Maggie Fick's blog

JUBA, Sudan—Hundreds gathered on a rainy morning in Sudan’s southern capital of Juba to mark the countdown to southern Sudan’s self-determination referendum.

The southern referendum, slated for January 9, 2011, was a key provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a landmark accord that ended decades of war between the Khartoum government and the southern rebels, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army.

With only six months until southerners cast their votes in a referendum that analysts widely believe will lead to separation of Sudan’s North and South, youth activists took to the streets of Juba today with one clear message: “separation is our ultimate goal.”

That was the slogan emblazoned on the bright orange shirts distributed en masse by a newly formed organization, the Southern Sudan Youth Forum for Referendum. One leader of the new group, Angelo Diing, a 32-year old businessman from Northern Bahr al Ghazal state, described the forum’s members as “young people who care about the future of southern Sudan.”

“We are all volunteering our time to help,” said Nya Willliam, a young southern Sudanese women who helped plan the inaugural rally of the youth forum. William said she is a civil servant in the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, though the organizers of the event are careful to note that the youth forum is not being sponsored by the southern government.

Diing said the forum plans to launch events in the coming months in all 10 states in the South. He said the goal of the group is to educate the mostly illiterate southern population about the referendum and to inform them that “this is their chance to decide” their future.

Men, women, and young children flocked to Juba’s football stadium in an ad hoc parade of motorcycles, “matatu” minivans, and the white 4x4s that are ubiquitous in this town, as organizers of the event threw t-shirts out the windows of cars and from their perches in the back of flatbed trucks. Yelling “SPLM Oyee,” a common refrain here, demonstrators voiced support for the South’s ruling party.
Basing themselves at a tall building in town that they’ve named the “Referendum House,” the Southern Sudan Youth Forum is one of a number of youth groups that have sprung up in recent months to raise awareness about the upcoming independence vote. All of these groups have a strong secessionist leaning, indicative of the general sentiment among southerners. Various signs attached to minivans and trucks reinforced these views: “No to the Arabization and Islamization of the South. Yes to Southern Sudan Independent,” read one banner.

Simon Kamis, 20, a secondary school student in Juba, said that he came to rally because he had been informed by his friends about it, and he said that he would definitely vote for secession. “We have been marginalized by the northerners,” Kamis said, echoing a common refrain among the population here that the Khartoum government has not done enough to fulfill the promises they made when they signed the CPA and promised to work with the southern government to “make unity attractive” to all Sudanese citizens.

Said one government official, “This is our ‘orange revolution.’”

It’s a truism that in southern Sudan, history is living; it is essential to know the history of southern Sudan and its peoples to make sense of the equally historic machinations and crucial developments underway today.

Exhibit A is the current situation in Abyei, on the disputed border between North and South; many a southerner will tell you, “if there’s a return to [North-South] war, it’ll start in Abyei.” That assertion is, of course, well-grounded in recent and past history. The May 2008 bombardment of Abyei town by Sudanese Armed Forces that were a part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement-mandated “Joint Integrated Units,” was arguably the greatest threat to the breakdown of the tentative peace brokered by the CPA since the agreement was signed in 2005.

Tensions are on the rise again in Abyei, reminiscent of a year ago, when anxious Abyei residents awaited the ruling of the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration on the contested boundaries of the region. Although many observers (myself included) feared the worst in Abyei following the high-stakes court ruling, the aftermath was, at first glance, a best-case scenario. The NCP and SPLM pledged to immediately begin implementing the agreement by demarcating the new boundaries and sensitizing local populations—both the nomadic Misseriya populations who graze seasonally in the Abyei area and the native Ngok Dinka people—about the ruling.

Unfortunately, the parties have not kept their promises; the boundaries of Abyei remain un-demarcated (with the SPLM credibly alleging foul play by Khartoum through the use of unauthorized security forces to prevent demarcation in the area), and Abyei residents remain in the dark about their future. What is known for certain is this: on January 9, 2011, when the people of southern Sudan vote in their self-determination referendum, the people of Abyei are set to vote in a separate referendum, which should (according to the CPA and to the Abyei Referendum Act passed last December) enable them to choose to retain their “special administrative status” in northern Sudan or to join the South’s Warrap state.

In recent days, local tensions have flared in Abyei over the lack of progress on preparations for the Abyei referendum. On Monday, an estimated 3,000 Abyei residents marched to the gates of the U.N. Mission’s compound in Abyei to present a communiqué addressed to President Bashir that detailed their grievances, including discontent that the Abyei Referendum Commission had not yet been formed (the southern referendum commission was approved by the National Assembly more than two weeks ago and even that was delayed), the border demarcation had not progressed, and that SAF forces and “allied militias” have not withdrawn from the new boundaries of Abyei.

Then on Tuesday, reports emerged of a clash between gunmen and police in the village of Tajalei, roughly 20 miles northeast of Abyei town. Four civilians and a policeman were killed in this clash, which the Abyei chief administrator Deng Arop Kuol described to Reuters as a politically-motivated attack by Misseriya militia: “They are trying to disrupt the referendum activities, particularly the voter registration." This is not the first time southern officials have linked instability in Abyei to the nomadic Misseriya populations, who the SPLM often view as proxies for the NCP.

It is hard to predict what’s ahead for Abyei, but if history is any indication, this region will continue to be a volatile flashpoint, with local populations bearing the brunt of higher-level disputes between Khartoum and Juba.

Photo: SPLA soldiers in Abyei in 2008 (IRIN)

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JUBA, Southern Sudan—While reading today’s papers, I couldn’t help but notice a recurrent trend across the three papers I was perusing.

Despite the recent efforts of the National Congress Party to “make unity attractive” to southerners anxious to cast their votes in the upcoming self-determination referendum, the resounding sentiment of southerners still seems to rest in the “separation” camp. In other words, last ditch attempts by the Khartoum government to show the South that a unified Sudan will provide southerners with a better life than the alternative (an independent South) seem to be falling on deaf ears.

On that note, here are some snippets from the local papers:

“In conclusion, volumes of words will not make unity attractive. Seeing is believing and there is nothing that can be seen practically to demonstrate the attractiveness of unity. It is obvious that our brothers north of the border are specialist in talking too much devoid of substance. There is therefore no regret for the separation of the South.”

--Jacob K. Lupai, in an opinion piece titled “A million signatures to dishonor the CPA in Sudan,” 5 to 11 July edition of the Southern Eye

“As for now the NCP officials have suggested that they will seek to carry out as many development projects as possible for Southerners to see the fruits of remaining within a united state. Many countries in the region as well as the African Union and European Union appear reluctant to see Sudan break up into two but what the Southerners on the ground need for now is separation.”

--Manyang David Mayar, “NCP-SPLM unity support deal is too late: Popular Congress Party,” 5 to 8 July edition of The Juba Post

“It is…not practical to force unity on the people of Sudan at this point in time. Besides, Southerners aren’t faking their quest for freedom; our people have paid a price for it, and are ready to do more in the event of sabotage and ploys. We have matured and we can do it without the North.”

--Isaiah Abraham, “Hardliners or not South Sudanese set to secede,” 29 June to 9 July edition of the Sudan Mirror

JUBA, Southern Sudan -- Yesterday, one of the two vice presidents in Sudan’s Government of National Unity traveled from Khartoum to the southern capital Juba to help launch an extensive development project aimed at increasing infrastructure in the 10 states that share the 2,100 kilometer North-South border. In yesterday’s meeting, Vice President Ali Osman Taha and the senior leadership between Vice President Taha and the senior leadership of the Government of Southern Sudan hammered out some of the details of road and water projects that will cost the Khartoum and Juba governments some $210 million, with Khartoum contributing the majority of the funds for the border initiative.

A journalist friend of mine who sat on the sidelines of the high-level meeting noted to me that the GoSS perspective following the meeting seems to be that the new collaborative spirit expressed by Khartoum is welcome and "better late than never.” Indeed, it is hard not to question the motives of the National Congress Party in sending Vice President Taha to Juba to unroll projects that could, at least on paper, make unity more “attractive” (to quote the CPA’s famous catchphrase) to southerners gearing up to cast their independence vote in six months. But based on my experiences speaking to southerners during my work here in Juba, the efforts by Khartoum to appeal to southern citizens may be viewed as “too little, too late” instead of “better late than never.”

Photo: Ali Osman Taha (AP)
 

This piece originally appeared in Global Post.

JUBA, Sudan — While celebrations marked the inauguration of Sudan president Omar al-Bashir to another term of office in Khartoum, the mood was more somber and determined in southern Sudan. The people of southern Sudan are looking ahead to the referendum in January 2011 when they will vote to determine if the south can secede to become an independent country.

If all goes according to plan, African’s largest country will be well on its way to “divorce” by this time next year.

But before the referendum — viewed as the real “end game” for the South — can take place, the two parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) must wrap up the electoral process and forge ahead into a gauntlet of negotiations over the future of Sudan, regardless of whether it remains one country or becomes two separate nations.

The elections took more than two years and cost hundreds of millions of donor dollars to pull off. Significant diplomatic capital has been expended in hemming and hawing over the international community’s response to elections that returned an indicted war criminal to power.

The “check the box” mentality toward the elections was the tacit approach of many international actors, including the Obama administration. This conflict prevention-focused strategy suggested that the elections were necessary to keep the peace agreement on track, because a breakdown of this agreement would almost certainly spark a return to all-out North-South war.

There’s arguably a serious discussion needed about the merits, disadvantages, and long-term consequences of significantly lowering the credibility bar of Sudan’s elections in order to clear yet another CPA hurdle.

Now that the new governments have been formed in Khartoum and here in Juba, the southern capital, Sudan's two ruling parties and the international actors with a stake in the future of the country have shifted their attention to the unpredictable period ahead.

In the seven-month run-up to the South’s referendum on independence in January, the National Congress Party-led regime in Khartoum and the guerrillas-turned-politicians of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement will need to engage in more of the deal-making and elite bargaining that characterized the recent political dramas in Sudan prior to the elections. A myriad number of hot-button issues — from the sharing of oil-revenues following the referendum to the demarcation of the North-South border — must be resolved before southerners return to the polls in January.

Before the elections are shelved and forgotten, it’s worth considering the lessons that all parties could learn from the process, given that it in the South, it was in some ways a “dry run” for the referendum.

Click here to continue reading.

Photo: Voter registration booth in Juba (Enough/Maggie Fick)

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Don’t miss out on the insights from The New York Times’ Nicholas Kristof in his latest dispatch from Sudan. Here are a few key quotes and takeaways from this important piece:

• “[W]e should all try to pay more attention to the risk of a catastrophic war ahead in Sudan. Everybody knows it may be coming, but until the bullets start flying, it simply isn’t going to get the attention it merits… behind the scenes the real question is whether the north-south civil war is going to resume.”
• “The next north-south war, if there is one, will be extraordinarily ugly.”
• There are two main reasons to be optimistic (and to think that a return to N-S war could be avoided): The governments in Juba and Khartoum both have an interest in finding a mutually beneficially oil revenue sharing arrangement and “both sides are exhausted by war.” Plus: “The world is also much more attentive to Sudanese abuses, and there would be an immediate outcry if Khartoum unleashed militias on the south once more.”
• Reasons to be pessimistic: President Bashir has never kept his promises (particularly on the peace agreement front). There are several key issues that must be resolved between Bashir’s National Congress Party and the South’s ruling Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement before the South’s self-determination referendum. If they are not resolved, each of these discrete issues could justify another war for one side or the other. These issues include: the future of Abyei (and details involving its referendum), the demarcation of the North-South border, which slices through several oil-rich areas that both parties seek to lay claim to.
• In addition to these high-level political tensions, add to the mix intra-southern tribal tensions and long-standing grievances between Arab nomadic populations and southern pastoral groups coexisting near Sudan’s contested internal border. An anecdote from Kristof helps to explain how extremely localized disputes frequently magnify into deadly serious incidents.

Kristof concludes that while a new war in Sudan isn’t inevitable after next year’s southern referendum, “it’s a real risk.” He argues that the U.S. and other countries who played a crucial role in the signing of the North-South peace deal in 2005 can’t look away now. Kristof also suggests that the U.S. should consider messaging to Khartoum that it will provide military support to the southern army if Khartoum opts to resume air strikes à la Darfur and the previous North-South civil war. While military assistance is obviously controversial, it is clear that the administration needs to make absolutely clear to Khartoum that there are some redlines it is unwilling to accept in terms of the government's behavior on the ground. The U.S. needs to be very focused on planning for numerous possibilities and eventualities for the very rapidly approaching post-referendum Sudan.

Finally Kristof encourages comments from his readers on this topic, particularly from Sudanese readers. More discussion and consideration of the risks in the run-up to the referendum is needed, and I for one will be checking the comments on this post to see the range of thoughts and ideas emerging during this critical moment in Sudan’s history.

Photo: SPLA soldiers in Abyei (IRIN)

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UPDATE: The official results for the southern Sudan state-level races have now been made public. In Juba, the capital of Central Equatoria state, the mood was tense after incumbent Governor Clement Wani was declared the victor over independent canddiate Alfred Ladu Gore. The Government of Southern Sudan and the United Nations ordered a curfew yesterday evening, and it remains to be seen how the citizens of Juba will react to this news, which is sure not to sit well with many.

JUBA, Southern Sudan—If you read the recent Economist article that cavalierly proclaimed Sudan’s elections to be “horrid” in the North and “more or less fair” in the South, please think again. If you’re under the (correct) impression that Sudan’s five-day polling period passed generally peacefully, resist the urge to therefore conclude that the country is out of the woods until its next major political event next year.

The elections are not over yet, because the official results have not been announced in some races (in Central Equatoria state, where I live, for one), and if anything, the process is getting messier by the day. Since the Economist article was published, the following events have transpired in South Sudan:

•    Two people were killed on Friday April 23 in Bentiu, the capital of oil-rich Unity state near the North-South border, in a clash between security forces and supporters of a gubernatorial candidate following the announcement that the incumbent governor had won. A local radio journalist was reportedly arrested and beaten by security forces while covering the unfolding events in Bentiu.

•    According to the UN, polling station staff rioted in the Northern Bahr al Ghazal state capital of Aweil on April 21, with an estimated 200 protestors gathering outside the State High Elections Committee office to demand their salaries for their work during the elections. Local elections staff also gathered in Juba at the State High Committee office after staff at three polling stations in Juba had gone on strike to demand their pay.

•    Ballots boxes being stored in a primary school were reportedly burned last week in the village of Yangiri in Western Equatoria state.

•    Senior elections officials in Western Equatoria state received anonymous death threats late last week; these officials claim they are being intimidated into manipulating elections results in incumbent governor and SPLM candidate Jemma Nunu Kumba’s favor. On Saturday, two election officials were reportedly kidnapped and badly beaten; local news sources reported allegations that the state government has ordered the withholding of elections results and the detainment of elections officials in the state.

•    Also on Saturday, April 24, the Political Parties Council of Southern Sudan—a body comprised of all of the political parties in the South and formed with the assistance of the African Union Panel on Sudan to resolve elections-related disputes—accused the SPLM of committing “serious and grievous” violations during the polling period.

Initial statements and reports on the elections by the Obama administration and other governments, and by the Carter Center and a host of other observer missions, have helped foster the impression that the elections “box” has officially been “ticked.” The logic goes that the elections are over and it’s time to press ahead into the “pre-referendum period,” because less than nine months remain before the southern Sudanese will cast their all-important vote for the future of their country. True enough; serious negotiations over a number of contentious issues must take place in the coming months between the two ruling parties to Sudan, who are also the signatories to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA.

But just because there are many CPA-related issues to resolve before the southern referendum does not mean that the serious transgressions currently occurring in Sudan should be ignored. The overriding theme in the incidents detailed above is clear: the South’s ruling SPLM party and its security forces are responsible for the majority of the reported cases of political repression, intimidation, and arbitrary uses of force against civilians and elections officials in the South. In many of the instances where “plain clothes security forces” or “unauthorized security personnel” have reportedly committed violations, it is clear that the reason these individuals have not been described as SPLM-affiliated armed forces or political agents is because southerners are afraid of the consequences of speaking out against the ruling party in the South. The SPLM’s conduct during the electoral process should be subject to local and international scrutiny as the party positions itself to lead what will likely be Africa’s newest state.

*Hat-tip to Reuters’ Juba-based correspondent Skye Wheeler, for this close look at allegations by opposition parties and independents candidates of fraud and intimidation by the SPLM during the five-day polling period.

Photo: A crowd gathers around a polling list (Enough/Maggie Fick)

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JUBA, Southern Sudan—Today, Sudan’s National Electoral Commission pushed back the announcement of official results for the country’s first multi-party elections in 24 years. BBC reports that “a full picture is unlikely to emerge until next week.” However, this evening SUNA, the state-owned news agency, sent a text saying that the results of the presidential elections have been completed in the North and will be finalized in the South in the next 48 hours. Contradictory statements, misinformation, and rumors are the norm at present, as Sudan waits in vain for the electoral process to yield results.

To many in the South, the NEC’s announcement today came as no surprise, given the significant difficulties in collecting ballot papers and results from local polling stations—some of which are not accessible by road. (In these locations, the United Nations is helping collect elections materials by helicopter). The tabulation of results is complicated for some of the same reasons that the polling process was complex; the number of ballots and the lack of resources at the local level.

Today, an official at the South Sudan Elections High Committee told Enough that the NEC should have listened to the state-level elections committee in the South, who have a better understanding of the logistical constraints and technical challenges that have affected the electoral process in the South than the national body in Khartoum. Indeed, the NEC has had to push back the results announcement more than once since the polls closed. Some southerners view the delay as yet another tool for NEC manipulation or “fixing” of the results. One man in Juba said to me today, “well, [the results] don’t really matter much at this point, the rigging was already done long ago.”

As the waiting game continues, rumors of the results for hotly contested races are stirring tensions between candidates and their supporters. In the absence of official results, various camps have begun asserting that their candidate has in fact won. (Yesterday, the South’s ruling SPLM party posted on its blog that senior SPLM official Malik Agar had won the Blue Nile state governorship, following reports that both northern and southern military forces were building up troops along the state’s southern border).

In Juba this week, one of the major markets has been closed on and off, likely due to fears by some northern merchants that their shops will be targeted should violence break out around the announcement of results. In other markets, produce and other goods that are typically brought by road from Uganda and Kenya have been in scarce supply, as much of international trade between the South and its neighbors has been put on hold.

Photo: Preliminary tallies in polling station in Juba, giving Yasir Arman the win. (Maggie Fick)

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A new report from the venerable Small Arms Survey takes a close and informed look at drivers of armed violence and inter-communal conflict in southern Sudan. This report is valuable because it reviews the dynamics of proxy warfare in southern Sudan and the fragmentation of armed groups within the South during the North-South civil war (particularly during the 1990s).

The report also offered its two-cents on what should have been prioritized by the international and Sudanese community, as Sudan entered into the eleventh hour of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This assertion stood out to me, particularly as we continue to wait here in Sudan for official polling results to be announced:

Matters are further complicated by the current elections, which are characterized on a national level by reports of intimidation and mass disenfranchisement leading to last minute boycotts, threats, secret deals, and great confusion. Southerners have reason to celebrate being able to vote, but the rancour and divisions within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement are growing just as it needs to pull together ahead of the upcoming referenda. If half the resources and energy—both Sudanese and international—had gone into reconciliation activities as have been devoted to ‘democratization’, Sudan’s future might seem more promising.

The report concludes by stressing the importance of “coordinated international pressure,” noting that “Sudan’s willingness to respond to such pressure led to the signing of the CPA,” and that this pressure is urgently needed once more to prevent the CPA’s collapse and renewed conflict in the South.

Photo: Murle tribe displaced by Lou Nuer attacks in the South. (AP)

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“These elections are an important lesson for us,” said Dr. Anne Itto, a senior official in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, at a press conference she convened yesterday to discuss the SPLM’s stance after four days of polling (today marked the end of polling in Sudan).

Dr. Itto’s remarks are a signal that her party, the ruling party in the South and the signatory along with the National Congress Party of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, has wised up to an important trend that characterized the CPA’s post-2005 “interim period.” The trend has been evident in two of the major political processes called for in the CPA: the census (carried out in 2008 and 2009) and this month’s Sudan-wide elections.

In these complex and protracted technical exercises, sleights of hand by the NCP have enabled the regime to shape results in a way that suits their interests at the expense of free and fair processes. The ways in which the NCP rigged and manipulated both the census and the elections have been well-documented, and the important point at the moment is that much of the electoral gerrymandering was complete well before the polls opened last Sunday. Most of the irregularities of this week’s polling process have been widely reported to be “technical difficulties.” Indeed, some of these problems, from the wrong ballot papers being delivered to polling stations to the voter registries at these stations not containing a full list of those registered, appear to be technical issues that may be attributable to the fact that Sudan has not held multiparty elections in 24 years and that the vast majority of the population in the South cannot read and write.

However, the SPLM’s Dr. Itto made a compelling case yesterday that the National Electoral Commission, or NEC, could have done more to anticipate and resolve these irregularities prior to the start of polling “if they had had the will to do something.” She said that if the NEC had “really cared” about holding free and fair elections, then they could have conducted the electoral process differently, in a way that allowed the people of Sudan to express their political beliefs freely. Dr. Itto then linked this issue of what she called “negligence” back to next year’s self-determination referendum—an all-important issue for the South that will determine whether or not the region becomes independent next year: “The referendum is key so we must be careful with it,” she said, noting that the Referendum Commission’s members have not yet been announced, and that the SPLM intends to make sure these members are “serious” about the conduct of a free, fair, and credible referendum.

It’s wise of the SPLM to treat the elections as an opportunity to learn how the ruling party operates to engineer results and maintain its dominant position in Sudan. As the referendum looms, the SPLM can’t afford to be outwitted by NCP maneuvering again.

Photo: Dr. Anne Itto, a senior official of South Sudan's ruling party, the SPLM. (Maggie Fick)

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