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5 Lessons from Congo for Afghanistan Mining

Gold powder - SLezhnev

This post originally appeared on Global Post.

The recent report that Afghanistan has mineral deposits worth $1 trillion has led several writers to make a broad comparison to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Conflict in that country, which is blamed for killing more than 5 million people, is fueled in significant part by the illicit trade in minerals worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. It’s worth delving into the less obvious links between mineral resources and instability in eastern Congo to illustrate the potentially grave effects of a gold, lithium, or niobium rush in Afghanistan.

1) The pell-mell rush to exploit minerals and other natural resources in the midst of a war further complicates already thorny conflicts. At the outset, the war in eastern Congo was not about minerals, but was the result of an explosive combination of fallout from the genocide in neighboring Rwanda, the collapse of the regime of Mobutu in Congo (then known as Zaire) and simmering tensions over land and citizenship in eastern Congo.

But the profits from the mineral trade enriched whatever rebel group controlled the mining area and gave incentive to for the systematic looting of the country by interlopers on all sides of the war from 1998 through 2002, and then by an alphabet soup of rebel groups, militias and military units operating in the restive eastern provinces up until the present. The money gained from the mining changed the logic of the war.

Immediate thought should be given as to how a potential mineral windfall will impact Afghanistan’s similarly intricate layers of local, national and regional conflicts.

2) Earnings from minerals put weapons in the hands of warlords by strengthening their global networks of financial supporters. Control of minerals has made rebels in Congo less dependent on external political support, and given them a connection to international markets. Electronics companies, jewelers and other end-users of Congo’s minerals are effectively laundering the proceeds from war. Moreover, in the pursuit of profits, competing networks of armed groups and business elites routinely manipulate Congo’s inflammatory grievances around ethnicity and other sensitive subjects. It’s a toxic combination that helps to explain why the conflict in eastern Congo remains so deadly, after more than a decade of U.N. peacekeepers. As the war in Afghanistan drags on, the mineral trade could well further entrench that conflict, too.

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Update on the Chebeya Assassination

Kinshasa street - LHeaton

Events surrounding the murder of Congolese human rights defender Floribert Chebeya are developing rapidly, with significant political fallout in Kinshasa. Last weekend President Kabila suspended General John Numbi, the powerful head of the Congolese police forces, who Chebeya had told his wife he was going to meet the night before his body was found. Human Rights Watch has a detailed rundown of the events surrounding Chebeya’s murder and the initial shoddy efforts by authorities.

Sources in Kinshasa say that that several senior police officers arrested in connection to the murder have admitted to acting under the direction of General Numbi. Numbi, who is apparently under house arrest in Kinshasa, denies ordering his death. It’s worth noting that John Numbi is not just the head of the police, but also a senior figure within President Kabila’s small inner circle, who has been a major player in Kinshasa’s renewed relationship with Rwanda during the past 18 months.

Chebeya’s assassination is a daunting blow to human rights across Congo. But the controversy surrounding his assassination is already becoming a major political liability for President Kabila and his government, which is already under pressure for seeking the withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers by the end of 2011.

Under mounting pressure from Chebeya’s family, Congolese civil society, and the international community, the Congolese government has accepted assistance from a team of Dutch doctors in the performance of the autopsy, scheduled to take place tomorrow on June 11. Why this turnaround, given the strong opposition to international participation in the investigation from senior government officials in Kinshasa? Now that it is obvious that Chebeya’s death was the result of a well-planned assassination, it appears the government is betting that the doctors will uncover little new information from the autopsy. Meanwhile, the government continues to refuse international involvement in the investigation. 

It’s crucial that the world keep up the pressure on the Congolese government for an international investigation. The key question is not whether this was an assassination; it clearly was. The key question is who committed the crime and for what reason? 

As Jason Stearns notes at Congo Siasa, these events are unfolding at a politically sensitive moment, with both the 50th anniversary of Congo’s independence and decisions about debt relief rapidly approaching. Kabila appears to be undertaking a full-court press to manage the controversy and was just in Bukavu visiting Chebeya’s extended family. But it is too soon to tell whether he will make the choice to ensure a rigorous and transparent investigation of Chebeya’s murder, or whether the steps taken thus far are just window dressing designed to avoid international involvement. Stay tuned.

 

Photo: Street in the Congolese capital of Kinshasa (Enough/Laura Heaton)

Why Nintendo?

The conflict minerals problem is a systemic one in consumer electronics. To date, no companies have actually taken the steps required to verify that their products are conflict-free. Some individual companies and industry associations are doing more than others. Our action last week targeting Intel was nuanced to show appreciation for their efforts to date, but to challenge them to do more by supporting legislation.

Nintendo, on the other hand, has been entirely unresponsive to NGO engagement efforts. They did not reply to letters sent by Enough and our coalition partners. They are not a member of the electronics industry corporate responsibility association that has been working on conflict minerals, or the trade associations that have engaged on U.S. legislation. Instead of engaging with activists, Nintendo has an auto-response email to our concerns:

“On behalf of Nintendo I appreciate the opportunity to respond and thank you for your patience. Nintendo does not purchase any metals as raw materials. As a remote purchaser that buys finished components made from many materials, Nintendo requires its suppliers to comply with its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Procurement Guidelines, which stipulate suppliers comply with applicable laws, have respect for human rights and conduct their business in an appropriate and fair manner.”

This response shirks responsibility for what transpires in Nintendo’s supply chain back to its suppliers. And without verification and enforcement mechanisms, the requirements for suppliers are inadequate and easily vulnerable to falsification.

We decided to focus on Nintendo in today’s email in order to contrast this lack of engagement with other companies who have taken some important steps forward on this issue. During the rest of this week we will adjust our message to different companies based upon their relative performance cleaning up their supply chains and engaging with governments, activists, and NGOs to help solve this problem.

A Step Forward on Conflict Minerals via Financial Reform

Tin ore in Congo - S.Lezhnev

UPDATE 5/22: The New York Times picked up the story today. Read it here.

UPDATE 5/21: With the passage of the financial regulatory bill, the conflict minerals amendment will also proceed to conference committee where the differences in the House and Senate versions of the legislation will be worked out. Stay tuned.

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The prospects of actually passing legislation to hold companies to account on conflict minerals increased dramatically this week, with the addition of Amendment 3997 to the financial reform bill that is advancing in the Senate. The amendment was introduced by Senator Sam Brownback and co-sponsored by a bipartisan coalition of nine senators.

Building off of the Congo Conflict Minerals Act (S.891), the amendment requires companies listed with the Securities and Exchange Commission to disclose if minerals in their products may have originated in Congo or a neighboring country. Moreover, it requires companies to disclose the measures they’ve taken to ensure such materials didn’t benefit armed groups.

This is a major victory, and a testament to the tenacious commitment of Senator Brownback and his colleagues, who persevered over a coalition of industry groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who circulated a letter opposed to the amendment. Enough and a coalition of activists and human rights organizations weighed in with our own letter to Banking Committee Chair Chris Dodd and ranking member Shelby. Special recognition goes out to Connecticut activists who used their leverage as constituents to help secure Dodd’s support. Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) commended his colleagues for accepting the amendment, saying that these steps to promote transparency “will help the United States and our allies more effectively deal with these complex problems, at the same time that they will also help American consumers and investors make more informed decisions.”

Curiously, the electronics industry did not come out with a public statement on the amendment, and we hope to see them do the right thing by supporting it moving forward.

This means the frontline battle on legislation will play out in the conference committee that reconciles this bill with the House financial reform bill passed earlier this year (which didn’t contain anything on conflict minerals). This also means that the legislation will be based on the Senate’s SEC disclosure model, rather than the import-based process that was the basis for the Conflict Minerals Trade Act (H.R. 4128).

In the coming weeks, we will need to fight tooth and nail to make sure we get language that effectively holds companies to account. We need legislation that actually creates transparency, has serious penalties for lying, and which would enable the naming and shaming of companies that source from conflict zones. Ultimately, we need a bill that paves the way for consumers to be able to choose be conflict free, because given that choice, we think consumers will side with helping to break the link between mineral resources and human rights abuses in eastern Congo.

 

Photo: Minerals dealer shows the difference between tin ore from a rebel-held mine and a non-conflict mine. (Grassroots Group/Sasha Lezhnev)

New Study Shows Severity of Sexual Violence in South Kivu, Congo

Last week the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam America published an in-depth report investigating sexual violence in eastern Congo. The report, based upon a rigorous analysis of the records at Panzi Hospital (a hospital in South Kivu that specializes in caring for survivors), adds welcome analytic heft to our understanding of the impact of sexual violence in this area.

Media reports have focused upon the dramatic increase in civilian rape that is among the reports main findings. This is a particularly tragic but unsurprising consequence of the Congo’s ongoing conflict, as the widespread use of rape during wartime often leads to what the report calls “a normalization of rape among the civilian population”—a phenomenon not uncommon in post-conflict settings.

It’s worth noting that the report provides only a limited view of the sexual violence problem. Because it is based on documentation from South Kivu’s Panzi Hospital, it is specific to that region and looks only at data from 2004 through 2008. During this period, violence in South Kivu waned and violence predominantly affected North Kivu. Given the spike in violence in South Kivu as a result of military operations last year, we could well see a corresponding rise in sexual violence in more recent data.

Alongside sensible policy recommendations, the report’s authors also suggest a number of compelling areas for future research, including a specific examination of sexual violence in mining areas:

“The coltan and gold mines of North and South Kivu have long been hotbeds of militia activity, child labor and sexual exploitation of the surrounding population. We speculate that local mining communities have been predisposed to rape as a weapon of war by virtue of their close proximity to the mines and the armed military groups operating in the surrounding areas. Little is known, however, about the relationship between sexual violence and the struggle to control these rich natural resources. Further research in these areas can shed light on the predatory behaviors of militias and promote strategies for the protection of women and girls in local mining communities.”

Photo: Fighting in eastern Congo. (AP)

A Compelling Proposal on Conflict Minerals

Gold miner in eastern Congo - S. Lezhnev

In early December, Enough participated in a small gathering of organizations working on the connection between conflict and natural resources in eastern Congo, convened by the Center on International Cooperation. The idea behind the workshop was to identify points of consensus particularly related to short to medium term efforts to combat the militarization of mining. Congo specialists Jason Stearns and Steven Hege recently published a proposal that encapsulates much of the thinking from the workshop, available here.

The concept note, “Independent Oversight for Mining in the Eastern Congo? A Proposal for a Third Party Monitoring & Enforcement Mechanism,” posits the need for greater independent oversight of mining and the minerals trade as an important means of supporting wider efforts to demand increased accountability both from companies involved in the trade, as well as the Congolese institutions that are responsible for its regulation.

Importantly, Stearns and Hege underscore the importance of making this independent monitoring team a joint effort between the Congolese government and the international community, and charging it with working together with the Congolese to establish a definition for the illegal trade in minerals. Moreover, they propose merging this mechanism with the burgeoning efforts to develop a map of Congo’s militarized mines, work pioneered by the International Peace Information Service and more recently assigned to U.S. government agencies in a law passed last year. They anticipate the mechanism would cost $3-5 million annually and be funded by international donors. The proposed mechanism would eventually facilitate the handover of its responsibilities to Congolese leadership, and is explicitly framed as one part of a wider effort to formalize the mineral trade.

Given the complexities of the mineral trade and the many powerful vested interests who continue to profit at the expense of Congo’s crisis, it can be tempting to say that it’s just too difficult to do something about this problem. This proposal powerfully and succinctly suggests otherwise. It deserves to be widely read and thoughtfully considered.

 

Jenn Altoff contributed to this post.

Photo: Man pans for gold in eastern Congo (Grassroots Reconciliation Group/Sasha Lezhnev)

U.S. Official Undercuts Sudan Policy, Misunderstands Elections

There’s been no shortage of high-level attention to Sudan as of late, from President Obama’s comments on YouTube yesterday, to strong words from U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, and comments by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the anniversary of the CPA. Whether you agree or disagree with their statements, they all clearly articulated the administration’s Sudan policy, emphasizing the perils and prospects that face the country during the coming year.

But the senior U.S. official who spoke to Reuters this week about Sudan’s upcoming elections not only fails to grasp the nuances of the administration’s Sudan policy; the official also seems to fundamentally misunderstand how elections work:

"Yes there are probably irregularities, yes, in all elections there are probably some," the official told Reuters in a telephone interview late on Monday.

"But in the big scheme of things ... there's probably a high probability that if 16 million people come out and vote, that ... will reflect a large proportion and fair proportion and credible proportion of the Sudanese voting population."

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said estimated numbers of false registrations ranged from between 300,000 to 1.5 million from a total of more than 16 million voters.

"It makes it very difficult to sway an election because the numbers are so great," the official added. "I don't see all these gross violations."

There is so much that is wrong with this assessment that it’s hard to know where to start. First, as Enough and nine other advocacy groups argued in a recent paper, conditions for free and fair elections in Sudan involve far more than some rough math about the number of registered voters. Conditions conducive to credible elections must include protections of the rights of assembly and ability of candidates from all parties to campaign, freedom of the media, the independence and effectiveness of the National Elections Commission, freedom of movement for international and domestic elections monitors, steps to prevent election violence, and urgently needed voter education efforts, to name just a few.

So how is Sudan shaping up in terms of these key components of electoral integrity? Although this anonymous official denies “gross violations” in Sudan, Human Rights Watch just warned that “violations of civil and political rights by Sudanese security forces throughout the country are seriously undermining prospects for free, fair, and credible elections in April 2010.” And today, former president Jimmy Carter—whose Carter Center has the only elections observation team currently on the ground in Sudan—takes to the Washington Post to warn: “The international community must do more to help ensure successful elections” in Sudan. He specifically cites weaknesses with the National Elections Commission and the “unacceptably repressive” national security act recently passed by the Sudanese government as red flags.

Secretary of State Clinton too, has made clear the steps that Sudan’s ruling party must take in advance of elections: “The NCP, therefore, must … suspend elements of the national security and public order laws that are incompatible with free and fair elections. There must be no efforts to restrict freedom of speech and assembly. And there must be no prohibitions on peaceful protests.”

Aside from the fact that a U.S. diplomat is using the cover of anonymity to color outside the lines of U.S. policy, what bothers me about these comments is their willful ignorance as to what can happen when elections go bad. In the past few years we’ve seen how U.S. support for fatally flawed elections in Kenya and Afghanistan have resulted in immense human suffering and deep blows to our strategic interests. Why does this official think that Sudan will be different?

 

Photo: Woman registers to vote in Juba, southern Sudan (Enough/Maggie Fick)

Silent Night

Bad things have a tendency to happen in faraway parts of the world during the holiday season, when policymakers head home and the 24hour news cycle momentarily slows down. Last year the LRA killed nearly a thousand people during the Christmas massacres following the botched Operation Lightning Thunder. At the same time on the other side of the continent, the military junta commanded by Moussa Dadis Camara took power in Guinea, precipitating the crisis that has pushed that country to the brink. In 2007, violence ripped through Kenya following elections that were held on December 27, with some 1,500 people killed. And back in 2006 there was the disastrous Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, which took place on Christmas Eve.

This is no coincidence. Rebels and politicians alike know that they can get away with a lot when no one is paying attention. This is why Enough sounded the alarm about new threats by the LRA in northeast Congo, and we hope that the reinforcements deployed by the UN to that region can help protect civilians. Wouldn’t it be nice to have a quiet holiday this year?  

On Cell Phones, Sexual Violence, and Straw Men

Morehouse professor Texas in Africa is skeptical about much Congo-related advocacy, particularly that which focuses on the role of conflict minerals in fueling the violence. Having conducted field research in the Kivus, especially about the role of Congolese civil society groups, she knows a lot about the region and regardless of our disagreements we welcome her perspective. But her recent post, which takes issue with claims that the minerals are directly causing sexual violence, is an egregious and misleading attack on a straw man.

Texas in Africa starts from the notion that Enough is promoting a “cell phones/minerals cause rape” thesis, an oversimplification and misrepresentation of the research and policy positions that Enough has developed in multiple strategy papers over the course of the past year. In our reporting we’ve been quite careful to argue that the relationship between the minerals trade and mass atrocities including sexual violence is, like most things in the Congo, complicated. Texas in Africa goes to great lengths to demonstrate her own understanding of these complexities: “There's a definite correlation between some of the violence and the fact that armed groups profit from the mineral trade. And we know beyond any doubt that armed groups terrorize populations who live near their respective mines.”

The strategy and reasoning behind Enough’s conflict minerals work is not that the minerals trade is the “primary cause” of conflict in the Kivus, or that if you could somehow get rid of the minerals that the conflict would magically cease. Rather, the international dimension of the minerals trade provides an entry point for efforts to address a multidimensional crisis. Because we are the ultimate consumers of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, we have an opportunity to channel our demand for these products in ways that can begin to reduce support to war criminals and their support networks. Moreover, continuing demand for conflict resources has severely undermined international investments in aid, elections, peacekeeping, and other assistance. Efforts to deal with the minerals trade is a necessary component of a wider peace strategy that will require, as my colleague John Prendergast has argued, “everything from grassroots development and reconciliation efforts all the way up to an effective diplomatic strategy and a peacekeeping force that is actually capable of protecting civilians.”

What are some of the direct connections between violence in eastern Congo and the minerals trade?

-    Recent military operations have been centered on mineral resources. The U.N. Experts report details how control of mining areas was the key objective for the Umoja Wetu and Kimia II military operations. ICG reports that Rwandan and CNDP troops were airlifted to Walikale shortly after the launch of Umoja Wetu, and the Experts report that these forces “had cleared several areas of civilian populations,” and “planted the seeds of their present control over the principal axes in mining-rich zones of the territory.”

-    Minerals supply chains are a key lifeline for the FDLR. Many of the key enablers of the FDLR identified by the U.N. Experts are deeply involved in the minerals trade. This includes a Bukavu-based comptoir who was using Western Union to send funds to diaspora leadership, Congolese army officials with a long history of collaborating with the FDLR for profit, and the very problematic role of neighboring countries including Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, as well as the continuing purchases of FDLR-sourced minerals by international traders.

By demanding unreasonable levels of proof to validate a misleading “cell phones cause rape” thesis, Texas in Africa either ignores or neglects the substantial research and analysis of militarized mining that does point to potential policy solutions. This ranges from IPIS’ interactive map, which shows armed groups controlling the majority of mining sites in the Kivus, the exhaustive investigations by the UN Group of Experts, emerging steps toward consensus on short-term steps to address the problem, and regional steps toward a certification scheme, to cite just a few.

Another highly problematic aspect of Texas in Africa’s argument is the call for a data-driven approach to sexual violence. She should know the enormous problems with collecting data on the incidence of rape in eastern Congo. The UN Experts report “a worrying trend that victims of attacks who are discovered to have reported the abuses have often been attacked again in retaliation.” Demanding even more data in such a context could exacerbate these deadly dynamics.

Are there arguments to be made against our approach? Sure, and we’re happy to engage in substantive debate with critical voices. Other anonymous bloggers have already done more to advance this debate, and we do our best to incorporate their contributions into our work.

Does violence happen elsewhere in the region? Of course it does. Are grievances around land rights and citizenship also a driver of conflict? There is no doubt about this. Do other resources like charcoal also find their way into the coffers of armed groups? Absolutely. Do these factors somehow negate the crucial role of the international minerals trade in financing the largest threats to the civilian population? I would say no.

Texas in Africa closes by suggesting that policymakers provide the Congolese people with “peace, public order, and a chance to make life better.” What are the principal obstacles to such worthwhile pursuits? Is the continuing lifeline afforded by the criminal networks trading FDLR-sourced tin ore and gold an obstacle to peace? Is the existence of a minerals-driven patronage network that extends all the way from Bisie mine up to the highest levels of the Congolese army a problem for public order and a hindrance for security sector reform? And is the opportunity cost of the militarized minerals sector, the revenues that should have gone to providing basic services such as health and education, an impediment to improving the lives of Congolese civilians on the ground?

 

Photo: Gold powder. (Grassroots Reconciliation Group/Sasha Lezhnev)

Refugees And Revolt In Northwestern Congo

Enough’s work in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is focused on the restive eastern provinces, where armed conflict has persisted for more than a decade and where the highest levels of mortality and atrocities have occurred. But given Congo’s sheer size and multiple political challenges, it should surprise no one to see tensions rising in other parts of the country. Precisely this seems to be unfolding in the northwest corner of Province Orientale, where what was initially described by U.N. sources as ethnic violence between the Lobala and Bamboma communities over fishing rights has evolved into an armed insurrection against the government.

Now UNHCR is reporting that some 77,500 refugees have crossed the Ubangui river into the neighboring Republic of Congo, where aid agencies are struggling to meet basic humanitarian needs like food and shelter. I can attest to the size of this challenge, as I visited Congolese refugees in this region while working for the International Rescue Committee in 2003. Much of the region is inaccessible by roads, and instead aid is delivered via motorboat to refugees spread along the banks of the river.

Details regarding the new rebellion remain sketchy and rumors are running rife. A UN helicopter in the region was fired on at the end of November, injuring five. Enough has confirmed the movement of large numbers of Congolese army forces from the eastern provinces for transfer to the Dongo area of Equateur in a bid to quell the revolt. Keep in mind that Equateur province strongly supported Jean-Pierre Bemba, the rebel-leader turned runner-up presidential candidate in Congo’s 2006 elections, who is currently awaiting trial by the International Criminal Court for war crimes committed by his forces in the neighboring Central African Republic.

 

Photo: Congolese displaced by fighting. (AP)