Preparing for Two Sudans

Enough experts break down the possible outcomes of the upcoming referendum vote in Sudan.

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All signs indicate that Sudan, Africa’s largest state, will very soon split in two—either peacefully or violently. In a self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011, the people of southern Sudan are widely expected to vote for separation from their northern neighbors. Yet with the security situation in southern Sudan deteriorating, next month’s national election set to be deeply flawed, and several crucial elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, still unimplemented, the referendum and its outcome are by no means guaranteed. As a guarantor of the CPA, the United States must work multilaterally on several fronts to support the peaceful expression of the will of the people of southern Sudan and prevent a return to conflict.

The two parties to the CPA—the National Congress Party, or NCP, and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement, or SPLA/M—have a laundry list of difficult tasks to accomplish before the 2011 referendum. Next month’s elections will occur against a backdrop of intense political jockeying for position and rising tensions between the two parties. And while the Sudanese government has agreed to allow some external monitoring of the election, few Sudanese expect a credible process under the repressive security environment that persists throughout the country, particularly in the North.

The NCP and the SPLM must reach agreement on both outstanding CPA provisions and on post-referendum arrangements to avoid a return to war. Moreover, the international community must work to halt the downward spiral of intercommunal violence in southern Sudan—a situation that threatens the referendum altogether.

Unfortunately, the sustained multilateral pressure and unity of international purpose that yielded the CPA has not accompanied its implementation. In the absence of coordinated efforts by the international community, the United States remains the de facto external lead player on Sudan. However, U.S. efforts to date have assumed a level of good faith in the parties—particularly the ruling NCP—that simply does not exist. The NCP and SPLM reached agreement on areas of mutual interest with very little external facilitation. But with only nine months left before the referendum, there are major issues of disagreement that require international mediation if a return to conflict is to be averted. It is in these areas that the United States is expected to lead international efforts to facilitate compromises and to coordinate the development of multilateral pressures and incentives necessary to leverage such compromises. 

The Obama administration must work urgently to support the parties in defining a clear framework for two distinct sets of negotiations: the resolution of outstanding CPA provisions and the initial discussion of post-referendum arrangements. For talks to succeed, the United States must work multilaterally to put meaningful pressure on the NCP and SPLM to find common ground on the CPA and the contentious issues that will accompany an independent southern Sudan. This approach is consistent with the Sudan policy unveiled by the Obama administration in October 2009, but the policy has not yet been implemented.

Sudanese campaign posters for President's Salva Kiir (Southern Sudan) and Omar Bashir (Sudan). Photos by Maggie Fick / Enough

A ticking time bomb

Last year, Enough warned that the international community was at risk of sleepwalking through national elections and the run-up to the referendum.[1] Today, more international actors are clearly concerned about the potential return to conflict between North and South. Despite this increased attention, however, the trend lines in Sudan remain decidedly negative. Violence is rife in the South and in Darfur, state-sponsored political repression remains the norm in the North, implementation of key CPA provisions is effectively stalled, and a number of potentially explosive post-referendum issues remain unresolved. The recent agreement between the government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, in Darfur, which appears to be unraveling quickly, is a good example of the substantial risks carried by poorly executed negotiations at this juncture.

1.      Southern Sudan: Spiraling insecurity threatens the referendum

More than 2,500 people were killed and 350,000 displaced last year in southern Sudan.[2] Much of this violence is undoubtedly linked to historic tensions between southern groups over cattle and other resources, coupled with growing discontent over the lack of “peace dividends” received by the majority rural population across the South.[3] However, there is likely another historic trend at play. Throughout its two decades in power, the National Congress Party regime in Khartoum has frequently armed local proxies to wage war on its behalf and sow instability in Sudan’s marginalized peripheral areas.

Today, some reports indicate that Khartoum has provided arms to militias to attack civilians.[4] With this demonstrated track record of proxy warfare and now mounting anecdotal evidence, the perception among Southern leadership and some local populations is that Khartoum is the hidden hand behind recent violence. This perception is one that the Obama administration, and the international community more broadly, must take very seriously while still holding the GoSS accountable for its own shortcomings in the security sector.

Accusations by GoSS officials have stoked tensions between Juba and Khartoum and exacerbated barely below the surface rifts between communities in southern Sudan. The NCP’s hand has been strengthened by widespread perceptions that the GoSS has been incapable of extending authority throughout a vast, largely remote, and often inaccessible territory. Khartoum’s response to the intertribal violence has also helped to fuel mistrust between the parties and fostered the notion in some certain diplomatic circles that Sudan and its neighbors would be “better off” if Sudan remained united, implying that the South is incapable of “governing itself.”[5]

If 2009 was bad, 2010 may well be worse. Last August, a senior U.N. official characterized the situation in southern Sudan as a “humanitarian perfect storm.”[6] Deadly clashes have already occurred this year in four of the South’s 10 states and the threat of Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, rebels persists, particularly near the South’s borders with Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.

April’s elections could aggravate this already tense situation. A core element of the GoSS’s pre-elections security strategy is a military campaign to disarm civilians in areas with the greatest potential for election-related violence.[7] Despite efforts to improve upon past disarmament disasters, current campaigns in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, and Lakes state have directly led to violence and casualties among civilians and the army.[8] [9] The SPLA is charged by state-level security committees with carrying out disarmament, which the GoSS publicly described as “voluntary” and only coercive if civilians refuse to hand over their weapons to the SPLA.[10] However, according to a senior official with the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, rank-and-file soldiers are not trained in conducting voluntary campaigns, often leading soldiers to revert to coercive tactics.[11]

Communities have armed themselves—or are still holding onto the weapons they held during the war—in large part because they fear attacks by neighboring communities. Disarmament alone will not assuage these fears. Unless the SPLA and the GoSS devise a strategy for guaranteeing the security of disarmed communities and put greater efforts into community-level reconciliation, many communities will continue to arm themselves.

Indeed, the problems that come with a heavily-armed civilian population cannot be addressed through disarmament alone and must instead be part of broader security sector reform efforts with significant buy-in and support from donors and the international community. As one UNMIS official told Enough, “It takes a generation to get security sector reform right.”[12] With this realization in mind, it would be wise for the international community—particularly the United States and other actors already in the lead on funding security sector reform programs—to do the hard thinking now on how best to support these efforts beginning immediately after the referendum and beyond.

Given the likelihood of insecurity surrounding both the elections and the referendum, the international community also needs to work with the GoSS to anticipate and respond appropriately to outbreaks of violence in the coming months. However, security sector reform is challenging even in an environment of peace and stability and with genuine political will. It may prove almost impossible over the next year as all sides position themselves for a potential return to war.