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To the Referendum and Beyond: South Sudan’s Lesser Known Flashpoints

Ana Brzezinska — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 11:38:48 -0400

In less than six months, the people of southern Sudan will vote in a self-determination referendum that is expected to result in the secession of the South roughly a year from now. The dynamics shaping the historic and dramatic changes in Sudan are fluid, yet some of the core issues facing southern Sudan will endure regardless of the outcome of the referendum. Because these issues are likely to be flashpoints for conflict within the South in the years to come, international actors engaged in Sudan must now closely monitor and address them during the pre-referendum period. In her last field dispatch for Enough, southern Sudan field researcher Maggie Fick identifies some of these key, lesser recognized, flashpoints.

^{Photo Credit/Maggie Fick}

JUBA, Southern Sudan—While it may be taboo in international capitals to speak frankly about the results of the looming self-determination referendum before the vote actually occurs, here in the southern Sudanese capital, it seems unrealistic, even naïve, not to acknowledge the widely shared sentiment of southerners. To use a phrase I’ve frequently heard in my time here: “The South is going.” In other words, the people of southern Sudan widely favor independence. I have learned that perceptions in southern Sudan often shape—even directly impact—reality here. Based on recent conversations with Sudanese and internationals in Sudan, the following are some of the flashpoints and factors that seem likely to have a destabilizing impact on the South in the near future.

Managing sky-high expectations

Southerners have endured decades of war and internal conflict accompanied by death, displacement, and enormous suffering. It is to be expected that many hope to enjoy better and more peaceful lives as citizens of an independent South rather than as citizens of Sudan in its current construction. Indeed, holding out hope for a brighter future sustained many southerners throughout the brutal war and has continued to sustain them through the challenges that have plagued the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, since 2005. Unfortunately, this hope—or rather, expectations built on this hope—could pose a serious threat to stability and security in the South following the referendum.

Many southerners believe that their lives will be dramatically altered by the referendum and that life on the day after the vote will be vastly improved. The “lag time” between the referendum in January 2011 and the end of the CPA’s interim period in July 2011, which, according to the CPA, would also mark the official independence of the South, should the southerners vote for separation in the referendum, is in itself a chance for tensions to build further in anticipation of independence. However, the more significant lag time is likely to occur between independence and the delivery of even the most basic of services that a government must provide.

It is unrealistic to expect that the Government of Southern Sudan will quickly or easily transition into a highly functioning and responsive government with the capacity to extend services throughout the South’s vast and remote territory. The government has done very little to account or explain to its citizens why crucial infrastructure such as roads and basic services such as health clinics are still rare more than five years after the peace agreement was signed. Nor can the ruling Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement, or SPLM, provide effective security for the citizens of the region. If the post-election period has been any indication, the diverse array of internal threats facing the South are beyond the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan or its security forces to respond to, and international interventions to bolster this capacity have not succeeded in stabilizing the most volatile areas nor in helping to address the fundamental security dilemmas of the South. The Juba-based government must find the time and resources in the aftermath of the referendum—when negotiations with the National Congress Party, or NCP, are likely to be at a fever pitch—to communicate to its citizenry that an independent southern Sudan will not instantly be capable of delivering security, stability, and the “peace dividends” that both the NCP and SPLM promised to provide to all Sudanese citizens when the CPA was signed.

A lack of information among populations at the grassroots level, and particularly along Sudan’s North-South border, is another potential trigger for conflict. A vacuum of information about crucial questions such as citizenship and grazing rights could easily be manipulated by spoilers into a platform for misinformation among disenfranchised local populations. Proxy warfare, a tactic used to great effect by the NCP in its wars throughout Sudan, has long been a feature of the enduring tensions in Abyei. Astride the North-South border and shared by two groups that have strong and opposing loyalties to the governments of the North and South, Abyei is emblematic of how tensions between political elites in Khartoum and Juba frequently manifest in violent clashes between local communities at Sudan’s periphery.

^{Photo Credit/Maggie Fick}

Disaffected Youth

A passionate southern Sudanese women’s rights leader once told me that the young men and women of southern Sudan do not have a reason to believe in politics, because they have never seen a positive example of how government can improve the lives of people. Youth in southern Sudan still have reason to hope that life in an independent South will provide them with new opportunities and that the government will make good on its promises. Changing the fundamental realities for youth, however, will mean addressing complex issues such as the loss of traditional livelihoods, the challenges of urbanization for a largely rural population, and the deficiencies in the current education system, to name a few. Young people may lose hope if the government of the newly independent South does not quickly begin to show signs of working to address these challenges.

At this moment, there is one clear incentive for youth to resist picking up the readily available arms and engaging in banditry or other forms of violence: the referendum and the prospect of independence. But after the referendum, if it becomes clear to the average young person that life is not going to change for the better anytime soon, youth may choose to come together based on shared tribal, economic, or political interests, with potentially serious consequences for security in the fledgling state. One feature of war-time violence in the South was the use of proxy youth militias by both the NCP and the SPLM, and there are already signs of resurgent, well-armed youth movements mobilizing in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. Given the divisive, often violent nature of politics and inter-communal dynamics in these states, the additional X factor of discontent youth must not be ignored.

Various international donors, NGOs, and the United Nations are already working to engage youth living in the South’s historically tense and remote areas—along the state border of Jonglei and Upper Nile, and in Abyei, for example—but international interventions are not enough. The Government of Southern Sudan must also take responsibility for its future generations by investing in its youth and providing them with the chance to become leaders, instead of spoilers. The efforts of the United Nations and other actors to support and empower youth will have a more lasting impact if they are developed in close partnership with relevant government institutions like the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation and the Community Security and Small Arms Control bureau. It is imperative that young men and women begin to see their own government—instead of internationals—taking the lead in providing security, services, and opportunities to its people.

Centralization and Abuse of Government Power at the Local Level

It is sometimes difficult to generalize about the political and security dynamics of southern Sudan because of the inherently local nature of these dynamics in particular areas of the South. The localized nature of southern politics, however, is not only related to the geographical, historical, and tribal specificities of various regions, from the Equatorian states to the region formerly known as Greater Upper Nile. It is also linked to the way in which the decentralized model of government in southern Sudan, implemented through the 10 state governments formed during the CPA’s interim period, has enabled local administrative authorities and politicians to exercise significant power within their particular domains. For example, state governors, depending on their political influence at the Juba level, their history during the war, and the level of loyalty they wield among SPLA field commanders in the state, have proven capable of turning entire states into personal fiefdoms.

While decentralization of power from the Juba capital-level is essential, a consequence of this governance model to date has been that certain state government officials have used their power to disproportionately promote their interests within their area of authority. As I discussed in a recent field dispatch, the heavy-handed responses of some state government leaders to the challenges posed to their authority during the elections have already begun to generate hostility among certain constituencies. This hostility and discontent is poised to increase following the referendum, potentially in the form of more political-military uprisings of the sort that have plagued the southern government in the aftermath of the elections.

Efforts planned by the Obama administration to extend the U.S. government’s reach in southern Sudan by deploying American foreign service officers to state capitals will be energy well spent for many reasons, not least because it is impossible to understand the dynamics at play in the South’s vast peripheral regions merely from observing the situation from Juba. Sustained interaction by the U.S. consulate in Juba with the state governments throughout the South will complement existing USAID-funded government capacity building efforts and promote accountability among these local bodies. In the aftermath of the referendum, this local focus will be even more crucial, as local rivalries are likely to build in intensity over the prospect of access to the spoils of the newly independent state.

The “Juba Disconnect”

All of the potential sparks for internal southern conflict highlighted above are linked to a fundamentally dangerous issue that is likely to plague the southern government for years, if not decades, to come, if serious and sustained efforts are not taken by the government itself to change its ways. The “elite deal-making” that has characterized relations between the NCP and the SPLM during the five and a half years of CPA implementation has effectively cut the most Sudanese citizens out of the peace-building process, even while leaders continue to make lofty promises about an inclusive system of governance in Sudan that will deliver “peace dividends” to its diverse peoples. Neither the NCP nor the SPLM have kept these promises, but it should be noted that the SPLM’s efforts to implement the CPA have frequently been stymied by the NCP.

The SPLM-led government will have the chance following the referendum to change these dynamics by breaking from the Sudanese tradition of elite politicians ruling with little consultation or regard for the citizenry. The government in Juba must make genuine efforts to reconnect with its peoples at the grassroots level: in remote areas of the South that remain inaccessible during the rainy season because there are no roads connecting them to central towns, in areas where insecurity from the Lord’s Resistance Army and other threats prevent NGOs from bringing aid and supplies, and even in small clusters of huts mere kilometers outside of Juba, where people displaced by cattle raiding and other conflicts struggle to feed their families.

The single best thing that the southern government can do to prevent conflict and promote peaceful interactions between its peoples in the months and years following the referendum is to show its citizens—through actions, not words—that the government is trying to bring a new style of governance to Sudan, modeled after the “New Sudan” envisioned by Dr. John Garang. The good news is that the people of southern Sudan are committed to building this “New Sudan” because they have fought for decades for the chance for self-determination. Utilizing this hope, strength, and determination by empowering citizens to have a stake in this process will enable the southern Sudanese government to better address the daunting challenges ahead.

What's Wrong with U.S. Policy toward Sudan, and How to Fix It.

Mari Wright — Mon, 19 Jul 2010 13:37:01 -0400

WHAT’S WRONG WITH U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUDAN, AND HOW TO FIX IT

John Prendergast

Enough Project

July 20, 2010

Six months before the self-determination referenda for South Sudan and Abyei, U.S. policy is not contributing in a meaningful way to peace and justice in Sudan, whether in preventing a return to war between North and South Sudan, or in resolving the escalating conflict in Darfur. The time has come for an urgent rethink of how the United States can contribute to peace in Sudan now, building on the lessons of the recent past.

Complicating matters greatly, the Obama administration is not implementing the policy of benchmarks, incentives, and consequences articulated by Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice in October 2009, a policy which appears to have either been put on hold or abandoned. The lack of follow-up to the strong words that accompanied the rollout of that approach undermines U.S. influence further with each passing day.

The words and actions of key Obama administration officials reveal a largely hands-off approach to critical negotiations focused on peacemaking in Darfur, implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, between the North and South, and reaching agreement on crucial post-referendum arrangements to prevent an all-out national war. The same words and actions reflect a self-perception of marginal U.S. influence in peace-making in Sudan. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, the Obama administration is every day becoming less relevant to the prevention of war in Sudan, just at a time when its leadership and hands-on involvement are needed most.

Let’s be specific. There are four areas in which the Enough Project and a significant segment of the activist community disagree with the Obama administration’s words and actions.

Darfur Peacemaking

The Obama Administration’s View: The United States pressured Chad in an attempt to marginalize the Justice and Equality Movement, and then pushed for a peace deal with a number of entities with little field presence. Now, the Obama administration appears to have abandoned the idea of negotiating a sustainable peace deal with the parties to the conflict in Darfur, and instead is backing the idea of a separate internal process of peace-building referred to at times as the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. U.S. Special Envoy General Scott Gration is also backing the Liberty and Justice Movement in Doha, a newly formed rebel faction with little support on the ground and with minimal military significance. This will in all likelihood lead to a deal that further fissures Darfur and makes matters worse, similar to the Darfur Peace Agreement negotiated in part by the Bush administration in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2006. Although there are more American diplomats being deployed to Juba and Khartoum, the U.S. has no permanent presence at the peace talks in Doha or personnel assigned to move between government, rebels, and civil society. The special envoy appears to be concentrating the administration’s efforts on post-conflict development in lieu of securing a political deal, despite the enormous security issues and lack of any effective cease-fire on the ground in Darfur today. Also, numerous voices in the Obama administration are arguing to put Darfur on the back-burner while they focus on the North-South issues.

Enough’s Alternative View: The United States needs to ramp up its support of peace in Darfur by deploying a small team of negotiators and experts to revitalize the moribund peace effort. Their efforts should focus on contributing to a draft single text proposal with the full involvement of both armed and unarmed Darfuris that addresses the fundamental roots of the conflict and the issues that most concern the average citizen. Leaving the most powerful armed groups, and potential spoilers, out of the peace equation, and failing to garner the support of local communities throughout Darfur to back it up, will render any peace agreement impossible to implement. All Darfuri factions should be engaged in a revitalized process involving multiple tracks and securing the maximum buy-in from community leaders and civil society at-large. Furthermore, the Obama administration should not deemphasize the Darfur issue in favor of the North-South challenges. The ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, has succeeded in playing these two regions off against each other within the broader international community. It is imperative that the U.S. and other countries focus on both equally and work toward a comprehensive all-Sudan peace.

Post-Referendum Negotiations and CPA Implementation

The Obama Administration’s View: At a recent U.S. Committee for International Religious Freedom, or USCIRF, event, General Gration reported his satisfaction with the ruling NCP and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, hammering out an approach to North-South negotiations without the United States, and with the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, or AUHIP, and the United Nations taking the lead role as mediators. According to General Gration, the United States has been working hard on the key issues in the CPA, but that it was time for other international actors to take up the helm. He said he envisioned being called upon to assist occasionally, but that because the A.U./U.N. team has assumed leadership of the post-referendum negotiations, the United States would be allowed to concentrate on other issues of concern largely unrelated to these negotiations, such as food security and other functional support systems that would help “keep the place together.” The United States has not deployed full-time, on-site personnel to become embedded in the A.U./U.N.-led process to deal with post-referendum issues, a process that is critical to ensuring a peaceful referendum and smooth implementation of the referendum’s results. Vice President Biden’s recent involvement is a promising development, hopefully presaging more senior administration involvement.

Enough’s Alternative View: The United States has a sizeable responsibility in helping to ensure the implementation of the CPA after having been a major negotiator of that agreement. Given America’s special relationship with the South, the Obama administration needs to be deeply involved in pressing for full implementation, bird-dogging the parties, and shining a spotlight on any efforts to obstruct the peace. In addition to the new U.S. personnel in Juba and Khartoum, the United States should deploy additional diplomatic capacity whose sole focus is CPA implementation, so that hot issues like border demarcation and Abyei do not lead to a return to war. The United States also needs to be deeply involved in supporting the post-referendum A.U./U.N.-led negotiations by deploying a team of diplomats and experts in support of the mediation. As AUHIP has been named the lead international facilitator and mediator of these talks, the United States should actively and aggressively offer its resources and its technical capacity to this body. The model to replicate is the successful negotiation structure that produced the CPA. Africa led the talks, with the U.S. and a few other countries providing close diplomatic support, requisite leverage when necessary in the form of sticks and carrots, and high level diplomatic interventions by key Cabinet officials to help move the process forward.

Leverage

The Obama Administration’s View: General Gration and other U.S. officials are increasingly voicing a mantra that the United States has no influence in Sudan. Many in the administration, including the special envoy, operate on the premise that confidence-building measures and incentives are the best way to impact Khartoum’s behavior, but there has been no agreement on which incentives to offer. Given that other powerful voices in the administration are arguing for a pressures-based approach, this has created a stalemate, which also allows those who support an incentive-led approach to contend that their approach has not yet been tried.

Enough’s Alternative View: U.S. efforts to build unilateral and multilateral leverage points may be the greatest potential contribution to peace in Sudan the United States can make. Leverage can be built through intensive and high-level diplomacy and the building of a package of multilateral carrots and sticks that are robust enough to get the attention of the parties. Enough is outlining what some of these pressures and incentives could be in a forthcoming publication from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. As soon as the United States begins to build that package, and signals to the parties its commitment to seeing real change in Sudan, it will gain greater influence on the outcome of the efforts to support peace in both Darfur and the South.

Accountability

The Obama Administration’s View: The mixed messages emerging from the administration make it unclear what the U.S. wants vís-a-vís accountability in Sudan. While President Obama was expressing his view that negotiations in Darfur are supported by an emphasis on accountability, General Gration was sounding a more negative tone at the USCIRF event, saying that the genocide charges issued against President Bashir by the International Criminal Court, or ICC, will make his job harder. The bottom line is that the United States has not pressed the Security Council for specific targeted sanctions against any individuals subject to an arrest warrant, or even pushed for a Council statement in support of their apprehension, for fear that this will undermine efforts for a peaceful referendum in the South.

Enough’s Alternative View: The stronger the United States supports the ICC arrest warrants, the more influence it will have in the long-run in support of peace. Justice is a central component of sustainable peace. The United States should be pressing other Security Council members to publicly support the arrest warrants, call for the apprehension of the suspects, and introduce targeted sanctions against them, as well as rallying international opposition to any retaliation against humanitarian operations by the Sudanese regime, such as the expulsion of two International Organization for Migration aid workers on July 22, 2010.

Conclusion

Regrettably, U.S. policy appears to have abandoned the benchmark-based consequences promised by cabinet members nine months ago, and now is marked by support for General Gration’s shuttle trips to the region, consideration of some small confidence-building incentives, debates over whether to deemphasize Darfur in favor of North-South issues, and the deployment of a team of additional diplomats to Juba to support transitional issues in the South.

This represents a fundamental misanalysis of what is needed now. What is urgently required is a full-scale commitment to the kind of negotiations framework that produced the CPA, in which U.S. diplomats and experts were deeply embedded on-site in support of African-led negotiations that utilized international comparative advantages, particularly in the creation and utilization of leverage. Utilizing that lesson in the current context would take two forms: experienced teams deployed to the region to provide close diplomatic support to the A.U./U.N.-led peace processes in Darfur and the South, and U.S. leadership in developing a package of multilateral carrots and sticks to influence the parties’ calculations in support of peace. Having senior officials such as Vice President Biden, Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and President Obama himself make telephone calls, raise Sudan in meetings, make clear statements of U.S. policy, speak out against human rights abuses, and push the peace process forward will be essential for the success of peace-making in Darfur and the South.

The U.S. made a major contribution to peace-making in Sudan in the past decade during the CPA negotiations. Sadly, the Obama administration is not building on the lessons of past success and thus is not positioning itself to play the role that is needed in averting all-out war in 2011.

North Kivu: Controversy as Refugee Returns Exacerbate Land Conflicts

Ana Brzezinska — Fri, 16 Jul 2010 10:11:18 -0400

GOMA, Democratic Republic of Congo – The return of Congolese refugees from neighboring Rwanda remains a particularly contentious issue here in North Kivu, eastern Congo. As Enough’s new field researcher based in Goma, I recently traveled to some of the areas where displaced people are settling, and spoke to people closely involved in refugee returns in the region. This Dispatch presents a closer look at some of the patterns of returns and specific types of land disputes that have emerged during the past months, and their potential to further destabilize the region.

The arrival of “genocidaires” and substantial numbers of Hutu civilians caught up in the conflict from Rwanda following the 1994 genocide, in turn, triggered the massive displacement of Congolese Tutsis from eastern Congo, who fled from Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale territories across the border into Rwanda. In February 2010, the governments of Congo, Rwanda and the U.N. Refugee Agency, or UNHCR, signed a tripartite agreement that set the stage for the facilitated return of those refugees who have been living in camps in Rwanda. But there is a growing controversy over how many people will actually return to Congo, and over who exactly is a refugee and who is not. UNHCR registration reports indicate that approximately 54,000 individuals have been living in camps in Rwanda. But the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, the Tutsi-dominated former rebel group that signed a peace accord with the government but maintains autonomous control over some of its former strongholds in Masisi and Rutshuru, claims that as many as 100,000 additional Tutsi refugees live outside the camps in Rwanda. The Rwandan government uses an even higher figure, estimating that 150,000 refugees live outside the camps.

Stalled returns and squatters

The return of refugees is not entirely a recent phenomenon. During a visit to Kirolirwe, a spontaneous transit camp established in 2004 located 25 miles west of Goma, I spoke with refugees who told me they first came back to Congo in 2000, when the Rwandan-backed rebel group RCD-Goma controlled much of eastern Congo. These returns continued under the CNDP, but these refugees were largely unable to return all the way to their villages of origin, which remained under the control of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, the rebel group led by some of the architects of the Rwandan genocide.

Following the rapid integration of the CNDP forces into the Congolese army and subsequent military operations against the FDLR, the CNDP has entrenched its de facto control over much of North Kivu. Karekezi Etienne, a teacher and refugees’ committee secretary in Kirolirwe said his fellow refugees feel secure under ex-CNDP soldiers’ protection. But this has yet to lead to meaningful returns, as the FDLR has maintained control of many of its strongholds, and their retaliatory attacks have actually caused thousands more people to flee their homes. According to UNHCR statistics, over 700,000 people have been newly displaced as a result of the numerous U.N.-backed military operations while only 550,000 have gone back home. Meanwhile, most of the “returnees,” whose villages of origin remain insecure, either settle in transit camps or simply squat on the outskirts of Virunga National Park where they partake in the lucrative, but illicit, trade in charcoal made from timber harvested within the park.

Controversial newcomers

Recent population movements from Rwanda to Congo have exacerbated relations between Hutus and Tutsis who speak Kinyarwanda, and other local ethnic groups, including the Hunde, Tembo and Nyanga. According to Laingulia Njewa, the provincial coordinator of the National Commission for Refugees, some 12,000 families of controversial identity returned to Congo at the beginning of this year around the time of the signing of the tripartite agreement, with large herds of cattle in tow. These families are rumored to be economic migrants, rather than returning refugees. Local authorities I met in the towns of Burungu and Kitchanga said that many of the returnees have joined squatter communities in Magera and Bwiza, near the border of Virunga National Park, while others have bought up large tracts of pastureland. Local authorities and villagers, especially those of Hunde and other non-Rwandaphone origin, fear that these new returns and settlements are part of a coordinated effort by the CNDP to seize lands and shift the demographics of Masisi and Rutshuru to consolidate their political and economic control of the area. Such suspicions have been bolstered by the CNDP’s continuing operation of a parallel administration in Masisi, from which it has illegally taxed the local economy, with what seems to be the tacit approval of Congo’s government. On June 1, the Congolese home ministry appointed Gatemba Kalema, a CNDP official as new assistant administrator in Masisi. This news was widely covered in the local media, and many people I spoke to in Masisi believed this would be accompanied by the abolishment of the parallel administration with its illicit taxation, as promised by the provincial officials in Goma. However, contacts in Masisi say they have seen no change so far.

The tensions over refugees are further exacerbated by longstanding land use and tenure questions,such as disputes in North Kivu between farmers and herders. This has taken an ominous form as of late in Congo, as well-armed, self-professed returning refugees from Rwanda bring with them large herds of cattle, sparking conflict with local farmers who resent the imposition of what are locally known as “cows without borders” on their crops.

Yet another source of land conflict in the area is occurring when displaced persons and refugees return to the villages, only to find their lands sold by relatives or occupied by armed groups. Women are particularly impacted by this dynamic. This issue requires special attention.

Land Conflicts and shifting alliances

Conflict over land in eastern Congo has a long and complex history. While land use is often determined by traditional authorities, these practices have not been harmonized with official land laws, creating significant potential for conflict. The United Nations Human Settlement Program, or UN-HABITAT, is the lead international agency working to help mediate land disputes in the context of returns in North Kivu. But mediating land conflicts has proven very challenging, and they have successfully handled only 42 over the 337 land dispute cases received since starting operations in Masisi in September 2009. Lawyer Liévin Shakanya, UN-HABITAT’s representative in Kitchanga, says collective land disputes are the most difficult to resolve. For instance, new landowners have been threatening to evict some 3,000 families who reside in the Bukombo, Bishusha, and Makoto plantations, where they’ve worked as laborers for more than half a century. There is a similar situation for another 1,500 families in Kamuronza. These families fiercely oppose any forced adjudication of the process and fear that it might lead to a violent confrontation.

Meanwhile, armed groups opposed to the rapprochement between the Congolese government and the CNDP are skillfully playing upon these grievances to garner increased support. Representatives I spoke with from two militias, the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance, or PARECO, and the Alliance of Patriots for a Congo Free and Sovereign, or APCLS, both claim that they are fighting to protect their homelands from CNDP domination. But in the aftermath of the rapprochement between Rwanda and Congo, and the ensuing realignment of armed groups in eastern Congo, some unlikely new alliances have formed. For instance, the APCLS, a predominantly Hunde militia, has aligned with the predominantly Tutsi forces of the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Congo, or FPLC, a new rebel group operating near the Congo-Uganda border that was led by Gad Ngabo, who was just recently arrested in Kampala. The FPLC claimed responsibility for an attack on an arms cache at Burungu earlier this month in which 14 Congolese soldiers, mostly ex-CNDP, were killed. Ngabo and the FPLC represent a faction disaffected with the arrest of former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda, so for them to ally, even temporarily with a Hunde militia like the APCLS indicates the extent to which mutual enemies can bring together opposing armed groups in eastern Congo.

Tracking the internal dynamics within the CNDP and its factions, with the complex relationships between these groups and sponsors in neighboring Rwanda, is beyond the scope of this dispatch. But it is an issue that Enough will continue to watch closely in the weeks and months ahead.

Reversing a dangerous trend line

Tensions over refugee returns and land disputes are rapidly worsening, while efforts to resolve these issues and successfully reintegrate returning populations are time-consuming, complicated, and suffer from lack of coordination and coherence. Most importantly, the political arrangements between the Congolese government and the ex-CNDP are exacerbating tensions at the local level. For instance, when asked about the persistent illegal taxation by the CNDP’s parallel administration, members of the provincial assembly attribute this to a secret deal or unstated understanding that the government has granted the CNDP de facto control in Masisi. And yet it is precisely the political, economic, and increasingly demographic dominance by the CNDP that is increasing ethnic tensions and impeding the proper integration and reform of the armed forces.

International actors must keep the pressure on the Congolese government to properly integrate the CNDP and push them to dismantle their parallel administration, and to ensure that the refugee return process is implemented in a transparent and inclusive manner that eases the growing tensions in North Kivu. Otherwise the situation may continue to erode.

Field Dispatch: Election Grievances Reverberate in the Countdown to the South's Referendum

Ana Brzezinska — Wed, 14 Jul 2010 09:39:56 -0400

In the immediate aftermath of Sudan’s elections back in April, several potential flashpoints emerged. While the polls had passed generally peacefully in the South (at least at face value), the post-elections period has been marked by an escalation in tensions. The perception in some areas of the South that polls were rigged, combined with continued abuses by security forces and growing concerns that proxy militias are becoming more active, are making for a volatile stew in the countdown to the southern independence referendum.

Continuing insurrections

The clearest indication of the escalating tensions in the post-elections period are the three separate uprisings launched following contested local races in Jonglei and Unity states by dissident former members of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army, or SPLA, and the ruling SPLM party. The leaders of these rebellions—Lieutenant General George Athor, the defeated opposition party candidate David Yauyau in Jonglei, and Galwak Gai in Unity—have expressed their discontent with the Juba-based government and with the political leadership in their own states in particular through militancy. Aside from the threat of violence these rebellions pose, what is perhaps most alarming is that the southern government, led by the ruling SPLM party, and the SPLA itself, have proved incapable of resolving them, either politically or militarily:

With support from the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the GoSS initially tried but failed to reconcile with Lieutenant General George Athor through negotiations. Athor, the defeated gubernatorial candidate in Jonglei and former commander of SPLA troops in the state, refused to accept anything short of removal of the incumbent (and victorious) Governor Kuol Manyang from his post, along with immunity for the renegade general and his troops. Athor’s forces clashed numerous times in May with the SPLA troops sent to contain the general, and U.N. sources quietly expressed concern for the civilians trapped inside Athor’s area of operation. There are allegations that Athor has given weapons (reportedly collected during the pre-elections civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, which occurred when he was still commanding the SPLA in the state) to some of his supporters.
Following the hotly-contested gubernatorial race between incumbent strongman Governor Taban Deng (who was re-elected and is known to have strong support from the southern president Salva Kiir) and his rival Angelina Teny (the wife of the southern vice president Riek Machar Teny), Unity state has seen a number of military attacks led by former SPLA member Galwak Gai in the northwestern area of the state. The state government has been quick to link the attacks to the Khartoum government, and they accuse Khartoum of supplying Gai with weapons and supporters recruited from the pastoral Misseriya group who graze cattle in areas along the tense North-South border. Sharp discontent within communities in restive Mayom County (home of the Deputy SPLA Commander and powerful former war-time militia leader Paulino Matip) over the Governor’s choice for county commissioner could signal further problems ahead.

The southern government and the army claim that they have these rebellions under control; in fact, the SPLA has announced the defeat of both Athor and Galwak on several occasions. However, Athor and Galwak have not given up their struggles, and the SPLA continues to deploy more troops and resources to address the insurgencies with little success. The majority of citizens in both Jonglei and Unity states do not seem to broadly support Athor’s and Galwak’s insurgencies, given that the overriding priority of southerners is the referendum and subsequent secession of the South. But, there is little doubt that broad discontent with the southern government and localized dissatisfaction with particular state-level leadership will not end with the referendum, no matter what its result. The ability of the Khartoum government to stoke tensions both in the run-up and aftermath to the referendum also remains a very real fear, and was a long-exploited strategy during the previous civil war.

Repressive tendencies

The post-elections environment has also been marked by further restrictions on political freedom not only in North Sudan, but also the South. A recent Enough research trip to Bentiu, the capital of Unity state, found that state government officials view political opposition, both during the elections and currently, as a crime against the state—an attitude that motivates the heavy-handed approach the SPLM/A has adopted against dissidents.

Unsurprisingly, this behavior is generating hostility among local populations that will increase the likelihood of further unrest over time.

Upper Nile state also presents a telling example of the severity of the SPLM response to post-elections political opposition. Security forces associated with the SPLM have violently quashed dissent, often with grievous consequences for civilians who may or may not be directly allied to any opposition.

It is difficult to assess whether the ongoing abuses by southern security forces, notably the army, in Upper Nile are centrally directed by the Juba government. Regardless, in recent weeks, the southern army has been directly implicated in abuses against civilians. According to UN sources, several villages in Fashoda County were reportedly burned by SPLA troops on the eastern side of the Nile River, and some estimates indicate that the populations of more than 10 villages have fled into hiding in the bush, with reports that valuables were looted following the displacement.

Again, although the current violence in Upper Nile may not be orchestrated by the army’s leadership in Juba, it is propelled by the perceived challenge against SPLM leadership. The four members of parliament elected to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly from opposition party SPLM-Democratic Change were arrested in early June. These MPs hailed from constituencies in Upper Nile state, where the founder of SPLM-DC, Dr. Lam Akol, is known to have his support base, primarily among the Shilluk minority group. Thus, recent reports of SPLA abuses recent weeks in Upper Nile have a distinctly political and ethnic dimension, which is reminiscent of the sentiment expressed by SPLM politicians in other states such as Unity. Reports that Shilluk civilians, including women, children and traditional chiefs, were assaulted during a SPLA-led disarmament campaign in May in Upper Nile—because of their believed association with the SPLM-DC—underscore the severity of this issue.

The Task at Hand

As the governors of the ten southern states form governments that balance complex ethnic, political, and military dynamics, it is crucial that the Juba leadership take steps to reign in southern security forces. The balance is a tricky one: the South must be in a position to respond effectively to militia provocations from the North, but it must also be wise enough to recognize and tolerate legitimate southern political dissent.

Renewing the Pledge: Re-Engaging the Guarantors to the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Ana Brzezinska — Wed, 14 Jul 2010 13:13:57 -0400

With six months until a referendum on Southern independence, Sudan is alarmingly unprepared, according to a new report published today by a global coalition of 26 humanitarian and human rights organizations. In the joint report, titled Renewing the Pledge: Re-Engaging the Guarantors to the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the global coalition warns: “The clock is ticking fast towards what might be the most important date in modern Sudanese history – two referenda in Sudan that are likely to result in the breakup of Africa’s largest state.” In addition to the referendum on Southern independence, another vote will be held simultaneously in the area of Abyei, to determine whether or not it will join Southern Sudan. The report calls for urgent action from African heads of state who will meet at a major summit of the African Union in Uganda from July 19-27.

The report includes key recommendations for Guarantors—states and multilateral organizations that have pledged to help Sudan implement the CPA— to ensure a free and fair referendum is held on schedule. The report warns that the Guarantors have only six months to fulfill that promise. It also calls for Sudan to ensure that all Sudanese citizens, whether in the North or the South, are protected before and after the referenda. You can find the full report here.

Field Dispatch: Disturbing Developments in the Hunt for Kony

Kelsey Wickel — Tue, 29 Jun 2010 16:03:27 -0400

Fighters with the LRA (AP Image)

Although the details remain highly murky, it appears that the Ugandan army suffered a significant loss of troops in the Central African Republic, or CAR, as those forces continue to hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Exactly how many troops were lost and under what circumstances remain a matter of controversy, and there has been significant speculation groups other than the LRA may have also been involved. While this mystery may not be resolved any time soon, the incident again underscores the fact that the current efforts to apprehend the LRA leadership remain inadequate and demand strengthened international assistance and focus.

Here is what we know. According to a variety of sources—including the Ugandan media—a number of Ugandan army troops were found dead in CAR at the end of May, 2010. The number of soldiers killed is in dispute and varies widely depending on the source. The Daily Monitor reported 18 dead, but the Chief of Staff for the Ugandan army, General Aronda, insisted that only 10 soldiers had been killed. Other sources told Enough that as many as 53 soldiers—almost an entire squad—were killed. At least five soldiers, the majority officers—including the radio operator—are reported missing in action. According to this same source, 17 bodies were returned to a morgue at the Gulu army barracks in northern Uganda, while others were returned to their respective places of origin elsewhere in Uganda. Some of the bodies were allegedly mutilated. Enough was unable to independently verify these claims.

The Ugandan military was quick to implicate forces other than the LRA as having orchestrated these killings. Ugandan officials claimed that the perpetrators were “Sudanese militias” or “Sudanese poachers.” However, given that a large loss of life to the LRA would run counter to the Ugandan military’s consistent claim that the rebels are a spent force largely on the run, there is a clear incentive for the Ugandans to implicate other forces in the incident.

According to a source in the Ugandan army, on May 26, 2010, a squad of 58 soldiers from the Ugandan Third Battalion operating northeast of Djemah in CAR lost contact with its tactical headquarters. A team of soldiers sent to investigate initially found seven bodies, and that attacks against the squad had occurred in multiple locations.

The commander of the investigating team maintained that the camp of those who attacked the squad did not bear the usual signs of the LRA. The commander noted that the camp showed signs of pack animals, likely donkeys, which would be unusual for the LRA. The commander suggested that the attackers may have been janjaweed militias from neighboring Sudan, as they frequently travel on donkeys.[1] The Ugandan military and such militias have frequently encountered each other in CAR, but have never previously been hostile. If such a militia or group of armed traders did attack the Ugandans, it’s important to ask: why the change of behavior?

While it is certainly possible that these forces killed the Ugandans, the direct or indirect involvement of the LRA should not be discounted. LRA troops could have lured Ugandans into a trap manned by other forces, or conducted the killings directly themselves.

In fact, another Ugandan army squad operating in the areas of the attack had encountered a significant LRA contingent just days earlier. On May 22, 2010, this Ugandan unit clashed with a LRA group led by Okot Odhiambo, a senior LRA commander wanted by the International Criminal Court. Odhiambo’s contingent had joined with a second LRA group led by Major Odooki and the two groups fled to the north, toward the area where the Ugandan soldiers were found dead several days later. Odhiambo, together with Dominic Ongwen and Joseph Kony, comprise the LRA’s senior command. Apparently Odhiambo and Kony have been operating in relatively close proximity during the past year, so it is possible that Kony was not far way. The Ugandan army squad that was attacked may have had the misfortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, encountering a sizeable massing of LRA fighters who felt that they had no choice but to fight to protect their senior leadership.

This incident is the latest setback in a Ugandan offensive against the LRA that seems to have stalled this year after some important initial momentum. As described in Enough’s latest report, “On the Heels of Kony: The Untold Tragedy Unfolding in CAR,” the Ugandan army took three LRA commanders off the battlefield in September 2009, capturing Major Okot Atiak, and killing Major Okello Kalalang and Brigadier Santos Alit. However, the last time the Ugandans killed a senior commander was in December 2009, and it now appears that the 18-month-long campaign against the LRA has taken a steady toll on the Ugandan army.

The initial deployment of some 5,000 Ugandan troops across Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and CAR has recently been reduced, with two battalions—approximately 1,000 soldiers—redeployed from CAR to the volatile Karamoja region in northeastern Uganda. Additional troops are expected to return to Uganda as that country’s electoral campaign heats up in advance of the February 2011 elections. A spokesperson recently stated that the army would be deployed to put down any potential unrest around the elections, and these soldiers will almost certainly have to come from contingents currently operating in Congo or CAR.

Dwindling troop strength on the ground, difficult living conditions, and recent losses are all combining to erode the morale of rank and file Ugandan soldiers pursuing the LRA. Alleged infighting among senior Ugandan army commanders has also darkened the atmosphere for troops involved in the campaign. The Ugandan commander in CAR, Colonel Emmanuel Rwashande, was reportedly removed by the overall commander overseeing the LRA operation, Brigadier Charles Otema in a disagreement about strategy. Colonel Peter Elwelu, a former commander of the African Union force in Somalia, replaced Rwashande. It is possible that this shuffle in command may have caused a delay in the response to the attacked Ugandan soldiers.

The LRA continue to pose an escalating threat to civilians. One June 10, LRA fighters abducted 30 people in Fode, CAR. Moreover, LRA fighters appear to be returning to their former bases in the Garamba National Park in northeastern Congo. Former LRA fighters also told Enough that the LRA recently attacked areas just north of Garamba on Kony’s orders.

As the Obama Administration prepares its strategy to deal with the LRA, it is more apparent than ever that maintaining the status quo is unacceptable. Policymakers must understand the actual situation on the ground, and the compelling need for far greater levels of international commitment and resources to apprehend the LRA leadership and neutralize their threat to civilians.

[1] Janjaweed, as used by the Ugandans, is a fairly loose term applied to Sudanese groups from southern Darfur in CAR, and can include Sudanese traders that are armed and travelled on donkeys.

On the Heels of Kony: The Untold Tragedy Unfolding in the Central African Republic

Zack Brisson — Wed, 23 Jun 2010 15:16:41 -0400

Enough Field Research Ledio Cakaj follows the violent path of Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army

Indicted war criminal and Lord's Resistance Army commander Joseph Kony smiles in his makeshift uniform. (AP Image)

Executive summary

The Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, has been ruthlessly attacking civilians in the Central African Republic, or CAR, since February 2008. Attacks continued unabated in the country’s isolated southeastern Haut Mbomou and Mbomou prefectures, and surged during the first three months of 2010. Despite this deadly track record, LRA violence in CAR, one of the world’s poorest countries, has been badly under-reported and gone largely unnoticed.This report, which is based on extensive interviews with eyewitnesses gathered during field research in LRA-affected regions, describes in detail the LRA’s reign of terror in CAR over the past two years. [1]

The report illuminates the casual brutality of the LRA in considerable detail, including the terrible toll the militia continues to inflict on civilians in a largely forgotten corner of Africa. These incidents make a compelling case that the international community continues to do too little too late to end the scourge of the LRA.

This research underscores two other key points:

Joseph Kony and other senior LRA leaders were nearly within the grasp of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, or UPDF, last year and could very likely have been apprehended if the United States and other members of the international community had provided more effective assistance in the form of intelligence sharing and key logistical and operational support for military operations.

There is a genuine risk of the LRA being able to regroup over time in CAR despite some key losses because of that country’s general lack of internal security and the relative absence of international attention to the situation in CAR.

Enough has confirmed 57 separate LRA attacks and 134 confirmed deaths in CAR since February 2008.[2] But the real number of those killed is likely far greater.[i] More than 500 people were kidnapped over the last two years.[ii] Enough documented 273 cases of abducted people believed to be still in the hands of the LRA. Those abducted, many of whom are less than 18 years old, are forced to fight or are used as sex slaves.

LRA violence is creating a growing humanitarian crisis. Nearly 15,000 people have been internally displaced and more than 5,000 Congolese live in refugee camps in CAR. The lack of humanitarian aid and inability to cultivate crops due to fear of LRA attacks have caused drastic food shortages. Even those residing in towns where the Ugandan army is present live in enclaves, unable to venture far from town for fear of LRA attacks.

Apart from the Ugandan army, there are no other military forces in the area capable of dealing with the LRA. CAR’s military has a very limited presence in LRA-affected areas; their handful of soldiers and gendarmes often refuse to engage the rebels. The majority of civilians in Haut Mbomou and Mbomou prefectures remain at the mercy of the LRA.

After signing the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act into law on May 24, 2010, the Obama administration began developing a comprehensive strategy to deal with the LRA. The ongoing atrocities in CAR underscore the urgent need for a strategy that outlines what is needed to end the LRA threat, not simply mitigate its impact. The dramatic situation in CAR calls for these specific measures to be implemented immediately:

Civilian protection. The government of CAR must prioritize the protection of its own citizens from the LRA by deploying an increased army and gendarmerie presence, both to reinforce troops in the major towns and to extend their presence to unprotected rural areas. This should be complemented by the UPDF, which has been pursuing the LRA but has not prioritized the protection of civilians. Providing effective protection for populated areas denies the LRA access to new abductees and needed food supplies, and should be made a central component of military strategy.

Humanitarian response. Aid agencies should step up efforts to maintain humanitarian access to populations in CAR. Although the Central African military has provided some support for aid convoys, these convoys are too few in number to be effective. The Ugandan military should provide additional support to fill the gap. The United Nations and government agencies can catalyze this effort by stepping up their presence in the field and utilizing emergency funding mechanisms if necessary.

Multilateral coordination. International actors, both uniformed and civilian, should step up their presence in LRA-affected areas of CAR. Increased U.N. efforts should include establishing a new mandate that would allow the redeployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, or MINURCAT, moving troops from the Chadian border to LRA-affected areas and tasking them with protecting civilians. Civilian U.N. agencies should establish a field presence in the region as well, and appropriate coordination mechanisms should be developed to ensure these efforts are linked up across borders with the U.N. missions in Congo and Sudan.

A quick overview of CAR

CAR, a former French colony that became independent in 1960, borders some of the most volatile countries in Africa, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south, Sudan to the east, and Chad to the north. One of the 10 poorest African nations, CAR was ranked a dismal 179 of 182 countries in the 2009 Human Development Index. The country has been ruled for most of its postindependence period by military men who came to power by force. The current leader, General Francois Bozize, took power in a coup on March 2003 and won the May 2005 presidential election. In general, CAR has tended to be a diplomatic afterthought for Western states and as well as its own neighbours. The light diplomatic and commercial presence in CAR, coupled with the fact that the country receives very little media attention, has allowed LRA abuses to flourish far from the spotlight.

Roughly the size of Texas, CAR has a population of around 4.5 million inhabitants.[iii] The majority of the population targeted by the LRA comes from the Zande tribes, which make up a very small percentage of the CAR population. Traditionally engaged in small farming—the word Zande means “land owners” in the local Pazande language—Zande tribes living in South Sudan and northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, have also been targeted by the LRA. [iv]

The population of Haut Mbomou and Mbomou prefectures is comprised of a mix of ethnicities. Chadian and Senegalese traders that have come into the country since the early 2000s have settled in some of the larger towns in Haut Mbomou while many Sudanese who came as refugees never left. One group that frequently encounters the LRA is the Mbororo.

The Mbororo: Confronting the LRA

The Mbororo are nomadic cattle herders originally from Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger.[v] There are many Mbororo groups with different cultures and languages. Many are Muslims although some groups practice animism. Mbororos arrived in LRA-affected areas of CAR, Sudan, and Congo relatively recently.

As nomadic herders, the Mbororo frequently come across the LRA while travelling in the bush in search of pastureland. The grazing patterns of the Mbororo herders have also created tensions with local Zande farmers, who feel their land is threatened by the pastoralists’ cows. But unlike in Southern Sudan and northeastern Congo, Mbororos in CAR have settled in towns like Mboki and Obo and have intermarried with the Zande. These marriages are most often unions between Mbororo men and Zande women. Settling might account for the relatively good relationships between the Mbororo and Zande in CAR. This is not the case in Congo and South Sudan where the Mbororo are frequently accused of collaborating with the LRA.[vi]

During research conducted in four different countries in Central Africa, Enough has found no evidence to support the claims that the Mbororo willingly assist the LRA. Like all other civilians in the region, the Mbororo are victims of LRA violence and seem to offer direct support to the LRA only as a result of being threatened and intimidated. The LRA have abducted Mbororo children and slaughtered Mbororo cattle.[vii] Mbororos have often been killed, but given the nomadic nature of some Mbororo groups, the number of deaths is difficult to estimate. The chief of the Mbororo in Mboki estimates that 53 Mbororos were killed by the LRA in the first two months of 2010 alone, although Enough could not independently verify these claims.

Former LRA fighters freely admit to exploiting the Mbororo.[viii] LRA groups in the bush use Mbororo tracks to move and for orientation. Former LRA abductees said that Mbororo cows are a good source of food for the rebels, who usually steal two or three cows, slaughtering and eating as much as they can on the spot and carrying the rest. Mbororo families are held hostage by the LRA as members of the family are forced to spy or buy goods for them. Often, the Mbororo are forced to serve as caretakers of the young children abducted by the LRA; to refuse such services would likely result in a death sentence for a Mbororo family.

But the Mbororo, especially in CAR, have established resistance to LRA rebels. Arming themselves with bows and poisoned arrows, Mbororos have created local self-defense groups. Most importantly, the Mbororo have valuable information on LRA whereabouts which they often use to alert civilians or the UPDF in case of impending LRA attacks. “The Mbororo are very helpful and we are allowing them to use our hospital in Obo as a way of thanking them for their help,” said a UPDF commander.[ix]

The LRA in CAR

Attacks during the Juba peace process

LRA incursions in CAR started at the end of February 2008. While the Juba peace talks were still ongoing, Kony, at the time based in the Congolese Garamba National Park, sent raiding parties to neighboring CAR. Led by Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen—two top commanders indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity—LRA fighters abducted people to be used as potential fighters. Some 130 people were abducted in February and March of 2008, most of whom were later forced to fight for the LRA. Many have either been killed or remain with the rebels.

The LRA’s first target in CAR was Bassigbiri, a town 50 km from the Congolese border in the southeastern corner of the country, which was attacked on February 25, 2008. The LRA abducted approximately 60 people, who were then taken back to the LRA’s camps in Garamba National Park. Six people abducted in Bassigbiri were later killed. “They came with guns, machetes and ropes to tie us,” said a man who was abducted that night and stayed for over a year with the LRA. The abducted were tied together by their waists and forced to carry all the looted food and goods. Once they had to spend the night in a hole in the ground under a large tarpaulin with large rocks keeping it in place. Many almost suffocated. The group made it to Garamba where they were first forced to cultivate LRA gardens, and later forced to fight for the LRA.

Subsequently, on the night of March 5 and morning of March 6, 2008, a large LRA group of 80 people led by Odhiambo attacked the evangelical Africa Inland Mission’s church neighbourhood in Obo. Of the 73 people who were abducted, 29 have since returned.[x] The majority of those abducted were less than 18yearsold. More than 30 children from Obo, some abducted after March 2008, are still believed to be with the LRA.

As in Bassigbiri, the LRA fighters looted food and other supplies during the attack in Obo, even though international organizations were at the time providing truckloads of foods to the LRA in an effort to bolster the peace process. According to a man from Obo kidnapped in March 2008 who stayed with the LRA for 18 months, much of the food was hidden in and around their camps in Garamba. The LRA planned for future war despite continuing to participate in the peace talks. “Kony ordered the raids,” said a Ugandan former LRA fighter who participated in the attack, “to collect more soldiers for us.”[xi]

Post Operation Lightning Thunder: The LRA moves into CAR

Attacks in CAR increased in 2009 after the regional offensive against the LRA in northeastern Congo, dubbed Operation Lightning Thunder, led by the Ugandan Army with U.S. support. As a result of the offensive several LRA groups, including one led by Kony, moved to CAR and resumed attacking civilians. In addition to Bassigbiri, Aboissi and Selim were some of the first locations in CAR to be attacked. In February 2009, LRA fighters ambushed troops from the CAR army east of Obo.[xii] Attacks continued around Obo and shifted west toward Mboki.

Mboki, July 2009: Civilians fight back

Mboki was attacked for the first time on July 24, 2009. The LRA group responsible for the attack came south from DRC and was commanded by either Colonel Acellam Smart or another fighter under his command.[xiii] According to an abductee who escaped this group just before the attack, Acellam’s unit totalled over 60 people, with at least 30 carrying guns, and settled near the Mbomou River, 10 km south of Mboki, inside the large forest of Reserve de Faune Mbomou Orientale. On the morning of July 24, 2009, LRA fighters abducted seven people: two Congolese refugees and five Central African citizens, including a 6-year-old girl. The rebels questioned the abductees about the market and military forces in Mboki.

According to eyewitnesses, the LRA group attacking Mboki included 13 fighters, 18 women and children abducted in DRC, and the six abductees from Mboki who were tied together with rope around their waists. An 8-year-old Congolese boy led the abducted, pulling the rope with which they were tied. The 6-year-old girl remained at the LRA camp and was later given to Mbororo cattle herders who brought her home. During the walk from the Mbomou River to Mboki’s market, LRA fighters told people they encountered on the way that they were from the Ugandan army.

Emerging on Mboki’s main road, where the town’s market is also located, the LRA group started to loot. Initially the traders allowed the rebels to take what they wanted, including tea, sugar, soap, boots, and machetes. But when one LRA fighter shot an 11-year-old Chadian boy, the traders responded with arrows and machetes. Two male LRA fighters whose guns jammed were killed with machetes by members of the community, while one armed female LRA fighter died immediately from an arrow. The LRA fighters killed five civilians in Mboki, three people from the local population, and the two Congolese refugees abducted that morning. The other abductees managed to cut the rope and escape.[xiv]

The LRA group retreated hastily, trying to evade the arrows despite being armed with sub-machine guns. At least three LRA fighters were injured by arrows. A Mbororo man kidnapped after the attack who later escaped told the Mbororo chief that two LRA fighters died that day in the bush and another was severely injured and died later, bringing the number of LRA killed in Mboki to six.[xv]

The attack in Mboki represents a turning point in the history of the LRA in CAR. It was one of the few times the LRA had ever been attacked by civilians and the first time it faced stiff resistance in CAR. A former LRA fighter who surrendered in CAR in September 2009 said that after the Mboki attack, “We received orders to be careful of civilians who are hostile in CAR. We were told to kill all civilians we caught with guns.”[xvi]

After the Mboki attack, LRA attacks in CAR became more brutal and civilian casualties increased. This was partly in response to Mboki but also because by July 2009, the UPDF had entered CAR and settled in Obo.

Targeting humanitarian aid

On September 20, 2009, a truck from the Italian non-governmental organization Cooperazione Internazionale, or COOPI, travelled to Obo from Mboki, carrying school construction materials. Seven people were in the truck’s cabin including the driver, another COOPI employee, two young Congolese refugees, and three people from CAR, including a 10-year-old boy. The truck was attacked in Mwanzi, 5 km beyond the Mbomou River, before the village of Kadjema. The LRA killed four people in total.

The COOPI truck was accompanied by a UPDF escort vehicle. According to eyewitnesses, the UPDF truck overtook the COOPI truck just before crossing the Mbomou River. “The Ugandan soldiers crossed the river on the barge before us,” said one person who was in the COOPI truck the day of the attack, “and we never saw them again.” A few minutes after crossing the river, seven LRA soldiers emerged from the bush and shot at the COOPI truck, killing one person aboard and injuring another. It is unclear whether the UPDF soldiers heard the shots or were aware of the attack taking place.

The driver of the truck turned off the engine and the LRA forced everyone out. All of the food in the truck was loaded onto the backs of the abductees, including the 10-year-old boy. The injured person and the dead body were left behind as the truck was set ablaze. The following day, the LRA gave the 10-year-old to Mbororos they came across in the bush to take back to Mboki. Later that day the LRA killed the driver of the truck. “They hit him with an axe on the back of his head until he was dead,” said one eyewitness. The third day, the group joined a bigger LRA group commanded by Brigadier Abudema. The same day, the LRA killed another person from Obo. The three remaining abductees were distributed to three different LRA groups. One of the abductees later tried to escape but was apprehended and killed.

In the aftermath of the attack on the COOPI truck, the few remaining international organizations in the area decided to temporarily suspend their operations, which cut off the very little aid flowing in the remote corner of CAR. COOPI eventually restarted their programs in Haut Mbomou but scaled down significantly and relocated to Obo. “I don’t think the LRA targeted COOPI and probably came across the truck by accident,” said an international aid worker, “but as a result, many international organizations now refuse to work in areas where there might be LRA presence.”[xvii]

The Maboussou and Djemah attacks: A near miss with Kony

The attack of October 2, 2009 in Djemah remains the most devastating blow the Ugandan army has inflicted on LRA groups in CAR.[xviii] About 25 LRA fighters were killed and a few were captured, including two “wives” of Kony, who was himself also almost caught.

Kony was leading a large group of LRA that stepped up their attacks on civilians in late August 2009. A team of fighters from this group attacked Maboussou, 30 km west of Mboki, on August 27, 2009. The LRA killed three people in Maboussou, injured one man seriously, and raped one woman. Eight people were taken; five have recently escaped. Of the three who remained with the LRA, a 12-year-old boy was later killed near Djemah for not keeping up with the group. “He fell on the ground and could not walk anymore,” said one witness. “One fighter smashed his skull with a club.”

According to two witnesses, the commander leading the attack on Maboussou was Major Olanya, Kony’s younger brother. There were 19 fighters in his group and over 30 abductees, mostly women. Another eight were abducted in Maboussou. The group later joined Kony in the nearby village of Kere. The abducted were made to kneel in front of Kony, who “allowed them to live.”[xix] One 14-year-old girl was given to Olanya as a “wife,” and the boys were assigned to two different LRA groups.[xx]

Kony’s group moved north toward Djemah. Located on the southern tip of a huge forested area called the Zemongo Reserve, Djemah is split in two by Ouara River, the neighborhood of Fouka in the north, and the rest of Djemah in the south. One team from Kony’s group attacked Fouka, only reachable from Djemah by a barge operating on the Ouara River. Kony’s group came from Maboussou, crossed the river north of Djemah by rope, took the Derbissaka road, and attacked Fouka. Meanwhile, Kony stayed away from Djemah, remaining inside Zemongo. According to one child who was with Kony outside Djemah, Kony planned to enter Djemah in the morning after his fighters had secured the town. “Kony was going to decide whether they would live or not,” he said.

At 3 a.m., on the way to Fouka, with two abductees in tow, the LRA killed one man.[xxi] “The commander bayoneted him to death, worried he would raise the alarm,” said a witness who was abducted earlier. At 4 a.m., under very heavy rain, LRA fighters gathered almost everyone from the village and forced them to sit in an open space and prepare food. Two people managed to escape undetected and one swam across the river and alerted the UPDF troops in Djemah.

Teams of eight UPDF soldiers each responded rapidly by taking the barge to Fouka from Djemah. The soldiers reportedly shot in the air first to force the rebels to leave and not harm the people they had taken. Most of the rebels ran immediately toward the bush, but a few returned fire and dragged some of the abductees they had already tied and loaded with food into the bush with them. The LRA managed to take seven people that night. According to one witness in Kony’s camp, Kony initially thought the shots were by the LRA and started to walk toward Djemah but as LRA fighters appeared running toward him Kony retreated immediately.

During their escape, the LRA killed eight more people, having already killed two near Djemah. Of the seven people the LRA abducted, four were girls and three boys. The day after the attack, Kony ordered that all three boys be killed as revenge for the number of deaths the LRA suffered in Djemah. The LRA killed 13 people in total from Djemah. The UPDF likely killed 25 LRA fighters in Djemah. Two were killed in Fouka but the rest were killed in the bush as the UPDF continued the chase for days after the initial attack. “We kept running,” said a witness in Kony’s group, “and the UPDF almost caught up with Kony, killing one of his bodyguards.”

This incident powerfully demonstrates how—with greater international assistance such as intelligence sharing, logistics, and transport—apprehending Joseph Kony is a distinctly achievable goal. It also underscores the hard fact that a failure to apprehend Kony will only lead to further war crimes against the civilian population in CAR and beyond.

Recent attacks: LRA violence intensifies

After the Mboki and Djemah attacks in 2009, LRA violence increased considerably. While mass abductions have continued, killings per attack more than doubled on average, starting in mid-October 2009.[xxii] The first four months of 2010 were the bloodiest so far, with 63 people losing their lives at the hands of the LRA. This further raises concerns about the ability of the LRA to potentially regroup and regain strength in the often lawless hinterlands of CAR.

After Djemah, the LRA groups further splintered, moving in several directions while continuing to attack civilians. Kony’s group moved south to Derbissaka, abducting 21 people there in late October, and then moved eastward.Another group moved west into Mbomou prefecture, and attacked the gold mining town of Nzako on February 10, 2010. One particularly brutal group remained around Obo, despite the large Ugandan military presence in that area.

The same group that attacked Nzako went on a rampage in Mbomou prefecture, attacking a series of locations while moving south and west across CAR, culminating in an attack on the relatively large town of Rafai on February 19, 2010. Two were killed, 14 were severely wounded, and 30 were abducted.[xxiii] While some rebels remained around Chinko River and attacked Dembia on February 25, another group moved northwest to Yalinga where on February 27 they attacked the police post, stole medicines from a clinic, and looted and destroyed property.[xxiv]

The LRA continued to attack civilians in CAR over the past three months. On March 22, the same LRA group operating around Chinko River attacked Agoumar, west of Rafai, killing 10 and abducting 50.[xxv] On April 4, a commercial truck coming from the direction of Bangassou was attacked by the LRA in Guerekindo between Rafai and Dembia. Eight people are believed dead while two were severely injured.[xxvi] On April 21, 2010, six people were killed in Gouete, 45 km north of Zemio, and three were kidnapped. On April 29, Kitessa, 45 km east of Zemio on the road to Mboki, was attacked. Eight people were killed.[xxvii]

The LRA’s movement and strategy

The LRA’s movement into CAR appears to have been part of a carefully executed plan. As previously described, Kony had prepared contingency plans for an eventual move to CAR and had sent LRA teams to carry out reconnaissance and abduct people 10 months before Operation Lightning Thunder. The abducted were thoroughly interrogated about military and police positions. In many ways, CAR is an ideal base for the LRA. CAR is remote, the country lacks a professional military, and its location allows for fluid movement between CAR, Sudan, and Congo for the LRA. Kony and his group moved to CAR from Congo around May 2009 after he received word from his advanced units that it was safe to go there.[xxviii]

LRA strategy for CAR, at least for the first part of 2009, seemed to have been aimed at not attracting attention. Unlike in eastern Congo, where the LRA has killed many with brutality, attacks in CAR were initially focused on abducting people and stealing food, not necessarily committing massacres. Keeping a low profile in CAR was most likely intended to allow Kony and other top commanders to move freely and avoid UPDF attacks as the force grew more accustomed to its new landscape. In contrast, violence in Congo was highly instrumental, in that it was meant to scare Congolese civilians into not disclosing LRA whereabouts to Congolese and Ugandan militaries and to divert attention away from Kony and other commanders operating in CAR.

Kony’s group, which included approximately 80 fighters and more than 100 abductees, first settled in Gougbere, 45 km north of Obo. It appears that the LRA commanders did not think that the UPDF would follow them into CAR. In the first three weeks of September, two LRA commanders, Major Okello Kalalang and Brigadier Santos Alit, were killed and Major Okot Atiak was captured, all north of Obo, around Gougbere, in three separate incidents, and the element of surprise may have been a significant factor in the UPDF’s early successes.[xxix] Again, this speaks to the importance of assistance that would allow the UPDF to move more quickly, decisively, and with credible intelligence.

On September 9, 2009 the UPDF bombed Kony’s camp in Gougbere where he was allegedly injured. The UPDF said that a large storage of food in Gougbere had been destroyed. Kony’s group then moved to Nzo, an old French airbase and hunting lodge near the Sudanese border where Kony received medical help from Sudanese traders coming into CAR. Later, Kony’s group attacked Maboussou and moved to Djemah.

Kony ordered his commanders in CAR and DRC to go to CAR for a meeting north of Djemah.[xxx] Kony had likely identified the large Zemongo forest as an ideal place to settle, much like Garamba had been in DRC. With its northern tip on the border with Sudan (and South Darfur) and its southern edge being close to the DRC border, Zemongo occupies a geographically advantageous position. The rebels mined a strip of land north of Djemah—an almost sure sign that they planned to set up camp there.

Brigadier Bok Abudema, one of the LRA’s oldest and most senior commanders, led a large group from the Congolese border near Obo northwest to Djemah. The team that attacked the COOPI truck on September 21, 2009 was part of Abudema’s group. According to one of the abductees from the COOPI truck, Abudema had received orders from Kony to join him in Djemah. En route to Djemah, he was told by one Zande LRA fighter that they were going to “Nigeria,” a reference to Abudema’s camp in Garamba, another likely indication that the LRA were planning to set up base in Zemongo. “We walked for a month trying to find Kony,” said the boy, “until the Ugandan soldiers attacked us.” Abudema and three LRA fighters were killed on December 31, 2009, 20 km north of Djemah.[xxxi]

UPDF commanders claim that in the aftermath of the foiled attack on Djemah, the LRA was thrown into disarray.[xxxii] Kony’s group moved south to Dembia and then east along the Congolese border. On March 7, 2010 Kony crossed from Bassigbiri in CAR to northwest of Doruma in DRC. Kony is believed to have met with some commanders in DRC such as Dominic Ongwen and Binansio Okumu in Bas Uele. Kony apparently went to Garamba and crossed into South Sudan in mid-April of 2010.[xxxiii] The whereabouts of the LRA commander at the moment remain unclear, though he is likely in Congo.

One LRA group remained in Zemongo and later crossed into Sudan, not very far from Southern Darfur, a development first reported by the Enough Project. The group made contact with the Sudanese Armed Forces. According to a former LRA rebel, the LRA fighters carried a message from Kony asking the Sudanese government to resume supplying the LRA.[xxxiv] One of the leaders of the group, Okello “Mission” Patrick, captured in Sudan on March 31, 2010, said that Sudanese officials were reluctant to supply the LRA but offered Kony safe passage in Sudan.[xxxv]

At present, the multiple LRA groups remain active in CAR. At least one LRA group operates around Obo close to the border with South Sudan, while two LRA groups based in Ango territory in DRC move north into CAR to attack. The tenacity of LRA groups in CAR, particularly around Chinko River near Rafai, and the groups’ willingness to push even further west in CAR indicates that they are not willing to relinquish their positions in CAR. LRA groups are clearly told to keep their positions in an effort to keep the UPDF engaged on multiple fronts.

The humanitarian impact

Civilians in eastern CAR are suffering enormously as a result of the LRA’s presence. Unlike similarly affected areas of DRC and Sudan, where international organizations offer some help, few organizations work in this remote region of CAR. Continuing LRA attacks, coupled with a lackluster humanitarian response, are creating the conditions for a humanitarian crisis. The biggest threat right now is hunger. “We are starving,” said one local official, “and don’t know how we will survive next year, especially now that we have eaten what we had stored before the LRA arrived.”

LRA attacks in the region have triggered significant internal displacement within CAR, as well as a refugee influx, mostly from neighboring areas of Congo. Refugees fleeing LRA violence in Congo are now at risk of being attacked by the LRA in CAR, as was the case with two Congolese refugees killed in Mboki in July 2009. More than 5,000 Congolese refugees, mostly from the northern part of Bas Uele, in Ango territory, live in camps in Zemio, Mboki, and Obo.

Between 12,000 and 15,000 internally displaced people, or IDPs, have fled LRA violence to live in camps or with relatives in CAR. Entire villages have relocated to larger towns where the Ugandan army maintains a presence.[xxxvi] Based on data provided by local officials, there are more than 5,200 IDPs in Obo alone. Another 4,000 IDPs live in Zemio, Mboki, and Bangassou while a few hundred have even crossed to Bondo in Province Equateur in DRC.[xxxvii] Close to 2,000 IDPs live in Bambouti near the Sudanese border.[xxxviii]

According to refugee representatives, more than 3,000 Congolese refugees now live in a camp in Zemio while 1,100 refugees are based in Mboki and another 600 live in Obo. Numbers continue to grow daily as LRA attacks in Congo continue. By December 2009, there were 2,300 Congolese refugees in Zemio but by March 2010 the number had increased by 30 percent.[xxxix]

These 20,000 IDPs and refugees have lost access to their farms and gardens, their principal sources of food. International organizations try to help but their assistance has been sporadic and unpredictable. For instance, displaced people in Zemio waited more than four months between World Food Program distributions.[xl]

Facing an acute shortage of food and medicine, some Congolese refugees have braved returning home to obtain food only to be abducted or attacked by the LRA.[xli] Most of the children living in camps do not attend school, though COOPI has started to operate one school in an IDP camp in Obo. There is limited access to health care and deaths from preventable diseases are on the rise.[xlii]

Lack of clean water is another key concern. A relief organization team visiting the refugee camp in Zemio described the situation as deplorable, mostly due to water and sanitation issues. IDPs in Obo and Mboki face the same problems. The chief of an IDP camp in Obo said, “The biggest problem is drinking water; it is very difficult to find it. We have to walk 3 km to 4 km daily to a well to get water.” An interagency mission comprised of U.N. and nongovernmental organization representatives from DRC visited the Congolese refugees in November 2009. According to the internal U.N. report from this mission, “having been abandoned … there is a great need for the Congolese refugees to receive immediately food rations for at least the next six months.”

Even in towns where there is a strong Ugandan army presence, people cannot venture far from town to work their land because of the risk of LRA attacks. In Obo, for instance, where there are perhaps 1,000 UPDF soldiers, the population has been told by Ugandan army commanders not to go further than 5 km away from the town’s perimeter. “We cannot go out of our town,” said a local official. “We live in a true enclave.” Unable to work in their gardens, people have so far survived on stored food from previous years. But such stocks have been depleted. According to the Mayor of Djemah, “We don’t know how we will face this year. We already ate the planting seeds.”

Military response to the LRA

Central African security forces

The CAR armed forces are traditionally weak and often divided. The Forces of the Central African Republic, or FACA, numbers only around 5,000 personnel, although the number of soldiers on duty at any time is a fraction of that. These forces rarely stray from the capital, are paid infrequently, and have a miserable human rights record.

CAR armed forces are very few in number throughout Haut Mbomou and are unable to challenge the LRA or protect the civilians. There are only 10 CAR army troops in Obo and 13 in Mboki, but none in Zemio, Djemah, Dembia, or Rafai. Gendarmes—military troops usually tasked with carrying out police duties outside of urban areas—are even fewer in number than the army. There are four gendarmes in Obo and three in Mboki. Similarly, a handful of police operate in the entire Haut Mbomou area.[xliii]

CAR soldiers and gendarmes, who are well armed, tend to run when the LRA attacks, or appear after the LRA has already left.[xliv] On September 8, 2009, for instance, when the LRA attacked the village of Nguiri-Nguiri, 12 km northwest of Obo, eight CAR army soldiers ran away without firing a shot and never returned. There were close to 50 CAR troops in Obo and another 20 in Zemio but they were ordered to return to Bangui at the beginning of 2010. A local official said, “There were more [CAR army troops] here but it was found they were useless so it was decided to send them home.”

The Ugandan military

Ugandan army teams entered Central Africa in the early months of 2009 but only set up base in Obo in July 2009. There are between 5,000 and 7,000 UPDF soldiers in CAR at the moment with bases in Obo, Mboki, Zemio, Dembia, Djemah, and Sam Ouandja. In practice, the Ugandan military presence dwarfs the size of the country’s own military. Given the small number of CAR military forces present in the area, the UPDF is the only force capable of addressing the LRA threat. The UPDF presence has ensured a certain level of security but has not stopped LRA attacks altogether.[xlv]

UPDF strategy in CAR has largely focused on chasing LRA groups in the bush. UPDF officials have said that protection of civilians in CAR is the task of the CAR armed forces and the gendarmerie, even though they know that the numbers of CAR military forces are too low to be able to provide protection to the population.[xlvi] Initially, the UPDF engaged in protecting civilians, even accompanying people to work on their gardens, but such practice was dropped soon after it started according to a chief in Obo. According to interviews with UPDF officers, the Ugandans deemed civilian protection relatively unimportant from a strategic perspective, even though the example of Djemah—where UPDF presence caused a huge loss to the LRA—indicates otherwise.

The majority of people interviewed in five different towns in CAR said that the UPDF had behaved professionally.[xlvii] “The first UPDF soldiers here were wild,” said one person, “but after the commander arrived last summer, things improved.” There were four reported cases of rape in Obo and harassment in Djemah committed by UPDF soldiers. Colonel Rwashande, overall UPDF commander in CAR, said that undisciplined soldiers were court marshalled and that a military court was going to Obo to try two soldiers accused of assaulting two women.[xlviii] In Djemah, UPDF commanders have conducted frequent informational meetings with local authorities and the population. The mayor of Djemah said, “As two people trying to live together, we have our differences but we talk about them and resolve them.” The UPDF has also tried to win the goodwill of people in Obo by allowing civilians to use the UPDF field hospital in Obo and bringing in medical supplies from Kampala for the use of the local population.[xlix] The local population, however, is frustrated with the inability of the UPDF to finish off the LRA.

Many were surprised with the UPDF’s failure to eliminate top LRA commanders. “The UPDF are too slow and weak,” said a man who was abducted and spent time with the LRA. “The LRA always knew when the UPDF were coming and outran them.” Frequently UPDF soldiers are slow, mostly because they are dependent on food and water rations delivered by helicopters. A guide used by the UPDF to track a large LRA group led possibly by Kony said that the UPDF travelled in a group of 300 and that they had to wait for the supply helicopter for days at a time. “The closest we got to the LRA group was four days behind them,” he said.

Logistics present the biggest challenge for the UPDF, a fact readily accepted by UPDF officers as contributing significantly to failure in the fight against the LRA. Helicopters are needed to carry food and water from Obo to forward bases and bring back injured soldiers. The helicopters used currently are too few and inefficient. To transport jet fuel from Obo to Djemah, for instance, the UPDF uses a Mi-17 helicopter which burns seven drums of fuel but can only carry eight drums. Lack of fuel and technical expertise also accounts for at least two other UPDF helicopters not being used at the moment. Other concerns include lack of water for the troops, especially in places far north in CAR such as Sam Ouandja.

Conclusion

Throughout its existence, the LRA has terrorized marginalized populations in remote areas of Africa, beginning in northern Uganda and moving to remote regions of Sudan, Congo, and now CAR. For too long, this has allowed the international community to overlook the LRA’s atrocities, which goes a long way toward explaining their remarkable and deeply regrettable longevity. Thanks to concerned citizens and congressional leadership in the United States, there is now a window of opportunity to reset the international strategy to apprehend Kony and his commanders and remove the LRA threat. It is essential that the world have as full a picture as possible of what is happening on the ground in CAR and its neighboring countries. This will require a surge in international support for threatened civilians. The United States will need to seize this opportunity by leading renewed international efforts at the Security Council, galvanizing key allies with interests and capabilities that can help bring Kony to justice, and catalyzing much stronger action on the ground that will actually deliver some measure of security to civilians in eastern CAR.

Appendix: Chronology of LRA attacks in the Central African Republic

February 2008—April 2010

Date	Location	Description
2/25/08	Bassigbiri	A large LRA group attacked the village in the middle of the night, abducting 60 people, who were taken back to the LRA camps in Garamba National Park; six of the abducted were later killed while the rest were forced to work and fight for the LRA.
3/4/08	Ngouli	The LRA abducted an unknown number of people during this raid.
3/5/08	Obo	A contingent of 80 LRA fighters, led by ICC-indictee Okot Odhiambo, attacked the Africa Inland Mission church neighborhood in Obo. Seventy-three people were abducted, of which 29 have since returned. The majority of abductees were less than 18 years old.
7/08	Nyokora	One killed.
1/13/09	Bassigbiri	As LRA groups infiltrated CAR in early 2009, one LRA group killed five Chadian traders coming from Sudan on the Bambouti-Obo road.
6/21/09	Ligoua	The LRA killed one person in the first of seven attacks on this village between June 2009 and April 2010. A total of six people have been killed and 30 abducted from Ligoua.
7/3/09	Gougbere	One killed.
7/14/09	Dindiri (3 km from Obo)	LRA looted and burned houses.
7/21/09	Aboissi (south of Bambouti)	One killed.
7/22/09	Ligoua	Second attack on Ligoua.
7/24/09	Mboki	A team from a 60-person LRA group, camped inside the forest Reserve de Faune Mbomou Orientale, first abducted seven people to interrogate for logistical information. A second team, comprised of 13 fighters, abducted 18 DRC women and children, and six Mboki, then attacked and looted the Mboki marketplace, initially feigning to be Ugandan soldiers. Traders retaliated with arrows and machetes. Six LRA and five civilians were killed.
8/5/09	Ngouli	Many houses were burned; many items were looted.
8/09	Aboissi	One killed.
8/7/09	Mbokou (near Obo)	Four Congolese refugees from Doruma killed.
8/11/09	Ligoua	Five people killed in the third LRA raid on Ligoua.
8/27/09	Maboussou	A group of 19 LRA fighters accompanied by 30 abductees attacked Maboussou under the command of Kony’s younger brother Major Olanya. Three people were killed, one woman raped, and eight abducted. One abductee, a boy of 12, was later killed near Djemah. The group later joined with Kony’s team in the nearby village of Kere.
8/28/09	Hele Nguiri Nguiri	Although no one was killed in this attack, most of the population fled to Obo.
9/7/09	20 km from Obo	Two killed.
9/8/09	Nguili-nguili (12 km north of Obo)	In UPDF response, 25 LRA fighters were killed. This is very likely when LRA commander Lt. Colonel Santos Alit was killed.
9/9/09	Gassimbala (20 km from Obo)	One killed.
9/9/09	Gougbere	UPDF bombed Gougbere where Kony supposedly was camped, allegedly injuring the LRA leader. The UPDF claims to have destroyed a large food stockpile.
9/9/09	20 km from Obo on road to Mboki	The LRA group operating around Obo killed seven on the road to Mboki.
9/11/09		LRA commander Okot Atiak, accused of leading an LRA massacre of 250 civilians in Northern Uganda in 1995, captured by the UPDF.
9/13-14/09	North of Obo	LRA commander Okello Kalalang killed.
9/21/09	5 km from Kadjema after river Mbomo	An LRA group that was a part of Brigadier Bok Abudema’s team attacked a truck from the Italian NGO COOPI that was carrying school construction materials after its Ugandan army escort went ahead across the Mbomou River. Four killed, two abducted. Both later escaped.
9/26/09	Bambouti	One killed and six abducted.
9/27/09	Aboissi (south of Bambouti)	Three killed.
9/27/09	Kadjema	One killed; one injured.
9/30/09	Ngouli and Nguiri-Nguiri.	The LRA killed six people in two separate attacks on villages nearby Obo. They abducted three people, including the former mayor of Obo, who is still held by the LRA.
10/2/09	Djemah	After abducting a couple in the northern neighborhood of Fouka to interrogate for information, a team of about 40 LRA fighters and 50 abductees raided the village, gathering locals into a central location. Two escaped and alerted Ugandan soldiers across the river in Djemah. Fighting ensued with the arrival of the Ugandan soldiers. Twenty-five LRA fighters were killed and a few were captured, including two of Kony’s “wives.” In reprisal, the LRA killed 10 civilians and abducted seven children—three of whom were later killed.
10/16/09	Djemah (Ourou 2)	LRA Brigadier Okedi killed. The commander was seen with his two bodyguards by two local women who alerted the UPDF.
10/22-23/09	15 km from Djemah, road to Derbissaka	Kony’s group, escaping the Ugandan army, moved south to Derbissaka, killing one person near the town and abducting 21.
10/29/09	Abouna	One killed.
11/3/09		UPDF starts a 23-day hunt of a large LRA group. Chases them until Baroua (south of Derbissaka).
12/31/09	20 km north of Djemah	Senior Brigadier Bok Abudema killed, along with three LRA fighters, while his team was searching for Kony.
1/1/10	Mogoroko (north of Doruma)	One killed.
1/10	North of Djemah	Huge UPDF bombardment.
1/10	Ngouli	Six killed.
1/22/10-1/23/10	Ligoua	One killed and three injured during the fourth LRA attack on Ligoua.
2/10/10	Nzako	A faction of the Kony-led LRA group fleeing the UPDF split off, moving toward the West and attacking the gold mining town of Nzako, killing four and abducting 50—of which 42 were later released. The same group then killed three on the road from Derbissaka to Dembia.
2/11/10	Bakouma	The LRA group that attacked Nzako then attacked this village, located north of Dembia.
2/15/10	Karmadare	Following the attack on Bakouma, the same group abducted 10, 40 km south of Dembia near the border with Congo.
2/17/10	Gbangomboro	Villagers in Gbangomboro, 7 km from Dembia, received warning that the LRA were coming and fled in advance of the attack.
2/17/10-2/18/10	Boule (55 km west of Zemio)	An attack by an LRA group that apparently came from Karamadar, south of Derbissaka; five abducted, one released.
2/19/10	Rafai	Two killed and 30 abducted.
2/22/10	Gougbere	The LRA group operating around Obo killed three, including one pregnant woman, during this raid.
2/23/10	North of Mboki	Three killed.
2/25/10	60 km from Mboki border of DRC	A Chadian trader was killed during a robbery by the LRA in the Reserve de Faune Mbomou Orientale.
2/27/10	Yalinga	The LRA abducted 27, and looted the gendarmerie, weather station, and a safari camp.
3/19/10	Mboki	One killed, two injured, six abducted, including the deputy village chief.
3/22/10	Agoumar (west of Rafai)	Ten killed; five seriously wounded; fifty abducted.
3/27/10	Dembia	LRA fighters looted and destroyed property, with unconfirmed reports of killings and abductions.
3/28/10-3/29/10	Guerekindo	Fourteen abducted; village looted.
4/4/10	Between Rafai and Dembia in Guerekindo	Eight killed; two severely injured.
4/21/10	Gouete (45 km north of Zemio on Djemah road)	Six killed; three abducted.
4/22/10	Between Kitessa and Gouete	UPDF finds six dead bodies (possibly some of the abducted).
4/29/10	Kitessa (45 km east of Zemio on road to Mboki)	Eight killed; many wounded.

[1] This report is based on field research during travel to the Central African towns of Obo, Mboki, Zemio, Djemah, and Sam Ouandja in March 2010 and subsequent follow up with sources on the ground. Unless otherwise noted, quotes and references are from extensive interviews conducted with eyewitnesses to LRA attacks, local officials, traditional chiefs, civil society representatives, aid workers, and Ugandan soldiers during this trip.

[2] See the appendix for a detailed chronology of LRA attacks in CAR during this period.

[i] Research indicates a sharp increase in attacks and killings committed by the LRA in 2010. Enough documented 35 attacks in 2009 and 22 attacks in 2010. Enough documented 71 LRA related deaths in the entirety of 2009, but 63 people were killed by the LRA in the first four months of 2010 alone. At least 83 more people were killed by the LRA but could not be independently verified. The combined number of 217 killings is probably lower than the real number of LRA-caused deaths in CAR. It is difficult to document deaths of people on the move such as Mbororo pastoralists, Chadian and Sudanese traders, and internally displaced people. Many are never found, likely killed and left in the bush.

[ii] Numbers have been compiled and cross-referenced based on Enough research, reports from local and international organizations, and media articles.

[iii] “CIA World Factbook, Central African Republic,” available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html (last accessed April 28, 2010).

[iv] Interview with Zande cultural chief, Yambio, October 14, 2009.

[v] This section is based upon an interview with a Mbororo expert, Zemio, CAR, March 13, 2010.

[vi] Enough interviews in Western Equatoria, Sudan, in October 2009 and Haut Uele, DRC, in December 2009, indicated that the Mbororo were frequently accused of supplying the LRA with food and ammunition.

[vii] Interview with former LRA fighters, Gulu, September 14, 2009, April 16, 2010. “Mbororo Update 1, 2010—‘They have been systematically and relentlessly targeted by organised groups of bandits and rebels,’” available at http://prayafrica.net/2010/03/mbororo-update-1-2010-they-have-been-systematically-and-relentlessly-targeted-by-organised-groups-of-bandits-and-rebels/ (last accessed May 6, 2010).

[viii] Interviews with former LRA fighters, Gulu April 15 and 16, 2010.

[ix] Interview with UPDF commander, Obo, March 9, 2010.

[x] Enough interviewed six people who were abducted in March 2008 and have since returned.

[xi] Interview with former LRA second lieutenant, J.O, Gulu, April 16, 2010.

[xii] Paul-Marin Ngoupana, “Ugandan rebels attack across CAR border-Colonel,” Reuters, February 27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLP808389._CH_.2400

[xiii] Interview with former LRA fighters. Gulu, April 16, 2010.

[xiv] Enough interviewed all of them with the exception of the six-year-old.

[xv] Interview with Mbororo chief, Mboki, March 12, 2010. There were reports that nine additional LRA fighters died in the bush but such claims are almost certainly exaggerated.

[xvi] Interview with former LRA fighter. Nzara, South Sudan, November 13, 2009.

[xvii] Email correspondence with aid worker, April 26, 2010.

[xviii] Interviews with UPDF commanders, Nzara, October 8, 2009 and Obo, March 9, 2010.

[xix] One of the witnesses said that the abducted were told Kony would decide if they would live or die. If abductees were deemed to be possessed by the bad spirits, they would be killed.

[xx] The witnesses accurately described Kony. They were also told by other Zande abducted before them that the commander was Kony. One of the abducted in Maboussou was tasked with finding honey in the bush for Kony, a well-known preference of the LRA commander.

[xxi] On the evening of October 1, 2009, 40 LRA fighters and 50 abductees captured a man and his wife working on their gardens north of Fouka. The couple was tied and questioned about military presence in Djemah. The LRA asked about the position of Fouka, the location of the barge and whether the population was armed. The captured man told Enough that he answered all of the questions but did not tell the LRA about the presence of close to 150 UPDF soldiers who had arrived in Djemah on the evening of September 30, 2009.

[xxii] LRA related deaths from October 2009 through March 2010 are roughly equivalent to the number of deaths during the 10 months from January to October 2009. See appendix for details.

[xxiii] Ibid. Paul-Marin Ngoupana, Richard Valdmanis, “Ugandan rebels kill two, abduct 30 in eastern CAR,” Reuters, February 20, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE61J0B1

[xxiv] “Les Rebelles Ougandais enlèvent des civils dans un village de Centrafrique,” available at http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ASAZ-838KCC?OpenDocument (last accessed April 28, 2010).

[xxv] Telephone interview with NGO worker, Zemio, March 25, 2010.

[xxvi] Email correspondence with aid worker. May 3, 2010.

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] Interview with CMI officer, Kampala, April 16, 2010.

[xxix] “LRA commander killed in CAR,” available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/695366 (last accessed May 5, 2010).

[xxx] Interview with CMI officer, Kampala, April 3, 2010.

[xxxi]“Uganda reports killing LRA commander Abudema in CAR,” BBC, January 2, 2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8437886.stm

[xxxii] Interview with UPDF commander, Kampala, April 24, 2010.

[xxxiii] Tabu Butagira, Betty Kyakuwa, “Kony rebels returning to Garamba, says UN report,” Daily Monitor, April 27, 2010, available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/907290/-/wy0qm1/-/index.html

[xxxiv] Interview with CMI officer, Kampla, April 5, 2010.

[xxxv] “LRA rebel pins Sudan on support,” New Vision, April 5, 2010, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/715274

[xxxvi] For instance, the entire population of Hele (495 people) and Nguiri-nguri (458 people), which the LRA attacked on September 30, 2009, moved to Obo. Another 520 people joined them, displaced from the village of Ngouli, 10 km south of Obo. Interview with village chiefs, Obo, March 8, 2010.

[xxxvii] “Bulletin 140, Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team CAR,” available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/DNEO-84JGLB-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (last accessed May 4, 2010).

[xxxviii] “Africa weekly emergency situation update, Vol. 2, Number 39,” available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VDUX-7X9M5L?OpenDocument (last accessed May 3, 2010).

[xxxix] Interview with OCHA representative, Zemio, March 15, 2010.

[xl] Interview with representative of the World Food Program, Zemio, March 15, 2010.

[xli] At least four Congolese refugees said their relatives have returned to get food but were captured by the LRA in Sukadi and Gwane. Interview with Congolese refugees, Zemio, March 15, 2010.

[xlii] “Central African Republic: humanitarian situation in southeast critical,” Jesuit Relief Service,December 10, 2009, available at http://www.jrs.net/reports/index.php?lang=fr&sid=5100

[xliii] Other forces protecting the population are self-defense groups. The biggest one is in Mboki with close to 200 people operating in eight different groups. Trained by a former Chadian soldier, Mboki groups comprise Chadian and Senegalese traders, Mbororos, and Zande, mostly armed with bows and arrows, machetes, and locally manufactured guns.

[xliv] Enough documented two cases when FACA actually fought LRA troops: In Kadjema on September 27 2009, 10 FACA soldiers repulsed an LRA attack, and in Rafai on February 19, 2010 FACA troops from Zemio ordered to return to Bangui happened upon the LRA group attacking Rafai.

[xlv] For instance, the LRA attacked Mboki on March 20, 2010 despite at least 50 UPDF soldiers stationed in Mboki.

[xlvi] Interviews with UPDF officers, Nzara, Obo and Kampala. October 2009, March and April 2010.

[xlvii] Overwhelmingly, people interviewed in CAR wanted the UPDF to stay. “They are a foreign army but I am happy for them to stay here to protect us from the rebels,” said a resident of Obo. UPDF presence in places like Obo and Zemio has ensured that some aid organizations have continued to operate in Haut Mbomou. “The Ugandan soldiers are the reason we are here and able to help others,” said an aid worker, “and had they not been around, more people would have died.”

[xlviii] Interview with Colonel Rwashande, Obo, March 9, 2010.

[xlix] Interview with UPDF medic and Colonel Rwashande, Obo, March 9, 2010.

A Benchmarks Report Card for Sudan

Tsegaye Hidru — Wed, 05 May 2010 12:14:03 -0400

In its initial Sudan policy review, the Obama administration pledged that it would regularly evaluate the progress of peace in Sudan—or lack thereof. The administration’s approach was clear:

“Assessment of progress and decisions regarding incentives and disincentives will be based on verifiable changes in conditions on the ground. Backsliding by any party will be met with credible pressure in the form of disincentives leveraged by our government and our international partners.”
Secretary of State Clinton, October 19, 2009^[1]

“There will be no rewards for the status quo, no incentives without concrete and tangible progress. There will be significant consequences for parties that backslide or simply stand still. All parties will be held to account.”
Ambassador Susan E. Rice, October 19, 2009^[2]

Because the administration had not publicly disclosed the precise benchmarks it is applying to assess developments, nine leading Sudan advocacy organizations co-authored the report ‘Clear Benchmarks for Sudan’ in January 2010.

Based upon the rigorous analysis of leading indicators across nine overarching categories of benchmarks, the Enough Project, the Save Darfur Coalition, and partners developed the following assessment of the amount of change or improvement that has been observed in key areas over the last six months. A more detailed examination of the factors driving each of these criteria is spelled out on the following page.

The absence of improvement during the past six months is a significant cause for concern. All parties, including the National Congress Party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, rebel groups, and others, should be held accountable. As President Obama stated, “If the Government of Sudan acts to improve the situation on the ground and to advance peace, there will be incentives; if it does not, then there will be increased pressure imposed by the United States and the international community.”^[3]

President Obama and Secretary Clinton must own Sudan policy far more directly, and actually implement pressures and incentives where appropriate or face growing risk that violence in Sudan will spiral out of control.

Endnotes

[1] State Department, Remarks on the Sudan Strategy, October 19, 2009.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Sudan Strategy, October 19, 2009.

Grading the Benchmarks

Will McElhinny — Tue, 27 Apr 2010 09:59:40 -0400

Grading the Benchmarks

An election official displays the ballots to be used for the elections at a polling station set in a restaurant in Juba, southern Sudan. Photo - AP / Jerome Delay

Executive summary

With its Sudan policy review, the Obama administration promised a diplomatic approach based on a clear-headed analysis of the situation on the ground across a variety of indicators. According to the strategy, the parties in Sudan would be held accountable for their actions, and incentives and pressures would be deployed in response to progress or backsliding on the ground. Now, almost six months after the policy review, an honest accounting of the “benchmarks” for progress in Sudan suggests how much important work remains to be done if broader conflict is to be avoided.

The national reforms for Sudan encompassed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement have largely been jettisoned as the South’s ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and other opposition parties have been unable to overcome resistance by the regime to such reforms. While there have been major improvements in relations between Sudan and neighboring Chad, the security situation in both Darfur and South Sudan remains poor, with significant numbers of Sudanese still displaced and vulnerable. Humanitarian access in Darfur and in some key border areas between North and South Sudan remains highly limited as part of the Sudanese government’s continuing strategy to deliberately conceal the scale of human suffering in these areas. There has been an ongoing peace process in Darfur, accompanied by efforts to unify rebel groups. The efficacy and durability of this peace process, however, are sharply in question, all the more so given that the government of Sudan was engaged in a major offensive in Darfur as talks were underway.

The handling of the recently completed national elections is of particular concern. Despite overwhelming evidence that the environment surrounding elections was neither free nor fair, and a widespread opposition boycott, the Obama administration seemed reluctant to offer an honest assessment of the numerous obstacles to a free election in the run up to voting. The administration has since noted that the election did not meet international standards, but there has been no suggestion that the NCP would face a cost for subverting the will of the Sudanese people. Negotiators from the ruling National Congress Party in Khartoum and the SPLM have made some progress in laying the groundwork for the South’s independence referendum in January 2011, but the list of issues that need resolution to keep the referendum on track and manage the likely transition to independence is enormous.

Obviously, successfully negotiating the peaceful division of Africa’s largest country while simultaneously resolving the conflict in Darfur is a Herculean task, rich with dangers at virtually every step. There will most certainly have to be intensive dialogue not only among the parties in Sudan, but among key international actors, to reach an acceptable outcome and avert widespread conflict. At times, difficult negotiations will entail unsavory compromises. That said, the Obama administration built a diplomatic approach to Sudan around periodic, hard-nosed policy assessments of the situation on the ground and the judicious deployment of incentives and pressures in response to the situation on the ground. Yet to date, there are virtually no indications that the administration has held any of the parties to account for their actions since the policy review was announced, and senior administration officials appear badly divided on their approach to Sudan. There is a pressing need for Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama to become directly involved, not only to signal that Sudan is a priority of the administration, but to get the interagency “deputies” review process and the overall approach to diplomacy back on track.

Introduction

In January 2010, nine organizations – the Enough Project, Humanity United, Human Rights Watch, the Save Darfur Coalition, Genocide Intervention Network, American Jewish World Service, Physicians for Human Rights, i-Act, and Investors Against Genocide – co-authored the report “Clear Benchmarks for Sudan.” The report, noting the commitment of the Obama administration to conduct a quarterly review at a senior interagency level of indicators of progress in Sudan, spelled out many of the key factors that should be considered as part of any principled set of benchmarks over the course of the year.

Given that there is broad agreement among Sudanese and those concerned with the fate of Sudan that these benchmarks constitute the fundamental elements of a durable peace, it is imperative to revisit where the parties stand with respect to these key indicators. (While the Obama administration said it would hold the parties in Sudan accountable to benchmarks, it never clearly articulated exactly what would constitute these benchmarks or how they would be measured, thus the effort by the group of organizations which authored this and the previous benchmarks report.) This is all the more important given the critical issues facing Sudan on the eve of the South’s independence vote. The Obama administration, despite having held its first “deputies meeting” charged with reviewing Sudan’s benchmarks, appears to remain divided with respect to its own assessment of the situation on the ground and the degree to which it should rely on incentives and pressures respectively.

National reforms

Key Benchmarks: Discontinuation of the use of the national security law to arrest or otherwise intimidate civil society, human rights activists, and political actors; Peaceful demonstrations and other gatherings allowed without interference; Freedom for candidates for public office to campaign without intimidation; Concrete measures taken in Khartoum and Juba to ensure freedom of the press and freedom of association.

By and large, the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, its southern counterpart the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and the international guarantors of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement have made an unfortunate collective decision to largely overlook the elements of transformational national reform contained in the CPA. These key elements of the CPA were designed to change the fundamental dynamics of how Sudan is governed and help ease the center-periphery tensions that have been at the heart of the country’s repeated conflicts. By largely sidelining implementation of these provisions in the interests of short-term deal making, all parties are making future conflict more likely. Worse still, the NCP was able to block these reforms with very little protest from international guarantors to the CPA and other international actors.

Agreements reached in December 2009 between the Sudanese parties over a package of legislation made it clear that the ideal of credible national reforms had been sacrificed for political pragmatism that would allow the parties to “check the box” of national elections and make forward progress on referenda preparations. The laws passed dealt with the referenda for the South and Abyei, popular consultations, and a draconian national security law which allows the NCP to continue using the security services as a blunt object of its political will. During the protracted negotiations between the NCP and SPLM last fall, and at other points during the CPA process, the SPLM fought for provisions in the CPA aimed at democratic transformation. However, the SPLM along with other northern opposition parties were stymied by NCP leadership in the presidency and the ruling party’s majority hold on the National Assembly.

In its 2009 human rights report on Sudan, the U.S. State Department detailed a litany of human rights abuses and violations by the NCP, SPLM, and their respective security agents; these abuses ranged from extrajudicial killings by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, to incommunicado detention of suspected government opponents by Khartoum’s security forces.[i] If the Obama administration has the resources and ability to document such abuses, then it should muster the courage to confront the Sudanese governmental parties responsible for them.

North

The National Security Act, which grants government security forces extensive powers to arbitrarily detain and arrest citizens without charge, remains the legal foundation of Khartoum’s powers to control its population and has been regularly used to arrest and intimidate political actors seen as threatening by the ruling party in the North. The National Security Act passed only by mechanical majority of the NCP in the National Assembly, with SPLM and opposition parties voting against it. The failure of these reforms was not for lack of effort on the part of the SPLM or the opposition parties in the North. Unfortunately, the international community was notably silent and largely invisible during these negotiations, rather than making a clear statement that “verifiable progress” from Sudan required more substantial reform to these laws.

Security forces continue to arrest and detain activists that speak out against the NCP. On March 15, Sudanese security forces in the North detained and tortured an 18-year old member of the voter education group Girifna. The political activist was reportedly beaten by 13 men, including with electric wires, and interrogated about the campaign’s activities.[ii] Before being released, the activist was forced to sign a paper saying he would not participate in political activities and that he would report on Girifna’s activities.[iii]

Campaign gatherings and demonstrations were circumscribed and broken up by security forces in the North in the run up to the national elections. In early March, the National Elections Commission published new campaign rules that significantly limited political parties’ abilities to exercise their freedom of assembly. The new rule dictated that parties had to give 72 hours notice for rallies held inside party premises and obtain permission 72 hours in advance for meetings in public places. Political parties report that this law has been applied arbitrarily.[iv] There were also reports from members of the Popular Congress Party that national security officials had prevented the party from holding meetings and rallies on at least 10 occasions in Darfur.[v]

Press freedoms remain sharply curtailed in the North, and candidates’ unequal access to and state censorship of the media remained critical problems throughout the electoral process. In one instance, the presidential candidate of the Umma Party Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi was blocked from airing his 20-minute campaign program, as set out by election rules, because of several sensitive remarks the Sudanese state radio objected to—including those referencing Darfur and the current President Omer al-Bashir’s ICC arrest warrant.[vi] Though state media have given candidates free air time, much of regular programming in Khartoum concerns the activities of NCP officials and could be considered campaigning for the ruling party.[vii] Also troubling, a prominent journalist and critic of the NCP, Alhaj Warraj was charged by the National Security Agency on April 6 with “waging war against the state” for an article that he wrote for the independent daily Ajras al-Huriya.[viii]

South

In the South, the Government of Southern Sudan also took steps in the run up to the elections to limit the ability of opposition parties and “independent candidates” to campaign freely. Intimidation of local media and detainment of opposition party members by the ruling SPLM and its security forces—namely the army and the South Sudan Police Service—indicate that the SPLM has placed a low priority on reforms that could create more political space and freedom of expression for Sudan’s population. In early March, South Sudanese military police harassed and detained the driver and campaign agent of an independent candidate for the Central Equatoria governor’s seat, Alfred Ladu Gore. In January, three candidates of the Southern Sudan Democratic Forum were beat up, arrested, and detained long enough to make them miss the deadline for submitting applications for candidate nominations.[ix]

There have also been numerous instances of South Sudanese authorities arresting and detaining members of opposition parties, especially those belonging to the NCP and the SPLM-Democratic Change, or SPLM-DC. In one instance, security forces arrested three members of SPLM-DC in February, held them at a military detention center, and questioned them about their political activities for several hours.[x] In its preliminary report, The Carter Center stated that “the elections in the South experienced a high incidence of intimidation and the threat or use of force. There were numerous instances of the SPLA intimidating voters and being stationed too close to polling stations. State interference in the campaigns of opposition candidates was widespread in the South.”

The media environment in the South is particularly disconcerting given the lack of media laws in place, forcing campaigners and media outlets to operate in an arbitrary environment without clear rules.[xi] In this environment, independent media has had to suffer from random crackdowns and raids. In early March, South Sudanese security reportedly raided the Bakhita FM and Liberty FM radio stations, while arresting and threatening the stations’ two directors.

Security

Key benchmarks: Negotiation and implementation of a functioning ceasefire in Darfur; An end to all provision of weapons, training, or supplies of financing to paramilitary militia groups in the North, South, or Darfur; Full cooperation from all parties to facilitate U.N. peacekeepers’ freedom of movement and other essential conditions to do their work effectively; Full compliance by all relevant parties with the U.N. arms embargo for Darfur; An end to unlawful aerial bombardment in Darfur; Increased peace-building efforts by the Government of Southern Sudan to prevent escalation of chronic interethnic fighting; Standard, clear policies by the SPLA on engagement in tribal conflict, including the respective

roles and responsibilities of the army and police services; Disarmament campaign carried out responsibly by SPLA in consultation with local communities.

The security environment throughout Sudan has not improved in recent months. To varying degrees and through the use of differing tactics, both the NCP and the SPLM are responsible for exacerbating a number of security threats and failing to take proactive or preventive measures to reduce others.

Darfur

In Darfur, following a period of escalating violence and infighting between factions within the Sudan Liberation Army, the Government of Sudan launched a major military offensive, including aerial attacks, even while its negotiators were in Doha working out a shaky framework agreement with the Justice and Equality Movement, the most militarily significant Darfurian rebel group. These attacks killed hundreds and displaced somewhere between 45,000 and 100,000 civilians. International officials offered virtually no condemnation of these attacks by the Sudanese government and peacekeepers continue to be blocked from reaching the site of these attacks. This latest offensive is an egregious act in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law and a clear impediment to the Darfur peace process.

Despite public denials, there were also indications that the Sudanese government facilitated the move of a contingent of Lord’s Resistance Army fighters into South Darfur, signaling a continued willingness by the NCP to support proxy militias.

The overall security landscape in Darfur is characterized by low-level yet persistent and widespread insecurity. The heavy presence of nomadic groups who were formerly associated with the Janjaweed, armed by the Government of Sudan, and promised land by the government as reward for their participation in the conflict, offer the most serious threat to the average Darfuri. Continuing to bear arms, these groups secure land that does not belong to them, harass the displaced who return to try and reclaim it, and engage in general banditry. No attempt has been made by the Sudanese government at disarming these groups, despite repeated commitments in past peace agreements. In such a volatile security environment, it will be very difficult for the nearly 3 million people who remain displaced within Darfur or are living as refugees in neighboring Chad to return home safely any time soon. In spite of this, the NCP and some of its international partners continue to discuss efforts to close displaced camps, regardless of the residents’ security concerns.

Freedom of movement for peacekeepers in Darfur remains limited, in contravention of the Status of Forces Agreement signed between the U.N./A.U. hybrid peacekeeping force, or UNAMID, and the Sudanese government. In November and January, the U.N. secretary general reported on 63 combined incidents in which a UNAMID patrol was denied passage by the Sudanese Armed Forces, its auxiliary forces, or armed rebel movements.[xii] UNAMID continues to be blocked from doing its job because of fighting perpetrated by rebel groups, government militias, and the military. It also continues to operate in an environment in which hijackings and abductions are too frequent. See the “Humanitarian Access” section for more on this topic. The secretary general’s report, which noted that violations of the U.N. arms embargo continue to be committed by most major armed actors, does not bode well for the future of effective peacekeeping in the region.[xiii]

South Sudan

U.N. officials in South Sudan have indicated that the number of internal conflicts has risen sharply in 2010, with 450 killed and 60,000 displaced within the first three months of the year. While a recent internal UNMIS assessment found that the situation in Jonglei state—site of much of the intertribal violence that wracked the South in 2009—is less tense than at the same time last year, the chronic drivers of insecurity in the South persist, and the broader political climate in Sudan in the run up to the southern referendum does not bode well for the likelihood of further violence this year. Much of the violence in the South continues to be associated with the civilian disarmament campaign led by the SPLA currently sweeping the South. The purported aim of this campaign was to bolster security in preparation for the elections by removing small arms from the hands of civilians. However, past disarmament campaigns in the South have proven that communities will resist giving up their weapons if they feel that their security cannot be guaranteed by the government’s armed forces, and many of the disarmament efforts to date in the South appear to have exacerbated insecurity and stoked tensions among rival and neighboring tribes. The goal of broader disarmament remains laudable, but should be pursued in the context of accelerated support for comprehensive reform of the security sector, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and efforts to increased the effectiveness and accountability of the SPLA and the police. International actors should also closely monitor the flow of arms and weapons to militias operating in border areas.

Security along the 2,100 kilometer North-South border, where six sections remain disputed, is another cause for concern. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, has faced challenges in its ability to respond to violence and to prevent it, both due to its mandate (which is currently up for revision and renewal at the U.N. Security Council) and its understanding and interpretation of its mandate on the ground.[xiv] Furthermore, UNMIS has not been granted full access by both the Sudan Armed Forces, or SAF, and the SPLA to certain critical and contentious areas along the border, most notably along the boundaries of Abyei, an oil-rich, contested border zone (see below for more on Abyei). The failure of both parties to enable UNMIS full access—per its mandate and per the parties’ CPA obligations—to these sensitive areas is cause for concern as the referendum approaches, with Sudan’s internal border still in dispute.

Humanitarian access

Key Benchmarks: Agreements to facilitate humanitarian access are being respected and implemented; Improvement in security for humanitarian organizations, and steps taken to investigate and prosecute attacks on these organizations; Delivery of sufficient aid, and access for new humanitarian NGOs, as needed, to reach vulnerable populations. Freedom for humanitarian organizations to report honestly on conditions on the ground; Aid agencies allowed to fully implement programs offering “non-essential” services, such as those assisting women who have been survivors of sexual violence or other forms of abuse.

Seven months after President Bashir’s expulsion of 13 international aid agencies from Darfur and dissolution of three Sudanese organizations last March, the U.N. Panel of Experts observed a “widespread decline in the delivery of services to affected communities.”[xv] Thanks to major efforts by other international and Sudanese humanitarian organizations, Oxfam Great Britain noted in March: “A major humanitarian emergency has largely been averted at least in the sense that what is still one of the biggest crises in the world has not got substantially worse.”[xvi] But it should also be noted that since the expulsion, support for “non-essential” services has suffered dramatically. The number of services available to survivors of sexual violence, for example, have massively declined even as sexual violence and assault remain prevalent in Darfur¾an unsurprising effect given that 14 of the 16 expelled or shut down organizations had projects working to support survivors of sexual violence. Emergency efforts by the humanitarian community to fill this gap in services have thus far failed to return the level of gender expertise in Darfur to that existing pre-expulsion.[xvii]

The U.N. secretary general has rebuked the Sudanese government for denying UNAMID access to sites of recent fighting and vulnerability, including camps for the displaced. In recent months, UNAMID, other U.N. personnel, and humanitarian aid agencies continue to have little to no access to vulnerable areas in Darfur because of high insecurity, or claims of high insecurity, largely perpetrated by the Sudanese government. Meanwhile, the gap in services for Darfur’s most vulnerable, including survivors of sexual violence and children, remains.

Aid and U.N. workers operate under the threat of hijackings, abductions, and harassment by armed actors, as well as fears of expulsion by the Sudanese government. There have been little or no serious efforts by the Government of Sudan to hold local actors accountable for attacks on the United Nations or humanitarian assets and property. Indeed, the Government of Sudan widely looted vehicles and other supplies from humanitarian agencies that were kicked out of Darfur in March 2009 and continues to use them with impunity. Since the expulsion of foreign aid agencies in March 2009, the number of foreign aid workers and U.N. personnel kidnapped has increased.[xviii] The insecurity of the current operational environment has forced many agencies to limit their presence to areas around large towns, leaving some of the most needy populations, in remote and rural areas, without access to critical services. On October 22, 2009, a staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC, was kidnapped in West Darfur and kept hostage for 147 days. As a direct consequence, the ICRC scaled back its field activities in the region. The staff member was only recently rescued with the help of the Sudanese government, signifying cooperation on the part of Khartoum at least in this respect.

Harassment and abduction of U.N. personnel have become more blatant and frequent. On March 5, a UNAMID assessment patrol on its way to investigate the security and humanitarian situation in Deribat, in the Jebel Marra region, was ambushed by unidentified armed men. Alarmingly, about 60 peacekeepers were abducted and released the next day, stripped of their weapons, ammunition, and vehicles.[xix] In response, the Sudanese government chastised UNAMID for ignoring the advice of the military to not go into that area, underscoring the government’s unwillingness to facilitate UNAMID movement throughout the region.[xx]

Humanitarian access to areas of prolonged or recent fighting remains severely curtailed. In the aftermath of recent violence in Jebel Marra, neither the United Nations, nor any other international humanitarian organization has had access to vulnerable populations in eastern Jebel Marra. The latest U.N. overview of the humanitarian situation in Sudan reports that “humanitarian partners have not been able to enter conflict-affected areas at all—a situation that leaves local civilians exposed to significant risks,” and the international community without an independent assessment of the level of need.[xxi] Violence in the area has already forced Medicins du Monde, the only medical organization with ground presence in eastern Jebel Marra, to suspend its operations.[xxii]

Humanitarian organizations continue to operate under the threat of government expulsion, which occurs arbitrarily and for ambiguous reasons. Within such an environment, organizations are forced to self-censor for the sake of being able to stay in the country to continue providing services to vulnerable populations. Without the freedom to report honestly on conditions on the ground, the international community is without an important source of information and monitoring.

Darfur peace process

Key Benchmarks: Establishment of an inclusive peace process and free participation of credible and independent civil society groups in peace process; Pre-existing commitments made in earlier talks and agreements fulfilled by the parties; Practical steps on the ground taken by parties to promote peace and improve security; Concrete steps toward accountability for crimes committed in Darfur.

Though Darfur peace talks are currently underway between the Sudanese government, rebel factions, and the U.N.-A.U. Mediation team, the progress made thus far appears to lack credibility when contrasted with the government’s continued military actions on the ground. Khartoum’s continuation of violence against rebel groups and civilians, as well as the general lack of transparency throughout the peace process suggest that a concrete, inclusive, and sustainable peace agreement will not emerge at the talks’ conclusion. Preliminary agreements have been signed between the government and the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, as well as with the rebel coalition known as the Liberation and Justice Movement, or LJM, but these agreements have only secured limited ceasefires and represented promises that negotiations over substantial issues for the future of Darfur (including those relating to power and wealth sharing arrangements, restitution for survivors, and accountability) will take place. So far, no peace deal has emerged and the ceasefire appears to have already been broken.[xxiii] The Government of Sudan has appeared more interested in further dividing rebel groups and pulling off a “successful” presidential election in Darfur than it has in securing a lasting peace. Equally corrosive to the process, the rebel movements engaged in the talks continue to bicker among themselves—while key leaders such as Abdel Wahid Al Nur refuse to participate at all in the talks. Like earlier failed peace talks for Darfur, little serious thought appears to have gone into the actual monitoring and implementation of the agreements, virtually assuring that they will remain hollow promises.

Of serious concern is the lack of transparency over the peace process itself, a fact that has prevented the negotiations from being truly inclusive. Civil society has thus far played a limited role in the current negotiations and sources on the ground say civil society representatives will continue to be sidelined in the substantive negotiation process moving forward.

In addition to the major offensive in Jebel Marra, the government also bombed the Jebel Moon area, a JEM stronghold, just prior to the start of peace talks. Humanitarian access to the two areas continues to be impossible, with no effort on the Sudanese government’s part to facilitate aid workers’ access to the vulnerable and newly displaced. If progress toward peace in Darfur is truly to be evaluated by the situation on the ground, as the administration indicated in its Sudan policy review, Khartoum’s decision to renew fighting should be a red flag indicator that the regime remains intent on pursuing a military solution in Darfur, despite the lofty rhetoric of Doha. The administration has also shown no willingness to confront with its international partners the intransigence of spoilers and holdouts among the rebel leaders.

No steps have been taken by the Sudanese government to advance accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. For more on the current situation, see the “Accountability” section.

Elections

Key benchmarks:Sudan’s constitutional protections of freedoms of assembly and expression ensured by the NCP and SPLM in the context of the current electoral process in northern and southern Sudan, respectively; Sudanese media free to cover and report on election related events, trends, and developments; Effective response by Sudan’s National Electoral Commission, or NEC, to concerns expressed by international and domestic monitoring bodies – including political party representatives – during the voter registration process in order to prepare for the polling period in April, including investigating claims of fraud; International and domestic monitors granted freedom of movement and freedom to report on election related activities in the coming months; Concerted steps by the NCP and SPLM to prevent electoral violence; Active measures by the NEC to educate Sudanese voters on the electoral process, particularly in areas with comparatively low levels of voter registration.

While the national elections were once seen as a cornerstone of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and a major step forward in Sudan’s democratic transformation, their ultimate reality was one of lost opportunity and disappointment. It was clear from previously cited concerns (see “National reforms” section) regarding the overall security environment and lack of national reforms, that free, fair, and credible elections were not possible in Sudan. Regrettably, the lack of an enabling environment for a free and fair election was largely publicly ignored by the U.S. special envoy for Sudan, and the Obama administration made clear early in the process that it was prepared to accept practically any process at the ballot box in favor of “checking the elections box” on the CPA list and moving on.

In the days leading up to the voting period, almost every major opposition party boycotted elections to various degrees, including the NCP’s main political opponents, the SPLM. On March 31, the southern ruling party announced the withdrawal of its presidential candidate, Yasir Arman, as well as its decision to boycott elections in Darfur, citing continued violence and election irregularities in the region.[xxv] Most major northern opposition parties also boycotted the elections, citing the state’s monopoly over the media, its manipulation of electoral legislation, and the oppressive media and campaigning environment in place. In advance of the elections, a large number of groups, including Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, the Enough Project, and the Carter Center highlighted serious irregularities and the lack of a free environment for the ballot.

In Darfur, elections were engineered to consolidate NCP control over the region. NCP manipulation of the vote could be found in the counting of the 2008 census, the way in which electoral districts were drawn, the registration process, and the bribery of local leaders. Not only did the 2008 census not take into account a majority of Darfur’s 2.6 million displaced, it inflated the proportion of pro-NCP groups, even counting new arrivals into Darfur. Electoral districts were drawn in a way that gave areas with greater NCP support more seats. The rebel stronghold of Jebel Marra, with an estimated population of 1 million, was allocated zero seats in the national assembly. Government security forces were frequently stationed outside of registration centers, creating an environment of intimidation during the registration process for Darfuris used to the harassment and abuses committed by these same authorities.[xxvi] The NCP also offered money, gifts, and government positions to local leaders to solidify electoral alliances and put in place candidates that were pro-NCP.[xxvii]

The actual voting period was marred by a long list of technical irregularities and flaws. The confusion caused by last-minute changes to voter registry lists, mistakes on ballots, and arbitrary voter identification procedures discouraged voter participation, and has the potential to benefit one party over the others. The use of intimidation and force against voters, observers, polling staff, candidates, and party affiliates was also documented. In Darfur, a scheme to extort internally displaced voters to cast their ballot for NCP was exposed.[xxviii] According to Carter Center and E.U. observers, the administration of the entire electoral period, from the installation of an environment hostile to free and fair elections to the logistically flawed election period itself, fell short of meeting international standards.[xxix]

Both ruling parties, the NCP and the SPLM, should be held to account for their failure to support efforts to create an environment in which opposition parties could campaign freely and citizens could go to the polls without fear of intimidation or falling victim to violence. The parties did not invest early or substantially enough in setting up the National Electoral Commission, or NEC, to be a neutral governing body that had the capacity to conduct extensive voter education efforts, to pre-empt the myriad logistical failures that took place, and to be an arbiter between competing political interests of what the correct electoral environment and conduct of elections should be. Recent allegations by the SPLM that the NEC could have done more to anticipate and prevent the technical difficulties that marred the polling period particularly in the South may be well founded, but the SPLM is also at fault for not pushing the NEC into a more active role during the protracted electoral process.

Abyei

These include the following: Rapid and mutually agreed upon formation of the Abyei referendum commission; Full implementation of the Abyei Protocol and PCA’s ruling; Unreserved support for demarcation of the border; Support for a process to develop guarantees for nomadic tribes to access traditional grazing lands; Development of the popular consultation process (see below) to promote popular political transition in Southern Kordofan; Improved monitoring of Abyei’s oil revenues, payment of past arrears from Khartoum to Juba, and transparent functioning of the Unity Fund.

The situation in Abyei remains largely unchanged since last July’s ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or PCA. The committee charged with overseeing the implementation of the ruling and the demarcation of the newly defined border have been impeded in their tasks by political obstruction, security concerns, and a lack of funds desperately needed for development in Abyei and for dissemination of information about the ruling. Ignorance on the ground about the significance of the border has emboldened the Government of Sudan to prevent the demarcation as a pretense to argue to the Misseriya that they can still win back lands lost and will still be able to vote as an entire people in the Abyei referendum. This is not the case. The borders have been defined and are known to all regardless of whether the demarcation occurs or not. For its part, the SPLM has attempted to push the demarcation process forward, but the NCP has continuously refused to provide equipment or sufficient security support (as clearly requested by the SPLM members of the Abyei Oversight Committee, in large part because the Popular Defense Forces and other militias have been a major impediment to the demarcation team). For this and other reasons, the NCP is at fault for not summoning the political will to invest the necessary resources on the ground in Abyei to implement the PCA’s ruling, as both parties repeatedly pledged to do in the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision; the NCP may well see continued foot dragging as being in their best interest absent any international cost for doing so.

Although the Abyei administration was recently replaced with new leadership last month, much work will need to be done before the January referendum for the region in order to diffuse tensions that are bound to arise when the contentious issue of residency in Abyei is raised prior to the referendum. For one, the Abyei Referendum Commission—the body that will rule on the residency debate—has yet to be appointed. In addition, grazing rights for the nomadic Misseriya herders—a disenfranchised population frequently employed by Khartoum during the civil war as frontline troops in the South—must be secured prior to the referendum; this requires an honest commitment and willingness to compromise from both the NCP and SPLM which has been profoundly lacking to date on the emotionally and politically charged issue of Abyei.

Along the contested North-South border east of Abyei, tensions are escalating between the Misseriya and Dinka populations who both have a stake in the rich grazing land in northern Unity state in the South; the recent border conference in Unity’s capital, Bentiu, did little to resolve the deep-seated fears of both the Misseriya based in Southern Kordofan and the Dinka populations in Unity state. It appears the agreement was pushed through by Unity state’s SPLM leadership, who sought a win before the elections at all cost. Given that the agreement did not have the buy-in of key players such as the SPLA, who were conducting a disarmament campaign in Unity and were strongly opposed to allowing the Misseriya to enter Unity with their weapons (which the herders have traditionally carried in order to protect their cattle), this agreement is unlikely to promote stability in this already tense border area. In the weeks since the agreement was signed, SPLA and Misseriya have clashed near the contested North-South border, Misseriya elders have accused the SPLA of “ethnic cleansing,” and the SPLA spokesman in Juba has called for the Misseriya to abandon their weapons before entering southern territory to graze, which contradicted the border agreement signed in March.[xxx] The current situation along this section of the North-South border is reminiscent of the situation in the run-up to the May 2008 clashes in Abyei that sent the entire population of the town fleeing southward. Unless both the NCP and SPLM choose to stop making the situation on the ground worse through accusatory statements at the Khartoum and Juba levels, loss of life along the border is likely to continue as the referendum approaches.

Finally, improved monitoring of Abyei’s oil revenues, a commitment made by both parties in the Trilateral Points, has not been implemented by the NCP or the SPLM. Both parties are at fault for not attempting to promote greater transparency into the functioning of the Unity Fund.[xxxi]

Popular consultation

Key Benchmarks: Necessary steps for peaceful and successful popular consultations, and sustainable peace in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, include the following: Progress on the demarcation of the Abyei and North/South borders, including resolution of border disputes on southern borders of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile; Processes for broad engagement with constituencies throughout the two states; Improved integration of the Joint/Integrated Units, police, and state administrations; Political space and security for free and fair elections.

The popular consultation process will begin in earnest following the election of the state legislature in Blue Nile, but the process for Southern Kordofan will be more complicated, given that elections at the state level in Southern Kordofan have been delayed until another census can be conducted in the state.

Although some strides have been made by the parties, particularly in Southern Kordofan, in working together at a political level, sustainable peace in the Transitional Areas will require significant buy-in from local populations, who will need to be broadly engaged if the process of popular consultation is to live up to its name. Although it is too early to issue a verdict on the attempts by the parties to make these processes inclusive, successful, and peaceful, it is certain that sustained attention from the NCP and SPLM will be needed in the coming months if this region is avoid heating up before the likely separation of the North and South. Recent conferences in both Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan that brought together civil society, political parties, and traditional leaders are a welcome first step, and the need for civil society to begin education around the popular consultation process, and in general about accountability of their legislators (appointed or elected), remains crucial to the conduct of a genuine and inclusive process. The promise of Joint Integrated Units, or JIUs, under the CPA has not been met. Across the three border areas, including South Kordofan and Blue Nile State, SAF and SPLA soldiers remain under the distinct control of their armies. These forces have not only been ineffective in providing security, they have at times generated further insecurity.[xxxii]

Southern referendum

Key benchmarks: Rapid and mutually agreed upon formation of the southern Sudan Referendum Commission; Progress toward the full demarcation of the North-South border; No use of direct or proxy violence in an effort to derail the referendum; No actions that subvert the will of the people in casting their votes freely; Neither party negotiating in such a way that makes direct North-South violence more likely.

Despite the agreement reached in December between the NCP and SPLM on a package of laws related to the election and referenda, the South Sudan Referendum Commission has yet to be formed. At an Intergovernmental Authority on Development summit in mid-March 2010 in Nairobi, the parties committed to establish the Southern Referendum Commission by May. If this agreement is kept, the commission will have just over six months to prepare for the vote; the precedent of both the national census and the elections demonstrates that delays, distractions, and technical difficulties are the norm for Sudanese political processes. While substantial delays in the census and elections were tolerated, the referendum is a “redline” for the SPLM and the South; any delay in the holding of the referendum could immediately spark a return to war. It is important to note that the process of selecting and approving the members of the Referendum Commission will significantly impact the preparation for the referendum and the technical process itself. The Obama administration must closely monitor the parties in the coming months in order to ensure forward progress and ample preparation for the referendum before it is too late, and this process starts with the appointment of a commission that can capably, credibly, and fairly prepare for and carry out the process.

The technical process of holding the referendum is arguably of least concern for the parties and the CPA’s guarantors, although the recent national election underscores how much major work remains to be done on carrying out the logistics of elections in Sudan. Mismanagement at the administrative or procedural level (and the resulting disorganization, fraud, and possible manipulation) may in fact result in doubts about the results of the referendum, and leave the South and the international community in a very difficult position. Given the importance of a credible process that will not leave questions about the acceptability of the outcome and that will allow the South and international community to stand fully behind the results, the South and the international community need to focus on both the political and procedural framework for the referendum.

The need to come to agreement on a number of issues related to the referendum’s outcome is the paramount concern if a peaceful transition is expected in 2011 and renewed hostilities are to be averted. Failure by the parties to engage seriously and in good faith in order to reach initial agreements related to wealth sharing, and assets and liabilities, among other issues, is a recipe for disaster before or after the referendum. But before these initial agreements can be reached, the crucial question of where the North-South border lies must be answered—although no single issue should hold the referendum itself hostage.

There are currently five distinct sections along the border that remain undemarcated. With tensions along various parts of this border already heightened over issues such as access to traditional grazing areas for pastoral groups, neither party can afford to leave this simmering issue unresolved. Absent concerted efforts by both sides to resolve the multiple border disputes, tensions will continue to rise.

The intercommunal violence in the South that has killed thousands of people and displaced hundreds of thousands more in the past year and a half is a direct threat to the referendum, but not only because the violence is having a destabilizing impact on the South. Another great concern is that the NCP could be involved in stoking local tensions or providing ammunition to disenfranchised populations; this tried-and-true tactic of proxy violence is not new for Khartoum. If this is the case, this strategy could impact the ability of the South to peacefully hold its referendum in a secure environment.

Accountabilty

Key Benchmarks: Cooperation with the ICC or agreement to a robust accountability mechanism, such as the African Union’s recently proposed hybrid court for Darfur

The Sudanese government continues its complete noncooperation with the International Criminal Court arrest warrant for President Bashir. Since its inception in October, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Darfur, or AUHIP, has yet to make progress on implementing its recommended hybrid court for Darfur. The panel has instead been devoting increased attention to issues around CPA implementation and the elections. The NCP has also stated, as expected, that Bashir’s electoral victory will prove that the allegations against him are false and that the Sudanese, especially the people of Darfur, reject the International Criminal Court’s efforts. The complete lack of accountability to date only makes it more likely that the NCP will be undeterred from committing violence and crimes against its civilian population in the future.

Conclusion

As the review of the benchmarks makes clear, the situation in Sudan remains one of considerable concern. The deputies committee of the U.S. government charged with reviewing the situation in Sudan on a quarterly basis does not appear to be functioning as designed, and has not resulted in clear policy choices being presented to President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and respective agency heads. Indeed, one of the few consistent trends in U.S. policy toward Sudan has been the deep divisions in perspective between that of the U.S. special envoy and the leadership of the State Department and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

While it is obvious, it bears repeating: Africa’s largest country is likely to split into two in a matter of months, yet there is not a coherent policy approach from the U.S. government and that has undercut its ability to shape effective international diplomacy toward Sudan.

While the administration has made a calculated effort to avoid confrontational language with Sudan, it now appears the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction, and the ruling NCP has understandably interpreted the lack of condemnation for repeated abuses as either disinterest or acceptance. The time has come for President Obama and Secretary Clinton to own Sudan policy far more directly—or the risk of further missteps, miscalculation, and violence will only grow.

[i] U.S. State Department 2009, “2009 Human Rights Report: Sudan” (2010), available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135978.htm.

[ii] See Africa Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, “ACJUPS Condemns the Silencing of Political Activists” (2010), available at http://www.acjps.org/Publications/3-19-10ACJPSCondemnstheSilencing.htm.

[iii] See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Government Repression Threatens Fair Elections” (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/21/sudan-government-repression-threatens-fair-elections.

[iv] See Carter Center, “Carter Center Welcomes Sudan’s Elections Campaign, Urges Steps to Ensure Open and Inclusive Process,” Statement, March 18,2010, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-031810.html.

[v] See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Government Repression Threatens Fair Elections” (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/21/sudan-government-repression-threatens-fair-elections .

[vi] Sudan Tribune, “Sudan radio prevents candidate from addressing Bashir’s ICC warrant,” March 4, 2010, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34316.

[vii] See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Government Repression Threatens Fair Elections” (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/21/sudan-government-repression-threatens-fair-elections.

[viii] See the Committee to Protect Journalists, “Sudanese journalist charged with 'waging war' against state,” April 14, 2010, available athttp://cpj.org/2010/04/sudanese-journalist-charged-with-waging-war-agains.php.

[ix] See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Government Repression Threatens Fair Elections”.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Sudan Tribune, “Media leader: South Sudan journalism ‘a game of football without rules,’” March 6, 2010, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34335.

[xii] United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID” (2009), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/594/37/PDF/N0959437.pdf?OpenElement, pg. 3

[xiii] See United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts” (2009), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1591/reports.shtml.

[xiv] See Human Rights Watch, “No One to Intervene” (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/21/no-one-intervene-0.

[xv] United Nations Security Council. “Report of the Panel of Experts,” pg. 65.

[xvi] See Relief Web, “Northern Sudan: 12 months since expulsion,” available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MINE-839RXY?OpenDocument.

[xvii] See Physicians for Human Rights, “Action Agenda: Realizing Treatment and Support for Women and Girls in Darfur” (2010), available at http://phrblog.org/blog/2010/03/22/women-in-darfur-one-year-on/.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] See Reuters, “Sudan’s army says rebels ambushed UN-AU peacekeepers,” March 9, 2010, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE62800Z20100309.

[xx] See Reuters, “Sudan rebukes UN-AU force over Darfur ambush,” March 11, 2010, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE62A02E20100311.

[xxi] See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Sudan Humanitarian Overview,” 6 (2) (2010) available at http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan%20Humanitarian%20Overview%20vol6%20no2%20Feb%202010.pdf.

[xxii] See Relief Web, “Sudan: Darfur team evacuated and mission on hold,” available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/AZHU-83CQ5C?OpenDocument&query=Darfur%20aid.

[xxiii] See Reuters “Sudan, Darfur rebels exchange blame over ceasefire,” April 5, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6342A120100405.

[xxiv] See Médicins du Monde, “Fighting in the Jebel Marra: 100,000 Civilians Deprived of Access to Healthcare,” Press Release, No date, available at http://www.medecinsdumonde.org/gb/Press/Press-release/International/Combats-dans-le-Jebel-Mara-100-000-civils-prives-d-acces-aux-soins.

[xxv] Reuters, “South Sudan party withdraws presidential candidate,” March 31, 2010, available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62U2AL.htm.

[xxvi] See Carter Center, “Preliminary Statement on Sudan’s Voter Registration,” Statement, November 30, 2009, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/Carter%20Center%20Sudan%20statement_113009.pdf.

[xxvii] To read a more detailed analysis of the NCP’s management of elections in Darfur, see International Crisis Group “Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan” (2010).

[xxviii] See Al-Jazeera, “Scam mars Darfur polls,” April 13, 2010, available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/04/20104134594185402.html.

[xxix] See Carter Center “The Carter Center Election Observation Mission in Sudan Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Legislative Elections, April 2010,” Preliminary Statement, April 17, 2010, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-041710.html; Relief Web, “Preliminary Statement: Sudanese elections show significant deficiencies against international standards but pave the way for future democratic progress,” available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SNAA-84N6YP?OpenDocument.

[xxx] See Sudan Tribune, “13 people killed after fresh fighting between SPLA and Misseriya,” March 20, 2010, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34477; Sudan.net Discussion Board, available at http://www.sudanforum.net.

[xxxi] For background on the Unity Fund, see International Crisis Group, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock” (2007), available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B047-sudan-breaking-the-abyei-deadlock.aspx.

[xxxii] Sudan Human Security Baseline Project, “Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan.” Sudan Working Paper 20 (2010). pg. 28.

Southern Sudan’s Post-Election Flashpoints

Will McElhinny — Fri, 30 Apr 2010 09:40:57 -0400

A South Sudanese woman is directed by a police officer to enter the polling room at a polling station in Lologo, Southern Sudan

(AP Photo/Jerome Delay)

JUBA, Southern Sudan—Although the bulk of the results for Sudan’s recent national, regional, state, and local elections have been announced, the potential for local outbreaks of post-election violence in certain areas of the South remains. At this tense juncture, the results of several hotly contested races for state governor may spark local violence and potentially broader conflict in the near future, with consequences for the South’s fast-approaching self determination referendum. This dispatch provides a brief overview of some of the more disconcerting situations.

Unity State: proxy showdown between SPLM leaders

The rivalry between the candidates for governor of Unity state has its roots in the intra-South conflicts that crisscrossed this oil-rich area during the war, and is linked to high level tensions within the South’s ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM. The race between incumbent Taban Deng Gai and challenger Angelina Teny was referred to as the “most serious conflict” in the elections in the south in a recent edition of Africa Confidential. Governor Deng has the backing of the Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS, President Salva Kiir, while challenger Teny was supported by GoSS Vice President Riek Machar and Paulino Matip, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, or SPLA.

Late last week, the National Electoral Commission announced a handy victory for Governor Taban over Teny, the candidate many saw as the frontrunner in the race. Supporters from Teny’s camp gathered in the streets of the state capital Bentiu, and during an incident between these supporters and southern security forces (known to be loyal to Governor Taban), two people were killed and several others injured. Bentiu has calmed down this week, but Angelina Teny has since announced that she will not accept the results of the election, and the situation remains in an uncertain stalemate.

Blue Nile: border tensions flare

Although Blue Nile, one of the “transitional areas” with special status in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, falls north of Sudan’s 1956 North-South border, the state largely fought for the South during the war, and Malik Agar, the incumbent governor, is a long-time SPLM powerbroker.

The CPA established that the armies of the North and South would move their troops out of Blue Nile, to be replaced by “Joint Integrated Units.” But reports of the buildup of northern army troops along the border have complicated the security environment in the state. Elections exacerbated these tensions, especially as rumors spread that Govenror Malik had lost the election and reportedly fled South with his army. Soon after these rumors leaked, some of them in northern state media, results from the polling stations indicated that the incumbent governor had retained his post. The SPLM announced on its blog that their candidate had won, with official word from the National Electoral Commission following a few days later.

Initial concern that large-scale violence could be sparked by Khartoum’s hesitancy to accept Malik’s victory has subsided, but the presence of both northern and southern military forces in the border state will keep things tense. This is all the more the case because of the upcoming, CPA-mandated popular consultation process that Blue Nile will complete before the southern referendum (which Blue Nile will not participate in). Also, unless progress is made on demarcating the North-South border, which forms the southern boundary of Blue Nile state, the risks of border skirmishes between Northern and Southern security forces will multiply.

South Sudanese driving to election rally in Juba, South Sudan

(Photo/Maggie Fick)

Central Equatoria: calm holds after politically-charged contest

Home of the southern capital Juba, Central Equatoria’s gubernatorial race evolved into a zero-sum game after the polls closed and during the tense tabulation period. Both the incumbent governor, Clement Wani of the SPLM, and the independent candidate, former GoSS advisor Alfred Ladu Gore, claimed victory through local media and asserted that if they were not declared the winner that the polls were fraudulent. Although both candidates later tempered their language slightly to suggest that they will not personally direct their supporters to take to the streets, both used public rhetoric to imply that they cannot control what their supporters might choose to do.

Gore and Wani hail from rival tribes in Central Equatoria—the Bari and the Mundari respectively—that have faced off in cattle herding and inter-tribal conflict in recent years, resulting in mass displacement in rural areas of the state and in an influx of people into Juba fleeing this violence. Their popularity varies across the state’s six counties, but the flashpoint for conflict lies in Juba, where many residents perceive that Gore should be the rightful winner and voted against Wani for unpopular policies, such as bulldozing the homes of tens of thousands of people without advance warning, purportedly for urban planning purposes.

The southern capital was increasingly tense in the run-up to the announcement of results. A visibly increased police presence in Juba did not allay the concerns of residents anxiously awaiting the results, many of whom fear the police and see officers en masse at roundabouts and in markets as a sign that trouble may be on the horizon. Thankfully, the announcement of incumbent governor Clement Wani as winner did not lead to serious violence in the streets of Juba (some scattered gunshots in one neighborhood were the only major report the night after the announcement). The GoSS and the United Nations declared curfews to keep residents out of the streets in the immediate aftermath of the announcement. The situation has remained calm in recent days, despite widespread sentiment of disappointment evident among many supporters of the independent candidate, who maintain that the this particular race was rigged—or at least tipped—in favor of yet another powerful but unpopular southern Sudanese politician.

Western Equatoria: state-sponsored intimidation not enough to stop independent candidate

Change did come to Western Equatoria State, the only state in the South where an independent candidate managed to defeat the incumbent or SPLM candidate for governor. “The people of Western Equatoria State waited for long to see this historic moment,” said Sudanese journalist Richard Ruati after Colonel Joseph Bakosero was declared the winner of the governorship. But Bakosero’s victory did not come easily, and the violations and irregularities (many alleged to be directed by the other leading candidate) could have a destabilizing impact in the state, given that tensions between local populations and the state security forces were already high prior to the elections.

Western Equatoria borders the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and has been rocked by intense violence against civilians by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Although the SPLA has been conducting a state-by-state civilian disarmament process in the South, Western Equatoria was spared from this exercise due to a decision by the southern government that citizens in this state would be better off retaining their weapons for self-defense against the LRA. SPLA presence was bolstered due to the LRA threat and further increased for the CPA anniversary celebrations held in January in the state capital Yambio; the Ugandan army, or UPDF, is also present in the area, where it is fighting the LRA in coordination with the SPLA.

Incumbent governor and SPLM candidate Jemma Nunu Kumba was the only female governor in South Sudan, and is known to be favored among the SPLM’s senior leadership in Juba. Although GoSS President Salva Kiir appointed a “caretaker government” during the campaign period to replace governors and ministers who were running for office, Governor Kumba retained her position. With the state apparatus firmly under her control, it is widely believed that Governor Kumba overstepped her bounds during the electoral process. Mounting evidence from various incidents—including the burning of a school where ballot papers were being kept—indicate that the SPLA and police were used for political repression and intimidation. Credible rumors that high-level army and police officials pressured state elections officials to deliver results that favored the governor indicate that state-sponsored intimidation reached a very concerning level, one that threatened the lives of elections staff in the state and calls the eventual results of these local elections into question.

“The Western Equatoria State government really made a mistake,” said a member of one of the international observation missions recently in South Sudan for the elections. “The [incumbent] Governor [Jemma Nunu Kumba] underestimated the consequences of these actions,” said the observer, referring to some of the heavy-handed measures employed by the organized forces present in the state. The Government of Southern Sudan should engage constructively with the locally popular new governor, including by conducting a credible investigation into the allegations of electoral malfeasance. This will be crucial to help rebuild a measure of local confidence in the southern government as the referendum approaches.

Intra-South tensions won’t go away with the referendum

The people of southern Sudan deserve credit for participating peacefully in the polls and for accepting the results even in cases where they perceive that the contest was not free and fair. Their leaders, particularly the newly elected, SPLM-dominated government in Juba, must follow this example and begin the hard work of resolving some of the local tensions described above before they turn into much broader conflicts within the South following the referendum.