unrealistic, even naïve, not to acknowledge the widely shared sentiment of southerners. To use a phrase I’ve frequently heard in my time here: “The South is going.” In other words, the people of southern Sudan widely favor independence. I have learned that perceptions in southern Sudan often shape—even directly impact—reality here. Based on recent conversations with Sudanese and internationals in Sudan, the following are some of the flashpoints and factors that seem likely to have a destabilizing impact on the South in the near future.
 
Managing sky-high expectations
Southerners have endured decades of war and internal conflict accompanied by death, displacement, and enormous suffering. It is to be expected that many hope to enjoy better and more peaceful lives as citizens of an independent South rather than as citizens of Sudan in its current construction. Indeed, holding out hope for a brighter future sustained many southerners throughout the brutal war and has continued to sustain them through the challenges that have plagued the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, since 2005. Unfortunately, this hope—or rather, expectations built on this hope—could pose a serious threat to stability and security in the South following the referendum.
 
Many southerners believe that their lives will be dramatically altered by the referendum and that life on the day after the vote will be vastly improved.  The “lag time” between the referendum in January 2011 and the end of the CPA’s interim period in July 2011, which, according to the CPA, would also mark the official independence of the South, should the southerners vote for separation in the referendum, is in itself a chance for tensions to build further in anticipation of independence. However, the more significant lag time is likely to occur between independence and the delivery of even the most basic of services that a government must provide.
 
It is unrealistic to expect that the Government of Southern Sudan will quickly or easily transition into a highly functioning and responsive government with the capacity to extend services throughout the South’s vast and remote territory. The government has done very little to account or explain to its citizens why crucial infrastructure such as roads and basic services such as health clinics are still rare more than five years after the peace agreement was signed. Nor can the ruling Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement, or SPLM, provide effective security for the citizens of the region. If the post-election period has been any indication, the diverse array of internal threats facing the South are beyond the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan or its security forces to respond to, and international interventions to bolster this capacity have not succeeded in stabilizing the most volatile areas nor in helping to address the fundamental security dilemmas of the South. The Juba-based government must find the time and resources in the aftermath of the referendum—when negotiations with the National Congress Party, or NCP, are likely to be at a fever pitch—to communicate to its citizenry that an independent southern Sudan will not instantly be capable of delivering security, stability, and the “peace dividends” that both the NCP and SPLM promised to provide to all Sudanese citizens when the CPA was signed.
 
A lack of information among populations at the grassroots level, and particularly along Sudan’s North-South border, is another potential trigger for conflict. A vacuum of information about crucial questions such as citizenship and grazing rights could easily be manipulated by spoilers into a platform for misinformation among disenfranchised local populations. Proxy warfare, a tactic used to great effect by the NCP in its wars throughout Sudan, has long been a feature of the enduring tensions in Abyei. Astride the North-South border and shared by two groups that have strong and opposing loyalties to the governments of the North and South, Abyei is emblematic of how tensions between political elites in Khartoum and Juba frequently manifest in violent clashes between local communities at Sudan’s periphery.
Photo Credit/Maggie Fick
 
Disaffected Youth
A passionate southern Sudanese women’s rights leader once told me that the young men and women of southern Sudan do not have a reason to believe in politics, because they have never seen a positive example of how government can improve the lives of people. Youth in southern Sudan still have reason to hope that life in an independent South will provide them with new opportunities and that the government will make good on its promises. Changing the fundamental realities for youth, however, will mean addressing complex issues such as the loss of traditional livelihoods, the challenges of urbanization for a largely rural population, and the deficiencies in the current education system, to name a few. Young people may lose hope if the government of the newly independent South does not quickly begin to show signs of working to address these challenges.
 
At this moment, there is one clear incentive for youth to resist picking up the readily available arms and engaging in banditry or other forms of violence: the referendum and the prospect of independence. But after the referendum, if it becomes clear to the average young person that life is not going to change for the better anytime soon, youth may choose to come together based on shared tribal, economic, or political interests, with potentially serious consequences for security in the fledgling state. One feature of war-time violence in the South was the use of proxy youth militias by both the NCP and the SPLM, and there are already signs of resurgent, well-armed youth movements mobilizing in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. Given the divisive, often violent nature of politics and inter-communal dynamics in these states, the additional X factor of discontent youth must not be ignored.
 
Various international donors, NGOs, and the United Nations are already working to engage youth living in the South’s historically tense and remote areas—along the state border of Jonglei and Upper Nile, and in Abyei, for example—but international interventions are not enough. The Government of Southern Sudan must also take responsibility for its future generations by investing in its youth and providing them with the chance to become leaders, instead of spoilers. The efforts of the United Nations and other actors to support and empower youth will have a more lasting impact if they are developed in close partnership with relevant government institutions like the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation and the Community Security and Small Arms Control bureau. It is imperative that young men and women begin to see their own government—instead of internationals—taking the lead in providing security, services, and opportunities to its people.
 
Centralization and Abuse of Government Power at the Local Level
It is sometimes difficult to generalize about the political and security dynamics of southern Sudan because of the inherently local nature of these dynamics in particular areas of the South. The localized nature of southern politics, however, is not only related to the geographical, historical, and tribal specificities of various regions, from the Equatorian states to the region formerly known as Greater Upper Nile. It is also linked to the way in which the decentralized model of government in southern Sudan, implemented through the 10 state governments formed during the CPA’s interim period, has enabled local administrative authorities and politicians to exercise significant power within their particular domains. For example, state governors, depending on their political influence at the Juba level, their history during the war, and the level of loyalty they wield among SPLA field commanders in the state, have proven capable of turning entire states into personal fiefdoms.
 
While decentralization of power from the Juba capital-level is essential, a consequence of this governance model to date has been that certain state government officials have used their power to disproportionately promote their interests within their area of authority. As I discussed in a recent field dispatch, the heavy-handed responses of some state government leaders to the challenges posed to their authority during the elections have already begun to generate hostility among certain constituencies. This hostility and discontent is poised to increase following the referendum, potentially in the form of more political-military uprisings of the sort that have plagued the southern government in the aftermath of the elections.
 
Efforts planned by the Obama administration to extend the U.S. government’s reach in southern Sudan by deploying American foreign service officers to state capitals will be energy well spent for many reasons, not least because it is  impossible to understand the dynamics at play in the South’s vast peripheral regions merely from observing the situation from Juba. Sustained interaction by the U.S. consulate in Juba with the state governments throughout the South will complement existing USAID-funded government capacity building efforts and promote accountability among these local bodies. In the aftermath of the referendum, this local focus will be even more crucial, as local rivalries are likely to build in intensity over the prospect of access to the spoils of the newly independent state.
 
The “Juba Disconnect”
All of the potential sparks for internal southern conflict highlighted above are linked to a fundamentally dangerous issue that is likely to plague the southern government for years, if not decades, to come, if serious and sustained efforts are not taken by the government itself to change its ways. The “elite deal-making” that has characterized relations between the NCP and the SPLM during the five and a half years of CPA implementation has effectively cut the most Sudanese citizens out of the peace-building process,  even while leaders continue to make lofty promises about an inclusive system of governance in Sudan that will deliver “peace dividends” to its diverse peoples. Neither the NCP nor the SPLM have kept these promises, but it should be noted that the SPLM’s efforts to implement the CPA have frequently been stymied by the NCP.
 
The SPLM-led government will have the chance following the referendum to change these dynamics by breaking from the Sudanese tradition of elite politicians ruling with little consultation or regard for the citizenry. The government in Juba must make genuine efforts to reconnect with its peoples at the grassroots level: in remote areas of the South that remain inaccessible during the rainy season because there are no roads connecting them to central towns, in areas where insecurity from the Lord’s Resistance Army and other threats prevent NGOs from bringing aid and supplies, and even in small clusters of huts mere kilometers outside of Juba, where people displaced by cattle raiding and other conflicts struggle to feed their families.
 
The single best thing that the southern government can do to prevent conflict and promote peaceful interactions between its peoples in the months and years following the referendum is to show its citizens—through actions, not words—that the government is trying to bring a new style of governance to Sudan, modeled after the “New Sudan” envisioned by Dr. John Garang. The good news is that the people of southern Sudan are committed to building this “New Sudan” because they have fought for decades for the chance for self-determination. Utilizing this hope, strength, and determination by empowering citizens to have a stake in this process will enable the southern Sudanese government to better address the daunting challenges ahead.
 

Share Your Enough Moment

Posted by Enough Team on Jul 29, 2010

In their forthcoming book, The Enough Moment, John Prendergast and Don Cheadle present the stories of celebrities, activists and survivors who have dedicated their lives to advocating for human rights in Africa. It all begins with an "Enough Moment" -- an experience in your life when you realize you have to stand up, speak out, and organize with others on vital human rights issues in Africa.

The book hits stores Sept. 7, but you don’t have to wait to share your own Enough Moment. We’re interested in hearing your story now, so we’re gathering video versions of personal Enough Moments.

Just begin the video by introducing yourself: Tell us your name, where you live, and what you do. In three minutes or less, describe how you are involved in fighting for human rights in Africa, and the moment in your life that prompted you to take action.

Most importantly, be yourself. Film your video in a simple, natural environment. It's just you, on camera, sharing your story.

Want to see an example? Here's Enough's own Mari Wright sharing her Enough Moment.

When you're finished with your video, upload it to YouTube with the tag "enoughmoment." Please title it “[your name]’s Enough Moment.” For example, John would title his video “John Prendergast’s Enough Moment.” Finally, email the link to us at yourmoment@enoughproject.org.

Later this summer, we'll be launching a special Web site, www.enoughmoment.org, where your video will appear alongside other Enough Moments from celebrities, activists, and survivors.

To learn more about the book and to pre-order your own copy, click here.

Thank you, and we look forward to hearing about your Enough Moment.

Preparations Stall for Landmark Votes On Sudan's Future

Posted by Amanda Hsiao on Jul 28, 2010

Five months and 11 days until Sudan is set to hold critically important votes for both the South and Abyei, much remains to be done. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon emphasized the desperate need to speed things up in his latest report on Sudan: “I urge the parties to recognize that the pending issues outlined must be addressed immediately in order for the referendum to be conducted within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement time frame.”

Here’s a quick look at the status of some of the remaining, major provisions in the CPA:

Post-referendum negotiations: Though the format of, and parties involved in the negotiations have been identified, substantive negotiations have not officially begun. Originally set to begin this past Tuesday, Ajras al-Hurriya, a pro-SPLM paper, quoted Pagan Amum saying talks are postponed to August 7. Amum is the South’s Minister for Peace and CPA Implementation and a lead negotiator for the South in post-referendum talks.

Referenda: The Abyei Referendum Commission has yet to be formed—an alarming seven-month delay that has led to concern and tension among the population in the oil-rich area. The commission is the body charged with managing the vote that will allow Abyei residents to decide whether they want to be part of the North or the South, if South Sudan secedes. The appointment of the commission has stalled on the question of who will be chairperson, an individual who will have considerable influence over defining voter eligibility, a controversial issue that will have large consequences on the vote’s outcome.

According to the secretary general’s report, both the North and South Sudanese governments want the U.N. to take on an expanded role in the conduct of the two referendums. A joint request from the two Sudanese parties detailing what this role would look like is forthcoming – Ban says he hopes soon. In the meantime, UNMIS is hoping to bolster its presence across the South in advance of the referendum, with plans to deploy small teams at the county level.

Popular consultations: Secretary General Ban reports that there has been no substantive progress on the implementation of popular consultations in Southern Kordofan – legislative elections have to take place before the process can begin. Elections will be held after a new state census is conducted; currently, the state is waiting for census results from the Central Bureau of Statistics. In Blue Nile, the popular consultation process is underway. The consultations are an opportunity for the states’ populations to give their view on the CPA and its implementation, though the specifics of how, and what will come of those opinions, are not specified in the peace agreement.

Border demarcation: An official on the joint technical border committee tasked with demarcating the North-South border was recently quoted as saying that demarcation cannot be accomplished by the set referendum date. The committee has just adjourned its activities until October because of logistical challenges related to the rainy season. 
 

Photo: Abyei town (AP)

Vying for Leadership at the Expense of Peace

Posted by Policy team member on Jul 27, 2010

The U.N. Security Council is meeting today to discuss a recent report by United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the peacekeeping force in Darfur. The report warned of the potentially grave impact nationwide of a stalled peace process for Darfur. "Without an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur, as South Sudan heads towards a referendum on its future status, there is a risk of increasing instability in Sudan,” the secretary general wrote. The report details numerous reasons why the process is faltering; however, media reports and impressions gathered from meetings and conversations suggest that leadership of the process is one of the major hurdles.

A senior official from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, Yasir Arman, recently announced that southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir has offered to serve as a mediator for the Darfur peace process. Arman stated that the president’s involvement had been invited by the A.U.-U.N. chief mediator, Djibril Bassolé, with the hope that his intervention could break the current deadlock. Although Arman asserts that Kiir is, “the only person who can talk to both parties,” signs thus far from Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party indicate that the idea will be rejected.

This latest development comes on the heels of a meeting called by UNAMID chief Ibrahim Gambari in El Fasher, North Darfur, in which tensions among the senior international principals to the negotiations were starkly revealed. While the meeting’s attendees included envoys from China, Russia, and the European Union (among others), as well as high level U.N. representatives, glaringly missing from the proceedings were the special envoys to Sudan from the U.S., the U.K., and France. Although these envoys all reportedly had genuine scheduling conflicts, there have been rumors that when they asked whether the meeting could be rescheduled to accommodate them, Gambari refused. The Sudan Tribune, which initially reported on the envoys’ absence, suggested that it was tied to a sense of competition among the key international players in the Darfur peace process.

While the details of what happened in the run-up to the meeting may differ from what has been rumored, the tensions among the international leaders are undoubtedly real. The rifts that have taken place between Gambari and some of the envoys have been noted in articles and conversations in recent months, as have tensions between Djibril Bassolé, chief mediator for Darfur, and Thabo Mbeki, head of the A.U. High-Level Implementation Panel, which is currently trying to secure a peaceful transition for all of Sudan. In both cases, the tensions seem to be the direct result of what can only be termed as “turf wars.” Gambari seems to want to play a more substantial role in the process, while Bassolé feels as if Mbeki is intentionally encroaching upon the mediator’s territory. Meanwhile, U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration, who has butted heads repeatedly with the other leaders working on a political settlement, now seems to be carving out a role in the post-conflict development realm – he recently returned from Darfur, where he looked at early recovery efforts already underway, according to a blog post ahead of the trip. It is difficult, at this point, to say where Kiir might fit into this dynamic, but safe to assume that adding another mediator to the mix won’t go over well with all of the other players.

Unfortunately, all this tension over who is most fit to lead the peace process has detracted from what is most important here: the peace process itself. While all of these international leaders fight to be the most important man at the table, the Doha process remains in tatters: the Justice and Equality Movement has abandoned talks all together and is clashing with the government in pockets throughout Darfur; there are rumors that the Liberty and Justice Movement may also be abandoning the talks, due to the arrest of some civil society leaders expected to travel to Doha; and the civil society talks are making little progress. 

The inability of the international community to exercise the leverage necessary to bring the parties to the conflict back to the negotiating table is directly tied to its internal squabbling. Lack of consensus over who should lead, and how, directly impacts how the parties to the conflict view the international actors and their commitment to seeing a sustainable peace in the region. Furthermore, it creates more opportunities for the parties to the conflict to manipulate what is left of the process, making future negotiation that much more difficult.

The primary goal of these leaders should therefore be to coordinate among themselves and unify around the goal of pushing all parties to return to negotiations. This would demonstrate to the Sudanese parties that all the members of the international community want the same thing and will work together to ensure that they get it – a powerful message indeed.

 

Photo: A.U.-U.N. chief mediator Djibril Bassolé at the Darfur peace talks in Qatar, 2009 (AP)

Why We Should Care About the Congo

Posted by Enough Team on Jul 26, 2010

This post originally appeared on Huffington Post.

Deep in the mountains that separate the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Rwanda, largely hidden from public view, a war has been raging for the past 14 years. In this gruesome conflict, rape is frequently the weapon of choice, and a wide array of armed groups with many different patrons fight mercilessly for control of mineral riches.

There is no easy solution to ending the war in Congo, which has claimed more than five million lives, making it the most lethal conflict since World War II. But the Wall Street reform legislation signed into law by President Obama includes a far-reaching provision designed to reduce the horrific violence. Building on the work of a coalition of a dozen major humanitarian organizations and industry pioneers, the bill establishes a new mechanism that will limit the ability of armed groups to profit from the illicit mining and sale of cassiterite, coltan, and wolframite and other "conflict minerals."

My colleagues and I have been working for months to pass this provision, and by partnering with the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Barney Frank, and several other key allies in the House and Senate, including Rep. McDermott and Senators Brownback, Dodd, Durbin, and Feingold, we were able to secure broad, bipartisan support for a requirement that companies doing business in the Congo and adjoining countries disclose both the provenance of the minerals they use and the efforts they have taken to ensure that their dollars do not directly or indirectly support armed groups that employ rape as a tool of war and otherwise perpetuate the conflict.

Let there be no mistake: this is only one critical step of many that must be taken to stop one of the world's longest running wars. But it is a major step.

To be effective, this action must be paired with other efforts. By companies, who will need to build on the work of peers who have already started to develop conflict-free supply chains for the minerals they use. By consumers, who will need to make conscientious choices about the products they buy. By regulators, who will need to ensure that the disclosure process is taken seriously, and that loopholes are not reopened. And by Congress, which will need to carefully monitor the effectiveness of the new mechanism, and take other steps to enhance the ability of the United States to work for peace in places like Congo.

Several of those efforts are currently under consideration in the Foreign Affairs Committee. One that is a particularly high priority for me would overhaul U.S. foreign assistance programs for the first time since 1961, thus enabling our nation to more effectively and efficiently target and deliver our aid dollars.

In these difficult economic times, it is sometimes hard to understand why we should care about what happens in faraway and largely forgotten places like the Congo. But in our increasingly globalized world, conflicts in even distant corners of the world can create ripple effects – from mass migrations and the spread of infectious disease, to deforestation and the depletion of other key natural resources – that impact the current and future well-being of Americans.

Despite the difficult challenges we face here at home, Americans are a generous and compassionate people. Our values compel us to fight injustice wherever it occurs, and to reduce the suffering of innocents. The men, women, and children of the Congo have endured unimaginable hardships for more than a dozen years, and it is time for us to act. The conflict minerals provision in the just-passed Wall Street reform bill is an important first step in changing the situation in that beleaguered country.

The author is the Democratic Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He represents the 28th District of California.

On Wave of Financial Reform, Congo Captures Headlines

Posted by Laura Heaton on Jul 26, 2010

Working for an organization that has focused since its inception on drawing attention to conflicts that remain obscure to many Americans – despite being some of the world’s deadliest – it was remarkable to see Congo in so many prominent headlines recently.

One of the leading stories last week was of course President Obama’s signing of the Wall Street reform bill. But several news outlets delved into the 2,300-page bill and highlighted the provision that addresses the role that U.S. companies play in funding atrocities carried out by militias in eastern Congo.

In a front page story in The Washington Post, reporter Mary Beth Sheridan wrote about the impact the new law could have on thousands of U.S. companies:

"This is one of those issues that is below the radar for about 99.9 percent of Americans. . . . Everyone has their cellphone up against their ear, nobody is thinking of Congo or conflict minerals. But everybody's got some, potentially, right next to their ear," said Rep. Jim McDermott (D-Wash.), speaking recently at the Center for American Progress.

Although little noticed by the public, the provision in the regulatory bill could have a broad impact. It applies not only to electronics companies, which are major users of Congolese tantalum, but also to all publicly traded U.S. firms that use tin and gold.

"This is a law that is going to affect virtually the entire U.S. manufacturing sector," said Rick Goss, vice president of environment at the Information Technology Industry Council.

CNN’s The Situation Room also picked up the story and aired this segment by Mary Snow that features an interview with Enough’s John Prendergast and the viral “I’m a Mac” video by actress and activist Brooke Smith for the RAISE Hope for Congo campaign. (By the way, the video spoof now has an astounding 570,000 views.) Here’s the full clip:

One other prominent article was this analysis piece out of Kigali and Kinshasa by Reuters. Quotes from industry and mining interest groups in the region help illustrate the challenge ahead to ensure that the regulations enacted by the Securities Exchange Commission, the agency charged with devising the plan to implement the law, aren’t weakened by interests who benefit from Congo’s unregulated trade in minerals. Many of those groups seem to have quickly adopted the tactic of crying foul on behalf of the miners whose livelihoods depend on the minerals industry in eastern Congo.

On that point: In reality, of course, the well-being of miners in Congo is forefront on the minds of proponents of this new law. Across the board, from Congress, to advocacy organizations, to U.S. government agencies, to the Congolese government, people pushing for regulation of the mining industry in eastern Congo emphasize the importance of creating alternate employment opportunities and of working closely with industry leaders to ensure that the law doesn’t lead to a boycott. The status quo is far from defensible. The new law won’t be a silver bullet that ends the war in eastern Congo, but it is an important step that confronts some key components perpetuating the conflict: funding for armed groups and lack of Congolese government oversight.

The blogosphere too was abuzz with posts about the new conflict minerals law, culminating today with a post by Congo expert Jason Stearns. He summed up the various points of criticism raised in recent posts by writers critical of the law, and addressed them one by one. Stearns pointed out that while many issues need to be addressed to end the conflict in eastern Congo, regulating the supply chain for conflict minerals doesn’t preclude action on the host of other issues. He wrote:

Yes, I wish we could have greater engagement in strengthening the Congolese judiciary and police. I wish there could be meaningful land reform and that disputes over farming rights could be settled by expert mediators (UN Habitat is beginning to do this). I wish we could have transparent democratic institutions throughout the country. But none of those issues stand necessarily in contradiction with due diligence in the minerals trade. I can't tell you how often I have been in meetings with officials at the State Department, insisting that they help in security sector reform and in paying attention to the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees. Nothing much came of that. Now that we have a chance to help promote meaningful reform in the minerals trade, I think we should seize the opportunity.

Tune in Today for the Anti-Genocide Panel at Netroots Nation

Posted by Laura Heaton on Jul 23, 2010

After six years in existence, the U.S. anti-genocide movement that sprang up as a result of the outbreak of genocide in Darfur is valuable example of how a dedicated group of people can bring to light a serious social wrong -- even one obscure from the day-to-day lives of most Americans  -- and convince Americans to care and act.

The Enough Project, the Genocide Intervention Network, and Save Darfur Coalition are teaming up today at the Netroots Nation conference in Las Vegas to share the narrative of the anti-genocide movement and some lessons learned along the way. The movement literally put Darfur on the map for millions of Americans. Activists have turned out for rallies, sent emails and letters to their elected officials, organized events in their hometowns to raise awareness, and found other ways to creatively press for U.S. leadership to end the conflict in Darfur and promote peace in all of Sudan.

We hope that the conversation will give bloggers here in Vegas and the viewers who tune in via the live stream ideas about how to build a national movement around a niche issue, make U.S. foreign policy accessible to a broad audience, and involve people across the country in policy-making. Here’s the line-up:

-- John Prendergast, Enough Project
-- Martha Bixby, Save Darfur Coalition
-- Janessa Goldbeck, Genocide Intervention Network
-- Omer Ismail, Enough Project
-- Laura Heaton, Enough Project

Help us encourage bloggers to turn out for our panel today! Tweet to #NN10 and tell the more than 2,000 participants here to come to Zero2Sixty today at 4:30 p.m. PT in room Miranda 1/2.

You can tune in from afar at this live stream channel: http://www.ustream.tv/channel/nn10-miranda-1-2

Bashir's Summer Vacation

Posted by John Prendergast on Jul 22, 2010
Omar al-Bashir

President Bashir took a little risk in his first trip since a warrant was issued for his arrest by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide. Previously, he had only been visiting countries that were not signatories to the ICC. This week, he traveled to Chad, which is a signatory. The Chadians decided not to apprehend this particular genocide suspect, despite their obligations under international law. This is unfortunate but simply an expression of Chad's domestic political situation, in which the regime there is looking to improve ties with the Sudan government in order to reduce Sudanese support for Chadian rebels. 

This won't be the last time the ICC gets caught up in politics. So we shouldn't be discouraged, but just understand this missed opportunity as a function of the deeply flawed international system as it relates to the promotion of human rights. Speaking of flawed, we need only look at the confused response of the United States to the genocide warrant issued last week for Bashir. In the same week as President Obama was praising the Court, his special envoy for Sudan, General Scott Gration, was expressing concerns about the impact of the warrants on his job. 

The lack of imagination is staggering. General Gration does not see that, rather than hindering his work, the ICC warrants provide a point of significant leverage in support of peace in Sudan. First of all, sustainable peace will not come to Sudan without justice, so breaking that cycle of impunity is a prerequisite for progress.  Second, if the U.S. and other countries that are ICC signatories (the United States isn't) were more unified and vocal in their support of these arrest warrants in Sudan, this would have a major impact in deterring future human rights abuses. Third, the possibility of a one year conditional deferral of the warrants exists in the ICC charter in the interests of peace, so if Khartoum did all it could to ensure peace in Darfur and the South as well as provided for credible alternative justice mechanisms in Darfur, a deferral of the warrant could be possible. 

That is real leverage for peace. President Obama, please note.

 

N.B.: I had a chance to talk with NPR’s Michele Kelemen about Bashir’s visit to Chad on today’s Morning Edition. Listen here.

What’s Wrong with U.S. Policy Toward Sudan, and How to Fix It: Report

Submitted by Ana Brzezinska on July 20, 2010 - 1:47pm.
in
Date: 
Jul 20, 2010
Author: 
John Prendergast

 

What's Wrong with U.S. Policy Toward Sudan, and How to Fix It: Report

Contact:

Jonathan Hutson, jhutson@enoughproject.org

Cell: +1-857-919-5130

 

WASHINGTON, D.C—The Enough Project has released a new report that argues that U.S. policy is not contributing in a meaningful way to creating peace and justice in Sudan, and suggests alternative steps that officials can take to make peace in Sudan a reality. With only six months until the self-determination referenda for South Sudan and Abyei, the report describes how U.S. policymakers have failed to act decisively to prevent a return to war between North and South Sudan, or to resolve the escalating conflict in Darfur.

 

In the report, titled, “What’s Wrong with U.S. Policy Toward Sudan, and How to Fix It,” Enough Co-founder John Prendergast argues that the words and actions of U.S. officials have undermined the administration’s influence in Sudan, just when its efforts are needed most.

 

“The time has come for an urgent rethink of how the United States can contribute to peace in Sudan now, building on the lessons of the recent past,” writes Prendergast.

 

The report outlines four specific areas where U.S. policy is off course. These include a flawed peace process in Darfur, a hands-off approach to critical negotiations to prevent renewed North-South war, the role of the Unites States in building leverage for peace, and justice as an essential component of sustainable peace.

 

“The United States made a major contribution to peace-making in Sudan in the past decade,” argues Prendergast. “Sadly, the Obama administration is not building on the lessons of past success and thus is not positioning itself to play the role that is needed in averting all-out war in 2011.”

 

###

 

Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, the Enough Project focuses on crises in Sudan, eastern Congo, and areas of Africa affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Enough’s strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a “3P” crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. Enough works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises. For more information, please visit www.enoughproject.org.

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