Eastern Chad

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Share Your Enough Moment

In their forthcoming book, The Enough Moment, John Prendergast and Don Cheadle present the stories of celebrities, activists and survivors who have dedicated their lives to advocating for human rights in Africa. It all begins with an "Enough Moment" -- an experience in your life when you realize you have to stand up, speak out, and organize with others on vital human rights issues in Africa.

The book hits stores Sept. 7, but you don’t have to wait to share your own Enough Moment. We’re interested in hearing your story now, so we’re gathering video versions of personal Enough Moments.

Just begin the video by introducing yourself: Tell us your name, where you live, and what you do. In three minutes or less, describe how you are involved in fighting for human rights in Africa, and the moment in your life that prompted you to take action.

Most importantly, be yourself. Film your video in a simple, natural environment. It's just you, on camera, sharing your story.

Want to see an example? Here's Enough's own Mari Wright sharing her Enough Moment.

When you're finished with your video, upload it to YouTube with the tag "enoughmoment." Please title it “[your name]’s Enough Moment.” For example, John would title his video “John Prendergast’s Enough Moment.” Finally, email the link to us at yourmoment@enoughproject.org.

Later this summer, we'll be launching a special Web site, www.enoughmoment.org, where your video will appear alongside other Enough Moments from celebrities, activists, and survivors.

To learn more about the book and to pre-order your own copy, click here.

Thank you, and we look forward to hearing about your Enough Moment.

5 Best Stories You Might Have Missed This Week

Enough Project

Here at Enough, we often swap emails with interesting articles and feature stories that we come across in our favorite publications and on our favorite websites. We wanted to share some of these stories with you as part of our effort to keep you up to date on what you need to know in the world of anti-genocide and crimes against humanity work.

Somali-born rapper K’Naan’s song Wavin’ Flag had been a radio hit in the U.K. and topped charts in 14 countries long before it became an anthem of the 2010 World Cup. But the popular song performed by K’Naan and will.i.am at the World Cup Kick-off Concert was revised from the original to give it a more uplifting spin. The BBC’s Ian Youngs described the real story behind the music.

Foreign Policy put together a spectacular photo collection to illustrate the Failed States Index released by FP and the Fund for Peace. Sixty photos in all, the list begins with Somalia and covers Enough’s full repertoire by the time we get to photo 9.

Writing on Change.org’s Human Rights blog, Daniel Gerstle responded to the Failed States Index with some valuable points about how aggregating statistics masks the serious challenges that marginalized populations in wealthy countries face – and the progress made by entrepreneurs in poorer, unstable countries. Such lists and criteria would be more helpful for development initiatives if statistics were grouped by community rather than theme, Gerstle argued. Here’s a key passage:

“[W]hat would really help the most is to isolate the ‘Mogadishus’ which need a dramatic increase in conflict mitigation and humanitarian aid from the ‘Hargeisas’ which need a dramatic increase in private sector employment, and which largely relies on partnerships with regional and distant traders. While one part of a country fails, another part of the same country may have solutions which need to be supported.”

Scott Simon of the NPR program Weekend Edition spoke to filmmaker Mark Hopkins and one of the doctors featured in the new film "Living in Emergencies." The film follows four doctors through their stints with Doctors Without Borders in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the interview, Simon delves into one of the film’s most provocative themes and one that creates the most palpable tension: MSF’s policy of leaving a crisis zone when a modicum of stability returns. (A couple of us from Enough saw the film while it was briefly playing in Washington. Seek this one out – it’s intense, thought provoking, and captivating.)

Sudan activist and former pro basketball player Manute Bol passed away last Saturday, June 19, at the age of 47. The Washington Post published this slideshow of photos from his public life, cut too short.

Tiptoeing Around Africa’s Human Rights Abusers

Obama billboard

This post originally appeared on Change.org's Human Rights blog.

The Obama administration rolled out an impressive full afternoon event last week at the State Department, headlined by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which was very clearly designed to win over an audience of 300+ Africa specialists.

If the sampling of people I spoke to there were representative of the larger group, and I believe they were, there’s a sense of disappointment about President Obama’s limited engagement with the continent. Some pundits, like the New Yorker’s George Packer, point out, “Obama never placed democracy and human rights at the center of his foreign policy.” But President Obama’s well-regarded speech in Ghana last year certainly raised these expectations.

However, the briefing didn’t alleviate these concerns about the Obama administration’s follow-through, at least not on the conflict mitigation/prevention front.

Among my colleagues at the Enough Project and our partner organizations working on some of the most egregious human rights abuses, there is a particular frustration about the Obama administration’s hesitancy to criticize or use pressure to influence some of the continent’s most repressive leaders. Certainly after the policies of the Bush administration, the trend toward humility and respectful engagement is refreshing. But where’s the red line? So far, the Obama administration has been shockingly tolerant of backsliding on human rights issues and disrespect for democratic values, seemingly favoring policies that maintain the status quo rather than push for bold reforms.

Take the volatile Horn of Africa, for instance. The United States has good relations with most governments in the region, which is a useful diplomatic tool. But as Somalia expert Professor Ken Menkhaus aptly pointed out at a House subcommittee hearing recently, many of these governments are despised by their own people. The United States risks undermining the renewed good graces that the Obama administration ushered in if the U.S. government doesn’t using its leverage to push these “partners” to reign in corruption, address impunity rampant among security forces, allow press to report freely without fear of retribution. (I could list specific countries for each of these abuses, but this paragraph would get awfully long.)

Click here to continue reading.

 

Photo: Billboard honoring President Obama in Ghana (AP)

Supporting Darfuri Students on World Refugee Day

World Refugee Day is recognized each year on June 20, and the days leading up to the commemoration are always a popular time for organizations working on refugee and displacement issues to roll out their latest statistics and take stock of the past year. The updates this week about the world’s 43 million uprooted people are grim:

-- The U.N. refugee agency, or UNHCR, announced in its Global Trends report that the total number of displaced people in the world is the highest it’s been since the mid-1990s.

-- At the same time, UNHCR said that the number of refugees voluntarily returning to their home countries fell to its lowest level in 20 years.

-- Ongoing conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has prevented the 250,000 refugees living in neighboring Chad to return home. Some have lived in the camps in eastern Chad for more than seven years.

In recognition of these challenges, the Enough Project and its Darfur Dream Team highlight the enormous potential that exists among the children who make up more than 60 percent of the Darfuri refugee communities. Second only to a desire to return home, many of the children living in the camps say that they long for a quality education. “The education is very important to us in the future,” said one student at the Obama school in a letter he wrote to the U.S. president. “If we haven’t the secondary school we could not rule our country” when we return to Darfur, he wrote.

Inspired to help develop this potential after visiting Darfuri refugee camps in 2007, NBA star Tracy “T-Mac” McGrady and Enough’s John Prendergast co-founded the Darfur Dream Team. The organization now combines the forces of T-Mac and his co-captains – professional basketball players Derek Fisher, Baron Davis, Luol Deng, Etan Thomas, and Jermaine O’Neal –partner organizations, and a growing network of American sister schools to raise awareness and funds to help make the vision for a quality education system possible.

Students and alumni of Georgetown and Duke Universities, businessman Ted Leonsis, and NBA star Tracy McGrady are commemorating the day by announcing that they jointly raised the funds to sponsor a Darfuri refugee camp school. The students raised $21,661, and Ted Leonsis, Georgetown University board member and owner of the Washington Wizards, Mystics, and Capitals, matched the funds. (Read the full press release here.)

Vice President of Strategic Development at Georgetown Dan Porterfield said, "Georgetown is proud that our students, alums, and basketball fans, led by STAND and Ted Leonsis, teamed up to create a new school for 2,000 refugee children from Darfur. The international community must not forget that these families have been displaced from their homes, their land, and their culture. New schools offer hope and the opportunity for displaced children to develop their talents.”

More than 200 U.S. schools participate in the Darfur Dream Team Sister Schools program, which connects middle schools, high schools, and colleges with schools in the 12 Darfuri refugee camps in eastern Chad. In just its first year, the Sister Schools program raised $649,000 in donations and pledges to support schools in the camps. The Dream Team has partnered with UNHCR on the ground in eastern Chad to implement the program.

Follow the Darfur Dream Team today on Twitter as Sister Schools manager Stella Kenyi, Enough Co-founder John Prendergast, and I attend World Refugee Day events in D.C., featuring well-known advocates such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres (in a live feed from an Iraqi refugee camp in Syria), former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and U.N. Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie. We’ll be tweeting @enoughproject.

U.N. Peacekeepers to Leave Chad, Central African Republic

Darfuri refugee camp in eastern Chad

The Security Council voted unanimously yesterday to gradually pull out the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Chad and Central African Republic, or MINURCAT, despite concerns raised by human rights and humanitarian aid agencies.

According to Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s recommendations, which the council voted to adopt yesterday, a third of the current number of troops will be cut July 15, from 3,300 to 2,200; remaining troops will be withdrawn beginning October 15. 

As we’ve mentioned on this blog, of particular concern is the security of the estimated 270,000 Darfuri refugees and 170,000 internally displaced in eastern Chad—both byproducts of continued violence in Darfur and hostile Chad-Sudan relations. In a recent press release, Amnesty International said the withdrawal of peacekeepers will put the safety of these populations at risk.  

“The Security Council’s decision to withdraw peacekeepers is premature and dangerous. It will increase insecurity in the area and undermine attempts to provide emergency humanitarian assistance,” said Amnesty International’s Africa director.

There are also fears that the operational environment for aid agencies will become too hazardous with the withdrawal of the U.N. mission. A spokesperson for the U.N. refugee agency told BBC that U.N. troops were more able to provide security than Chadian forces and that the situation on the ground remains “very volatile.”

“We understand the reasons behind [the decision] but we are concerned for the consequences for our operations in eastern Chad,” the spokesperson said. “When they leave, we might have to restrict our operations.”

The Chadian foreign minister said that MINURCAT’s departure will not leave a security vacuum and that their presence will be replaced with a mixed Chadian-Sudanese force of 3,000 men as well as Chadian police and security forces.

 

Photo: School children in a Darfuri refugee camp in Chad

Darfur’s Forgotten Refugees and the Humanitarian Crisis in Chad

Ongoing human suffering and destruction in Darfur have been largely eclipsed both by recent national elections in Sudan and by growing, if belated, international attention to the imperiled southern self-determination referendum (slated for January 9, 2011). Even more completely obscured by recent events in Sudan, however, is the continuing humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad. 

Refugees from Central African Republic, internally displaced Chadians, and Darfuri refugees together make up a population of approximately 500,000 civilians, almost completely dependent upon international aid.  Half this population has come from the east, fleeing the killing fields of Darfur and the predations of Khartoum’s brutal Janjaweed militias, and its regular military forces. Recently the fleeing has begun again, just as Chadian President Idriss Déby is preparing to expel the U.N. force tasked with providing security in the region.  Once more, the U.N. and the international community are acquiescing before the supremely callous demands of a ruthless regime.

A great many Darfuris fled the early attacks of 2003-2005, and the refugee population in eastern Chad grew rapidly; many more fled subsequently, fearing further attacks and the ongoing, ethnically-targeted destruction of livelihoods.  Perversely, in Chad, they again became the victims of genocidal assault.  A January 2007 report from Human Rights Watch, or HRW, titled “‘They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad” remains our best contemporaneous account of violence perpetrated against Darfuri refugees and other civilians.  In October 2006, Khartoum’s military aircraft “bombed villages in eastern Chad (…) [as] part of a broader pattern of indiscriminate bombing attacks against civilians in Darfur.”  During its month-long field investigation, HRW also uncovered evidence “linking some attacks against civilians in eastern Chad with known Janjaweed militia commanders or with Sudanese government paramilitary forces known to include many Janjaweed militia members.”

Broader insecurity and more opportunistic violence came quickly in the wake of these attacks on civilians, as the growing refugee population required an increasingly comprehensive humanitarian response.  Seven years after war began in Darfur, this humanitarian response remains extremely vulnerable and lacks adequate resources.

This is the context in which we must understand recent reports of intense fighting in West Darfur, particularly in the Jebel Moon area, between Khartoum’s forces and those of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM.  Although there has been only vague confirmation from the U.N./A.U. “hybrid” peacekeeping force, or UNAMID, a range of reports and statements from a variety of actors suggest that JEM has indeed lost its most significant military redoubt, and that during the fighting many more civilians have been displaced. Radio Dabanga reports from Kounoungo refugee camp that officials for the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, or UNHCR, are preparing for approximately 2,500 civilians who have already fled to Birak in eastern Chad.  How many more are on the way is unclear.

These attacks are reminiscent of a major military offensive by Khartoum in the same region in early 2008.  At the time, UNHCR reported:

“[U]p to 12,000 ‘terrified’ refugees from Sudan's Darfur region have fled across the border to neighboring Chad after the latest air strikes by the Sudanese military and thousands more may be on their way. (…) Most of the refugees so far are men, [UNHCR spokeswoman Helene Caux] said. But the arrivals are telling UNHCR that ‘thousands of women and children are on their way’ to Chad, she added.”

Now, in the wake of rapprochement between N’Djamena and Khartoum, Déby is insisting that the U.N. force that followed an emergency European deployment to eastern Chad be removed. MINURCAT, as the U.N. mission is known, will have until July 15 to withdraw 1,400 troops, according to a report from U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon; the remaining 1,900 must be withdrawn by October 15. This is an outrageous assertion of national sovereignty, and will put at dramatically increased risk both civilians and humanitarians, especially humanitarian convoys—a particular concern of the U.N. World Food Program

Déby claims that his forces are capable of providing the necessary security; but this is patently false, even as Déby has shown no inclination in the past to use what military and police resources he has to protect refugees or aid operations. Much greater diplomatic pressure—especially from France, the U.S., and the U.N.—should have been exerted to forestall a development that clearly augurs near-term catastrophe. Yet again, before our very eyes, the people of Darfur have been abandoned.

 

Dr. Eric Reeves is a professor of English language and literature at Smith College. He has spent the past 11 years working full-time as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the U.S. and internationally.

A Short History of a Peacekeeping Mission

Over recent months I've been writing about the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, known as MINURCAT, and discussing the missing logistical and financial details of the Government of Chad's, plan to take over from the mission. However, for the majority of people who can’t access regular information about the situation in eastern Chad, and don't have the luxury of a job that allows them to spend time reading and learning about the situation, there is a lot that has gone unexplained about MINURCAT and the current situation.

To understand the withdrawal of MINURCAT troops, we need to first look at the political climate which allowed the Chadian government to successfully oppose renewal of the mission's mandate. Peacekeeping missions authorized and deployed by the U.N. Security Council depend on the permission of the host country, which allow the peacekeeping mission to operate within its borders, on condition that its presence is not recognized as a challenge to the state's sovereignty. When the host government does not have the capacity to address a humanitarian situation such as the one in eastern Chad, they require the assistance of the international community—however, this necessity does not always alleviate concerns about the threat to sovereignty.

In the case of MINURCAT, the Chadian government was concerned about these political issues, as well as about hosting a peacekeeping mission that stood at only 50 percent capacity and had training and conduct issues (as reported by human rights groups such as Physicians for Human Rights and Amnesty International)—shortcomings that the international community has failed to address.

In my opinion, the withdrawal of MINURCAT is unquestionably a step backwards for the security situation in eastern Chad. Unofficial reports from the border area last week reference heavy losses of both troops and vehicles by the Government of Chad during rebel attacks, which raise concerns about the possibility for continuing humanitarian operations in the area. Meanwhile, more than 200,000 Darfuri refugees are dependent upon these humanitarian operations for food, shelter, and medical care in the region.

In his report to the Security Council last week, the Secretary-General recommended that MINURCAT’s military component in Chad be reduced from 3,300 to 1,400 troops. If this scenario comes to pass, the remaining military troops would represent only 38 percent of the troops initially authorized by the U.N. as necessary to securing the displaced refugee population and humanitarian operations in eastern Chad. (Keep in mind that even before this withdrawal, MINURCAT never approached its full authorized deployment of 4,900).

Over the past year the region has remained among the most hazardous operating environments currently sustaining humanitarian operations. The disruption of humanitarian operations this month follows previous multi-week suspensions of operations by agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Programme in May and November-December 2009.

Human rights groups have urged the Secretary-General, in his review of MINURCAT, to consider the security of NGO operations, as well as the need for consultation and transparency with refugee communities and humanitarian agencies on the ground. It is vital that the final recommendations, to be adopted by the U.N. Security Council later this month, are revised to include these concerns.

Joe Read is a fellow at the Harvard University Committee on Human Rights Studies and author of the Action Agenda for Realizing Treatment and Support for Women and Girls in Darfur, published by Physicians for Human Rights. She blogs regularly at Health Rights Advocate and tweets via @readieontheroad.

Post-Peacekeeping Reality in Eastern Chad

This guest post by Joe Read of Physicians for Human Rights originally appeared on the PHR blog.

Next week, the U.N. Secretary-General’s report on the future of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad peacekeeping force, or MINURCAT, in eastern Chad will be released, outlining the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops in the Chad-Sudan border region visited by PHR researchers in 2008. The report "Nowhere to Turn: Failure to Protect, Support and Assure Justice for Darfuri Women," released by PHR in June 2009, outlined urgent human rights issues in eastern Chad, including food insecurity, camp infrastructure, access to health and psychosocial care, and security for refugee families. Among the disturbing findings of our investigation was a 50 percent rate of rape or sexual assault reported by women interviewed by the PHR medical team.

Since the time of PHR’s investigation, a number of security threats and human rights issues have been recorded — via international media reporting on hijackings and kidnappings of humanitarian aid workers, and reports such as that released by the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action on the continued need for the peacekeeping force.

Many large-scale infrastructure issues remain, such as the weak Chadian legal system, drought and food shortage, and the continued operation of militarized rebel groups in the area, as well as auxiliary practical issues such as low phone coverage (a key issue for reducing attacks against refugees and humanitarians, as emergency phone calls allow for MINURCAT forces to be alerted to security problems). The recent dispute over the continued presence of the MINURCAT force has detracted focus from these problems, which need to remain at the forefront of the diplomatic and humanitarian agenda in Chad. (Despite ongoing needs in eastern Chad, the Chadian government opposed the MINURCAT mission’s renewal in January 2010.)

The withdrawal of MINURCAT transfers responsibility for the security of refugees and humanitarian operations to the Government of Chad — a significant challenge for a state with low material wealth and incomplete infrastructure. So, what can be done, given the limitations of the current circumstances?

First, it is important to remember that the continued existence of the 200,000 Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad relies on the efforts of humanitarian aid workers and U.N. staff on the ground: managing the refugee camps, distributing WFP rations and shelter items, and providing emergency medical care. Humanitarian agencies have continued to operate in eastern Chad despite increasingly frequent security threats to NGOs and personnel, and rely on police escorts in order to operate in the Phase IV security environment. The current system of police escorts for NGO convoys must be taken over by the Chadian police force, and it is particularly important that NGOs are not obliged to pay or provide other compensation for the new security arrangements, and that the Chadian government accept responsibility for ensuring the security of the humanitarian operations.

Secondly, refugee communities and the humanitarian actors working with refugees must be consulted and kept informed of the transition and departure of MINURCAT and how the government will continue MINURCAT’s security and protection activities. In order to ensure this takes place, the government should immediately establish a dialogue and consultation forum with refugee communities and humanitarian workers, and the international community should remain engaged in the transition process to ensure that this takes place.

Thirdly, it is of utmost importance that the MINURCAT withdrawal not be allowed to disrupt the humanitarian operations in eastern Chad and/or detract from refugee security and protection. The continued monitoring of the human rights situation on the ground, and a specific focus on the security and protection needs of refugees, is paramount. The numbers of the civilian police force should be increased as the military component is phased out, and measures must be taken in the recruiting process to improve the conduct of police officers, sensitize police to human rights and gender issues, and dramatically raise the number of women police officers.

The disappointing withdrawal of the MINURCAT force — before the benchmarks of withdrawal have been met (see the Secretary-General’s December 2008 reports) — should not distract the U.N. Security Council or the international community from addressing the ongoing problems affecting the Darfurian refugee population in eastern Chad. The reduction of arms, sexual and gender-based violence and human rights abuses (demilitarization of camps) must remain a key priority, along with assisting the voluntary and safe return of communities. In addition to resolving security issues on a community level, it is vital that widespread problems, such as the capacity and training of national law enforcement agencies, judiciary and prison systems, are addressed, and that the Chadian military assigns a quick reaction force to take over from MINURCAT’s civilian component.

 

Photo: MINURCAT peacekeepers (minurcat.unmissions.org)

LRA Attacks in CAR: As Bold as They are Frequent

News reports about violence in the Central African Republic this week stated that the Lord’s Resistance Army attacked the towns of Mboki and Zemio in south-eastern corner of the country. Many people were apparently killed in Mboki and 50 kidnapped. Sources on the ground in CAR said, however, that the biggest attack took place in Rafai on Monday, 125 miles west of Zemio. As the discrepancies illustrate, reports on attacks in CAR are scarce and often conflicting, creating an impression that the LRA is not very active there. However, during a recent research mission in southern CAR, I found that LRA violence has been persistent and continues to spread westward despite a strong Ugandan army presence there.

The first in the series of attacks took place in Mboki last Friday night, March 19 and the next morning. At least two people were seriously injured and another one died.

The second attack took place in Zemio, 85 miles west of Mboki on Sunday. Three armed men wearing military uniforms were seen in town around 1 in the afternoon. Zemio residents, armed with locally manufactured guns and bows and arrows, understood immediately who the intruders were – many in Zemio are internally displaced or Congolese refugees who left their homes due to LRA violence – and chased them away. It is believed the three men were part of a reconnaissance LRA team and that a bigger group was waiting outside of town to attack later in the evening.

The third attack occurred in the town of Rafai on Monday. At least 10 people were killed and 50 kidnapped. One LRA fighter was caught by the population and burned alive. This was the second LRA attack in Rafai this year. The previous attack happened almost exactly a month before on February 21, and more than 50 people were abducted. During the February attack, the LRA specifically targeted the Catholic mission there, stealing solar panels and the multi frequency radio, and looting or destroying almost everything else. Monday’s attack targeted Rafai’s small market; the LRA were clearly after food. 

It is not a surprise that Zemio was targeted by the LRA. During my stay there less than two weeks ago, it was clear that people were expecting an LRA attack. Many were wondering why Zemio had not been attacked before when almost every surrounding town and village had been targeted by the LRA. Zemio is also home to 3,000 Congolese refugees who escaped attacks in northern Bas Uele district and about 500 internally displaced people also escaping LRA violence. The absence of the Ugandan army and the Central African army and police in the town meant the refugees and IPDs were easy targets for the LRA. To make matters worse, a convoy from the U.N.’s World Food Program delivered food to refugees and IDPs in Zemio on March 16. It is almost certain that attacks in Zemio and Mboki, where there was a food delivery on March 19, were related to the WFP supplies. The Ugandan army apparently deployed immediately to Zemio after the LRA sightings which has ensured a level of security in town.

The attack in Mboki is puzzling. Mboki has one of the strongest self-defense forces in all of eastern CAR. The self-defense force there was created after an LRA attack on July 24, 2009. In the attack last summer, the residents of Mboki responded with bows and arrows when the LRA approached the town’s market. The LRA killed six people, including two Congolese refugees, but three LRA were also killed by the local population. When I was recently in Mboki, there were at least 50 Ugandan soldiers, about 10 CAR soldiers, and 5 police. It is surprising that the LRA would attack a town with so many armed defenders.

Contrary to the claims of officials in the region, it’s clear the LRA is not dwindling. Almost simultaneous attacks in different towns hundred of miles apart in both CAR and neighboring Congo indicate the presence of many different groups. It is also becoming obvious that the Ugandan army alone is not able to finish them off. A regional strategy to contain this regional problem is urgently needed.

Darfur Peace Process Update: ‘Who Are We Fighting For?’

After nearly seven years of fighting, the displacement of three million people, and multiple failed attempts to negotiate peace, talks are ongoing to end the conflict in Darfur. Since mid-February, the joint African Union/U.N. mediation team has been working in Doha, Qatar with representatives of the Government of Sudan and more than 10 Darfur rebel groups to negotiate a solution. Diplomats from around the world have descended on Doha to support the process. The host government, in an effort to grease the wheels, publicly pledged $2 billion dollars for reconstruction efforts in Darfur.

From reports in the mainstream media and declarations by the U.S. and other officials, you would be forgiven for thinking that the process is moving along relatively smoothly. Two agreements have been signed, and, if you believe the reports, the only remaining hurdle is to overcome the contentious relations between various rebel factions. Yet a closer look reveals a flawed process, the impacts of which have not yet been felt where they matter the most: the ground in Darfur.
 
An initial agreement between the government and the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, is not a formal truce but an agreement to have further talks. Hailed as a major breakthrough by diplomats who had no hand in the negotiations, the JEM deal was quickly in trouble. In the days leading up to and following the signing ceremony in Doha, fighting reportedly rocked the JEM-controlled area of Jebel Moon. However, the fresh violence was largely overlooked as reports focused on the peace talks.
 
The second agreement, signed yesterday between the government and a new coalition of rebel groups called the Liberation and Justice Movement, or LJM, is a step forward. However, the LJM’s members are not major political or military players in Darfur and rumors of backroom deal-making could undermine any formal deal and its implementation.
 
Click here to read the full post.
 
This post originally appeared on Change.org's Human Rights blog.
 
Photo: Sudan Liberation Army rebels in South Darfur (IRIN)